Zeigler v. Fisher-Price, Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 January 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. C01-3089-PAZ.,C01-3089-PAZ. |
| Parties | Theresa M. ZEIGLER, Plaintiff, v. FISHER-PRICE, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Stephen F. Avery, Cornwall, Avery, Bjornstad, Scott, Spencer, IA, for plaintiff.
Cheryl Possenti, Goldberg, Segalla, LLP, Buffalo, NY, Kevin M. Reynolds, Whitfield & Eddy, PLC, Des Moines, IA, for defendant.
ORDER ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
This case arises out of a house fire that occurred on June 1, 2001, in Estherville, Iowa. The plaintiff Theresa Zeigler ("Zeigler") alleges the fire was caused by a defect in a toy vehicle sold by the defendant Fisher-Price, Inc. ("Fisher-Price"). Fisher-Price denies the allegation.
The dispute was tried to a jury beginning on July 7, 2003. At the close of Zeigler's case, Fisher-Price moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). The court reserved ruling on the motion, and directed Fisher-price to proceed with its case. At the close of the evidence, Fisher-Price renewed its motion, and the court again reserved ruling and submitted the case to the jury. On July 10, 2003, the jury returned a verdict finding for Zeigler on two theories of recovery (design defect and breach of implied warranty of merchantability), and for Fisher-Price on a third theory of recovery (negligent failure to warn). The jury awarded the plaintiff $195,217.95 in actual damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages. Judgment in these amounts was entered on July 11, 2003.
On July 24, 2003, Fisher-Price timely renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b), and also filed a motion for new trial. Fisher-Price requested oral argument on both motions. (Doc. Nos. 138 & 136, respectively) Zeigler resisted the motions on August 1, 2003. (Doc. Nos. 140 & 139, respectively) On August 7, 2003, Fisher-Price filed a reply to Zeigler's resistance to the motion for new trial (Doc. No. 141), and on August 11, 2003, Fisher-Price filed an additional reply on one issue raised in its motion for new trial (Doc. No. 142).
These motions are now fully submitted. Because the issues presented in the post-trial motions have been well briefed, and the court does not believe oral argument would be of assistance to the court, the requests for oral argument are denied. The court now is prepared to address the issues raised by Fisher-Price in its motions.1
Before 1994, "Power Wheels" toy vehicles were manufactured and sold by Kransco, Inc. In 1994, Mattel, Inc., the parent corporation of Fisher-Price, purchased the Power Wheels product line from Kransco. After the purchase, Fisher-Price began selling Power Wheels toy vehicles, and since then, the product line has accounted for a large part of Fisher-Price's revenues and profits.
In 1997, the grandparents of Madisen Zeigler, the plaintiff Zeigler's young daughter, gave Madisen a "Power Wheels Barbie Sun Jammer Jeep" for Christmas. At the trial of this case, Zeigler testified that shortly after Christmas, she mailed a warranty card for the toy vehicle to Fisher-Price.
In October 1998, after negotiations with the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC"), Fisher-Price instituted a recall of Power Wheels toy vehicles, in part because of allegations that the toys overheated and caused fires. Fisher-Price's witnesses testified at trial that Fisher-Price provided notice of the recall to everyone known to have purchased Power Wheels toy vehicles from Fisher-Price, including everyone from whom the company had received a warranty card. Fisher-Price also used a number of other avenues to notify the public of the recall, including advertising and the posting of notices at toy stores and pediatricians' offices. Zeigler testified she did not learn of the recall until after June 1, 2001, when her house and garage in Estherville, Iowa, were destroyed by fire.
At the time of the fire, Madisen's toy vehicle was parked in the garage attached to Zeigler's house. Zeigler claims the toy vehicle caused the fire. At trial, she proceeded on three theories of recovery: design defect, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and negligent failure to warn. Fisher Price offered evidence to prove both that the cause of the fire could not be determined, and that Madisen's Power Wheels toy vehicle could not have caused the fire.
The jury found for Fisher-Price on Zeigler's failure to warn claim, and for Zeigler on her design defect and breach of warranty claims. The jury awarded Zeigler actual damages of $195,217.95, and punitive damages on her design defect claim of $1,000,000.
The standards for a motion for judgment as a matter of law recently were summarized by the Chief Judge of this district, the Honorable Mark W. Bennett, in Knutson v. Ag Processing, Inc., 273 F.Supp.2d 961 (N.D.Iowa 2003), as follows:
The standards for a motion for judgment as a matter of law are outlined in Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In pertinent part, Rule 50 provides:
(a) Judgment as a Matter of Law.
(1) If during the trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue.
(2) Motions for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before the submission of the case to the jury. Such a motion shall specify the judgment sought and the law and the facts on which the moving party is entitled to the judgment.
(b) Renewing Motion for Judgment After Trial; Alternative Motion for New Trial.
If, for any reason, the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made at the close of all the evidence, the court is considered to have submitted the action to jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. The movant may renew its request for judgment as a matter of law by filing a motion no later than 10 days after entry of judgment — and may alternatively request a new trial or join a motion for a new trial under Rule 59. In ruling on a renewed motion, the court may:
(1) if a verdict was returned:
(A) allow the judgment to stand,
(B) order a new trial, or
(C) direct entry of judgment as a matter of law; or
(2) if no verdict was returned;
(A) order a new trial, or
(B) direct entry of judgment as a matter of law.
"Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only when all of the evidence points one way and is susceptible of no reasonable inference sustaining the position of the nonmoving party." Manus v. American Airlines, Inc., 314 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir.2003) (). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated the standards to be applied by the district court — as well as the appellate court — in determining a motion for judgment as a matter of law:
When the motion seeks judgment on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, the question is a legal one. Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1220 (8th Cir.1997); Jarvis v. Sauer Sundstrand Co., 116 F.3d 321, 324 (8th Cir.1997). A jury verdict must be affirmed "`unless, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have not found for that party.'" Stockmen's Livestock Mkt., Inc. [v. Norwest Bank of Sioux City], 135 F.3d 1236, 1240-41 (8th Cir.1998) (quoting Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 53 F.3d 899, 904 (8th Cir.1995)).
Cross v. Cleaver, 142 F.3d 1059, 1066 (8th Cir.1998); accord Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) () (citations omitted). Thus, this standard requires the court to:
"[C]onsider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, assume that the jury resolved all conflicts of evidence in favor of that party, assume as true all facts which the prevailing party's evidence tended to prove, give the prevailing party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the facts, and deny the motion, if in light of the foregoing, reasonable jurors could differ as to the conclusion that could be drawn from the evidence."
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...30 Likewise, transcripts of official briefings may also fall into the public records category. 31 28 Zeigler v. Fisher-Price, Inc. , 302 F.Supp.2d 999 (N.D. Iowa 2004). A Consumer Product Safety Commission press release announcing a toy vehicle’s voluntary recall was not hearsay in a produc......