Zeiders v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am.

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
• Writing for the Court: BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Docket Number: 2:24-cv-11197 (BRM) (JSA)
• Decision Date: 08 January 2026
• Citation: Zeiders v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., 2:24-cv-11197 (BRM) (JSA) (D. N.J. Jan 08, 2026)
• Parties: STACY ZEIDERS, CALVIN WESTLUND, MARIA LYDIA MARTINEZ, JAE YOUNG CHOI, AMANDA DeLONG, BRIAN CRAMER, and SCOTT WORTHINGTON, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., a New Jersey Corporation, d/b/a VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC., and VOLKSWAGEN AG, a German Corporation, Defendants.

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STACY ZEIDERS, CALVIN WESTLUND, MARIA LYDIA MARTINEZ, JAE YOUNG CHOI, AMANDA DeLONG, BRIAN CRAMER, and SCOTT WORTHINGTON, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., a New Jersey Corporation, d/b/a VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC., and VOLKSWAGEN AG, a German Corporation, Defendants.

No. 2:24-cv-11197 (BRM) (JSA)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

January 8, 2026

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before this Court is Defendant Volkswagen Group of America Inc.'s (“VW America”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Stacy Zeiders, Calvin Westlund, Maria Lydia Martienz, Jae Young Choi, Amanda DeLong, Brian Cramer, and Scott Worthington's Consolidated Class Action Complaint (“CAC”) (ECF No. 20) pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 29). Plaintiffs filed an Opposition (ECF No. 31) and VW America filed a reply (ECF No. 39). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Having reviewed and considered the parties' submissions filed in connection with the motion and having declined to hold oral argument in accordance with Rule 78(b), for the reasons set forth below and for good cause shown, VW America's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. Background

For the purpose of this motion, the Court accepts the factual allegations in the CAC as true and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court also considers any “document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Shaw v. Digit. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220 (1st Cir. 1996)).

A. Factual Background

This action arises out of an alleged defect in certain 2022 and 2023 Volkswagen Tiguan vehicles purchased or leased after November 2021 (“Class Vehicles”). (ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 12, 25, 36, 50, 61, 72-73, 82-83.) Plaintiffs bring this putative class action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated against VW America and Volkswagen AG (“VWAG”) (collectively, “Defendants”).^[1] (See generally id.)

Plaintiffs allege the Defendants defectively installed the piston ring assembly in the Class Vehicles' engines. (See id. ¶ 163.) The Class Vehicles employ “four reciprocating pistons to convert pressure into a rotation motion.” (Id. ¶ 109.) A four-step sequence is utilized to generate the rotating motion. (Id.) Relevant to this matter, “engine oil is used to lubricate the piston and cylinder wall as the piston moves up and down through the four-stroke sequence.” (Id. ¶ 110.)

Each reciprocating piston utilizes three compression rings, which if properly tensioned, “prevent[s] engine oil from entering the combustion chamber.” (Id. ¶ 111.) Absent properly tensioned compression rings, engine oil would enter the combustion chamber, which would result in decreased engine performance, damaged internal parts, and reduced engine oil. (Id. ¶ 115.)

Engine oil lubrication “reduce[s] wear on moving parts throughout the engine, improve[s] sealing, and cool[s] the engine by carrying heat away from the moving parts.” (Id. ¶ 110.) In contrast, a lack of lubrication would result in “premature wear of internal parts, inadequate performance, and/or catastrophic engine failure.” (Id.) A “smart oil monitor” gauges the amount of remaining engine oil and will illuminate a warning light on the dashboard if the engine oil in the vehicle needs to be refilled. (Id. ¶ 108.) The Class Vehicles' maintenance schedule advises the engine oil should be refilled either “every 10,000 miles or every year, whichever occurs first.” (Id.)

Between November 2021 and November 2022, Plaintiffs purchased their respective Class Vehicles. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 25, 36, 50, 61, 72-73, 82-83.) Prior to purchase, Plaintiffs researched the vehicle on the Volkswagen website, reviewed the available Volkswagen marketing and promotional materials at the dealership, reviewed the Monroney sticker on the vehicle, “and spoke with V[olkswagen] sales representatives.” (Id. ¶¶ 13, 26, 51, 62, 84; but see id. ¶ 37 (stating Martinez did not speak with a VW sales representative prior to purchase); id. ¶ 74 (stating Cramer only reviewed the Monroney sticker prior to purchase).) The Class Vehicles included a New Vehicle Limited Warranty. (See ECF No. 29-3.) The New Vehicle Limited Warranty “covers any repair to correct a defect in manufacturer's material or workmanship.” (See id. at 11.)

