Zeiger v. Pennsylvania R. Co.

• Decision Date: 06 March 1907
• Citation: 151 F. 348
• Parties: ZEIGER v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

151 F. 348

ZEIGER v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.

United States Circuit Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

March 6, 1907

At Law. On demurrer to declaration.

Weil and Thorp, for plaintiff.

Patterson Sterrett & Acheson, for defendant.

EWING District Judge.

The plaintiff is a citizen and resident of the city of Zenta Kingdom of Hungary, and in this action seeks to recover damages by virtue of the provisions of the acts of 1851 and 1855 of this commonwealth, for the death of his son, George Zeiger, late a resident of Pittsburgh, Pa., which was occasioned by a collision while the said decedent was a passenger on a train of the defendant company en route from New York to Pittsburgh. The train in which the said George Zeiger was a passenger collided with another train of cars of the defendant company at or near Harrisburg, Pa., early on the morning of May 11, 1905, and in that collision the said George Zeiger was so badly injured that he died about 11 o'clock that morning in the Harrisburg Hospital where he had been taken. The said George Zeiger was unmarried, and the plaintiff is his sole living parent, and the only person entitled to recover under the acts aforesaid. The declaration also alleges that the decedent devoted a large part of his earnings to the support and maintenance of the plaintiff, and for years has been, and at the time of his death was, his sole support.

The defendant company has filed a demurrer and assigned in support thereof the following reasons: (1) That the plaintiff is and was at the time of the accident complained of a nonresident alien parent. (2) That plaintiff's son George Zeiger, was at the time of the accident complained of a resident of the state of Pennsylvania.

The case was argued on this demurrer, and the pivotal point is whether or not the plaintiff, being a nonresident alien, can maintain this action under the provisions of the statutes of this state above referred to and the decision thereon of the Supreme Court of this State in Deni v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 181 Pa. 525, 37 A. 558,

59 Am.St.Rep. 676, and Maiorano v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company (decided January 7, 1907) 216 Pa. 402, 65 A. 1077; the contention of the plaintiff being that, notwithstanding these decisions of the Supreme Court of this state, the courts of the United States are at liberty to determine the question for themselves, and are not concluded by those decisions. I have examined with great care the very extensive and excellent brief furnished by counsel for plaintiff, and feel constrained to hold that the decisions of the Supreme Court of this state upon the statutes aforesaid are binding and conclusive upon the courts of the United States. At common law, the plaintiff had no right of action, nor any one else, for the death of George Zeiger, and it is only by virtue of the purely local statutes aforesaid that any right of action is conferred. In construing those statutes the Supreme Court of this state in Deni v. Railroad Company, supra, after full deliberation and consideration has decided that:

'Our statute was not intended to confer upon nonresident aliens rights of action not conceded to them or to us by their own country, or to put burdens on our own citizens to be discharged for their benefit. It has not extraterritorial force, and the plaintiff is not within the purview of it. While it is possible that the language of the statute may admit of a construction which would include nonresident alien husbands, widows, children, and parents of the deceased, it is a construction so obviously opposed to the spirit and policy of the statute that we cannot adopt it. A nonresident defendant is not entitled to the benefit of our exemption laws, although the language of these laws may admit of a construction which would include him. It has been so held in a number of our cases. In this connection the language of Mr. Justice Sterritt, in Collum's Appeal, 2 Penny. (Pa.) 130, is pertinent. In delivering the opinion of the court, he said: 'While nonresident debtors may perhaps be within the letter of the act we do not think they are within its spirit. As was said by Mr. Justice Woodward in Yelverton v. Burton, 2 Casey (Pa.) 351, and afterwards quoted approvingly by the present Chief Justice in McCarthy's Appeal, 18 P.F. Smith, 217, we do not legislate for men beyond our jurisdiction.' In one respect at least, our act of 1885, resembles our exemption laws. It is intended, primarily, for the benefit of the family of which the deceased was a member. The act of 1851, gave a right of action to the personal representatives of the deceased. Mr. Justice Green referred to this act in Books v. Borough of Danville, 95 Pa. 158, and said: 'The effect of this act was to make the damages recoverable in such actions general assets of the deceased in the hands of the personal representatives, and, of course, they were available to creditors in the first instance. It follows that in all cases of insolvent estates of such deceased persons, where the victim of the injury was the husband and father, the widow and children derived little or no advantage from the action, although they were the persons most directly and severely injured.' But this objection to the act of 1851 was overcome by the act of 1855, which designated the persons to receive the sum recovered, and directed that they should take it in the proportion they would take the personal estate of the deceased, in case of intestacy, 'and that without liability to creditors.' In Bacon v. Horne, 123 Pa. 452, 16 A. 794, 2 L.R.A. 355, it was held that the act of May 3, 1855 (P.D. 415), relating to the recording of an assignment made for the benefit of creditors by a resident of another state, which assignment included property of the assignor in this state, was for the protection of our own citizens, and that a creditor of the assignor who was a resident of the state in which the assignment was made could derive no benefit or protection from the act, although he was without notice of the assignment. There is nothing on the face of the act which limits the protection afforded by it to our own citizens. It is referred to as another illustration of the general rule that we do not legislate for persons beyond our jurisdiction. We have a number of statutes which expressly confer rights upon aliens, but none which confers them by implication or inference. When the Legislature intends to concede to nonresident aliens the rights which our own citizens have under and by virtue of the act of April 26, 1855 (P.L. 309), it will say so.'

This case was decided May 27, 1897, and has been the settled law of this state ever since and is reaffirmed in the case of Maiorano v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., supra. It will be noted that in the opinion of the court the decision is stated to be in line with the settled policy of this state, respecting legislation as affecting nonresident aliens, so that, since the first of the cases along that line cited in the opinion to the present time, it may be taken as settled that in the absence of some express provision to the contrary, or the character of the legislation be such as to absolutely demand it, our statutes are to be construed as providing for and affecting only those in the territorial jurisdiction of the state.

The Thirty-fourth section of the judiciary act of 1789 declares that:

'The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in courts of the United States, in cases where they apply. ' Act Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, 1 Stat. 92.

And this has been uniformly interpreted by the courts of the United States to apply to the positive statutes of the state and the construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals.

In Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 2 Sup.Ct. 15, 27 L.Ed. 359, Mr. Justice Bradley, in delivering the opinion says:

'The federal courts have an independent jurisdiction in the administration of state laws, co-ordinate with, and not subordinate to, that of the state courts, and are bound to exercise their own judgment as to the meaning and effect of those laws.

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