Zeedyk v. Stephens
| Decision Date | 11 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. H-13-0781 |
| Parties | PAUL JOSEPH ZEEDYK, (TDCJ-CID #1608279) Petitioner, v. WILLIAM STEPHENS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
The petitioner, Paul Joseph Zeedyk, seeks habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a 2009 state felony conviction for a third offense of driving while intoxicated. The respondent moved for summary judgment, (Docket Entry No. 11), with a copy of the state-court record. (Docket Entry No. 10). Zeedyk filed a response. (Docket Entry No. 12). Based on careful consideration of the pleadings, the motion and response, the record, and the applicable law, this court grants the respondent's motion and, by separate order, enters final judgment. The reasons are set out below.
A jury found Zeedyk guilty of the felony offense of felony driving while intoxicated, third offense. (Cause Number 09-03-02709-CR). The court found true three enhancement paragraphs alleging prior convictions, one for theft (Cause Number 526596), and two for burglary of a building (Cause Numbers 14,369 and 81-202-C). On October 16, 2009, the court sentenced Zeedyk to 30-year prison term. The Ninth Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the conviction on April 27, 2011. Zeedyk v. State, No. 09-09-00536-CR (Tex. App. - Beaumont 2011, pet. ref'd) (not designated forpublication). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused Zeedyk's petition for discretionary review on September 14, 2011. Zeedyk filed an application for state habeas corpus relief on May 11, 2012, which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied with written order, on the trial court's findings, without a hearing, on December 12, 2012. Ex parte Zeedyk, Application No. 29,845-03 at cover.
On March 14, 2013, this court received Zeedyk's federal petition. Zeedyk contends that his conviction is void for the following reasons:
(Docket Entry No. 1, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, pp. 7-8d).1
These claims are analyzed based on the applicable law and the record.
Zeedyk's petition is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Subsections 2254(d)(1) and (2) of AEDPA set out the standards of review for questions of fact, questions of law, and mixed questions of fact and law that result in an "adjudication on the merits." An adjudication on the merits "is a term of art that refers to whether a court's disposition of the case is substantive, as opposed to procedural." Miller v, Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 281 (5th Cir. 2000).
The AEDPA provides:
A state-court determination of questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact is reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and receives deference unless it "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000). A state-court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent if: (1) the state court's conclusion is "opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law" or (2) the "state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent" and arrives at an opposite result. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court unreasonably applies Supreme Court precedent if: (1) it unreasonably applies the correct legal rule to the facts of a particular case; or (2) it "unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Id. at 1495. A federal court considers whether the state court's application was "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 1495; Penry v. Johnson, 215 F.3d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 2000). The state court's resolution of fact questions is "presumed to be correct . . . and [receives] deference . . . unless it 'was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'" Hill, 210 F.3d at 485 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)).
While, "[a]s a general principle, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, relating to summary judgment, applies with equal force in the context of habeas corpus cases," Clark v.Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 831 (2000), the rule applies only to the extent that it does not conflict with the habeas rules. Section 2254(e)(1) - which mandates that findings of fact made by a state court are "presumed to be correct" - overrides the ordinary rule that, in a summary judgment proceeding, all disputed facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Unless the petitioner can "rebut[ ] the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence" as to the state court's findings of fact, these findings must be accepted as correct. Smith v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 2002).
Zeedyk is a pro se petitioner. Pro se habeas petitions are construed liberally and are not held to the same stringent and rigorous standards as pleadings filed by lawyers. See Martin v. Maxey, 98 F.3d 844, 847 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996); Guidroz v. Lynaugh, 852 F.2d 832, 834 (5th Cir. 1988); Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981). This court broadly interprets Zeedyk's state and federal habeas petitions. Bledsue v. Johnson, 188 F.3d 250, 255 (5th Cir. 1999).
Zeedyk asserts that the trial court's errors made the proceedings against him unfair. A federal court reviewing state-court evidentiary rulings on a petition for habeas corpus grants relief only if the state-court error is so egregious as to make the trial fundamentally unfair. Jernigan v. Collins, 980 F.2d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 978 (1993). "A state court's evidentiary ruling presents a cognizable habeas claim only if it runs afoul of a specific constitutional right or renders the trial fundamentally unfair." Cupit v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1163 (1995). The challenged evidence must be crucial, critical, or highly significant in the context of the entire case. Jernigan v. Collins, 980 F.2d at 298; Bridge v. Lynaugh,838 F.2d at 772; Thomas v. Lynaugh, 812 F.2d 225, 230 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 842 (1987). The test for whether a trial error makes a trial fundamentally unfair is whether there is a reasonable probability of a different verdict had the trial been properly conducted. See Guidroz v. Lynaugh, 852 F.2d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 1988); Rogers v. Lynaugh, 848 F.2d 606, 609 (5th Cir. 1988).
Zeedyk argues that the trial court abused its discretion because the evidence at trial did not prove that he was guilty of felony DWI. The State had the burden of proving the two prior misdemeanor DWI offenses to obtain a conviction for a felony DWI. The State offered two prior misdemeanor DWI Judgment Sheets bearing the name Paul Zeedyk. The State's expert witness testified that the thumbprints were "illegible." Zeedyk argued that the State's expert witness could not match the thumbprints from the two prior judgment sheets to the thumbprint she took from Zeedyk on the Monday before trial. Zeedyk contends that the State did not adequately prove the prior DWI convictions set out in the indictment.
The methods of proving prior convictions approved by Texas courts include: (1) testimony of a witness who personally knows the defendant and the fact of his prior conviction and identifies him; (2) the defendant's stipulation or judicial admission that he has been so convicted; (3) certified copies of the judgment, sentence, and record of the Texas Department of Corrections or a county jail, including fingerprints, with expert testimony identifying the fingerprints as the same as the defendant's prints; or (4) the factfinder's comparison of records of the prior convictions with photographs and a detailed physical description of the person convicted, with the appearance of the defendant in court....
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