Following purchase, Plaintiffs were frequently required to refill the engine oil due to the defectively installed piston ring assembly (the “Oil Consumption Defect”). (ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 1420, 27-31, 42-47, 52-56, 63-70, 75-76, 85-89.) As a result of the Oil Consumption Defect, Plaintiffs have developed concerns regarding the reliability and safety of the Class Vehicles (Id. ¶¶ 22, 32, 48, 58, 68; but see id. ¶¶ 71-93 (failing to allege either Cramer or Worthington share such concerns)) and have suffered damages, “including, but not limited to, out-of-pocket losses associated with the Oil Consumption Defect, diminished value of [the] [Class] [V]ehicle, and other consequential damages” (Id. ¶¶ 23, 34, 49, 59, 69, 79, 92). Plaintiffs allege Defendants knew of and concealed the Oil Consumption Defect. (Id. ¶¶ 133, 243.)

B. Procedural History

On December 16, 2024, Zeiders and Westlund filed a class action complaint against VW America. (ECF No. 1.) Both Martinez and Worthington subsequently filed their own class action complaints under separate docket numbers. (See ECF No. 11-1 at 4.) On February 4, 2025, Zeiders, Westlund, Martinez, and Worthington filed a motion to consolidate the three actions (ECF No. 11), which the Court granted on February 11, 2025 (ECF No. 13).

On March 13, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the CAC against Defendants on behalf of all individuals who purchased or leased a Class Vehicle in the nation (the “Nationwide Class”) and in the states of Delaware (the “Delaware Subclass”), Pennsylvania (the “Pennsylvania Subclass”), Georgia (the “Georgia Subclass”), Maryland (the “Maryland Subclass”), New York (the “New York Subclass”), Illinois (the “Illinois Subclass”), and Minnesota (the “Minnesota Subclass”) (collectively, the “Statewide Subclasses”). (See generally ECF No. 20.)

The CAC alleges five causes of action on behalf of the Nationwide Class or, in the alternative, the Statewide Subclasses: breach of implied warranty of merchantability (Ninth Cause of Action) (id. ¶¶ 226-32); breach of express warranty (Tenth Cause of Action) (id. ¶¶ 233-41); fraudulent concealment (Eleventh Cause of Action) (id. ¶¶ 242-59); negligent misrepresentation (Twelfth Cause of Action) (id. ¶¶ 260-65); and unjust enrichment (Thirteenth Cause of Action) (id. ¶¶ 266-71).

The CAC also alleges eight causes of action on behalf of the Statewide Subclasses, respectively violation of: the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act (Count Eight), Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2511, et seq. (id. ¶¶ 223-25); the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Act (Count One), 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 201-1, et seq. (id. ¶¶ 174-85); the Georgia Fair Business Practice Act (Count Three), Ga. Code Ann., § 10-1-393, et seq. (id. ¶¶ 192-98); the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (Count Two), Md. Code Com. Law § 13-101, et seq. (id. ¶¶ 186-91); the New York Deceptive Trade Practices Act & False Advertising (Count Five), N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349; § 350 (id. ¶¶ 21114); the Illinois Consumer Fraud & Deceptive Business Practices Act (Count Six), 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 505/1, et seq., and the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Count Seven), 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 510/1, et seq. (id. ¶¶ 215-22); and the Minnesota Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act (Count Four), Minn. Stat. § 325F.68-70 (id. ¶¶ 199-10) (collectively, the “Consumer Fraud Act Claims”).

On May 23, 2025, pursuant to the Court's Judicial Preferences, VW America submitted a pre-motion letter requesting leave to file a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 25.) Plaintiffs filed a response on May 29, 2025. (ECF No. 27.) On June 3, 2025, the Court entered a text order granting VW America leave to file a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 28.)

On June 17, 2025, VW America filed the Motion to Dismiss the CAC pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 29.) Plaintiffs filed their Opposition on August 1, 2025 (ECF No. 31; see also ECF No. 24 (permitting Plaintiffs to file their opposition within forty-five days of the filing of the motion to dismiss)); and VW America filed its Reply on September 16, 2025 (ECF No. 39; see also ECF No. 35 (permitting VW to file its reply on or prior to September 16, 2025)).

II. Legal Standard

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

“When a motion under Rule 12 is based on more than one ground, the court should consider the 12(b)(1) challenge first because if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, all other defenses and objections become moot.” Dickerson v. Bank of Am., N.A., Civ. A. No. 12-3922, 2013 WL 1163483, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2013) (quoting In re Corestates Tr. Fee Litig., 837 F.Supp. 104, 105 (E.D. Pa. 1993)). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenging the Court's subject matter jurisdiction asserts the Court lacks “authority or competence to hear and decide the case before it.” Northlight Harbor, LLC v. United States, 561 F.Supp.2d 517, 520 (D.N.J. 2008) (citing Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 5B Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 (3d ed. 2004)). It requires a plaintiff to bear the burden of pleading that jurisdiction is appropriate. Id. at 521; see also Wright v N.J./Dep't of Educ., 115 F.Supp.3d 490, 495 (D.N.J. 2015)...