Zelasko v. Charter Twp. of Bloomfield
| Docket Number | 359002 |
| Decision Date | 25 May 2023 |
| Parties | RICHARD ZELASKO, TINA PAUL, ERIN MCBRIEN, CHRIS BERESFORD, DAVE LEONARD, JOHN KENNEDY, ANNE KENNEDY, TIMOTHY GALLAGHER, CLYDE HERRING, JOHN NIKOLAS, PATRICK DOHERTY, MARY JANE DOHERTY, JOAN BAER, ROBERT TOMLINSON, CAROLYN WHITEMAN, DOUGLAS HILL, and ALLISON KRIEG-HILL, also known as ALLISON KRIEG, also known as ALLISON HILL, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF BLOOMFIELD and BLOOMFIELD TOWNSHIP BOARD OF TRUSTEES, Defendants-Appellees, and DETROIT MEETING ROOMS, INC/SHERMAN PROGRAM, INC, Intervening Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Oakland Circuit Court LC No. 2021-186430-CZ
Before: JANSEN, P.J., and SERVITTO and GADOLA, JJ.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court's order dismissing their complaint under MCR 2.116(I)(1). We affirm.
This appeal arises from a zoning dispute concerning a 9.84-acre parcel in Bloomfield Township owned by intervening defendant, Detroit Meeting Rooms, Inc./Sherman Program, Inc. (DMR).[1] Defendants are the Charter Township of Bloomfield and the Bloomfield Township Board of Trustees (the Township Board). In 2021, the Township Board approved a site plan and special land-use proposal for the operation of a private school and a place of worship on the parcel. Plaintiffs are 17 residents of Bloomfield Township who own property near the parcel and oppose the Township's action.
The parcel is zoned R-2, one-family residential. In 2013, DMR sought site-plan approval to operate a private school in an existing vacant building on the property. Public, private, and parochial schools are permitted uses in the R-2 zoning district. Because the Township zoning ordinance required a minimum site size of 10 acres for schools, however, DMR requested a dimensional variance allowing a .16-acre deviation from this requirement. The Township granted the variance in 2013, and Sterling Academy South opened in 2014.
In 2017, DMR sought approval to build a place of worship on the site. Places of worship are permitted uses in the R-2 zoning district, but require special land-use approval by the Township Board. A site plan and special land-use proposal submitted by DMR were considered by the Township's Planning Department and the Design Review Board, which both recommended that the matter be referred to the Planning Commission. At a public meeting on November 6, 2017, several individuals, including plaintiff Richard Zelasko, opposed the proposed special land-use and site plan. The Planning Commission tabled the matter to allow review by the Township Attorney. The Township Attorney thereafter issued an opinion addressing concerns raised by the Planning Commission and noting that DMR again would be required to seek a dimensional variance. In 2018, DMR held three meetings with surrounding neighborhood associations and modified its site plan to address concerns raised by neighboring homeowners.
On February 28, 2019, DMR applied to the Township's Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) for a dimensional variance of 3.22 acres and requested an interpretation of the zoning ordinance regarding whether land used for a school-related church facility counted toward the minimum acreage requirement for the school. At a meeting of the ZBA on June 11, 2019, DMR requested that the ZBA allow the school to occupy 6.78 acres and the proposed church to occupy the remainder of the parcel. A number of persons addressed the ZBA, including five plaintiffs in this case who spoke in opposition to the proposal. The Township Attorney addressed the ZBA, referring to the impact of the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 USC 2000cc et seq. The ZBA approved a motion "to allow the existing school site on 6.78 acres of the site [to] accommodate a proposed worship facility that will occupy 3.22 acres[2]of the site . . . ."
Plaintiff Richard Zelasko appealed the ZBA's decision to the circuit court, asserting that the ZBA failed to consider the proper standards for granting a dimensional variance, improperly allowed RLUIPA to override the zoning ordinance, and failed to apply RLUIPA properly. Zelasko also asserted that the decision of the ZBA was not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record, the need for the variance was self-created, the ZBA failed to consider the possibility of a lesser variance, and the ZBA did not discuss the required ordinance standards. The circuit court dismissed Zelasko's appeal in December 2019. Relying on this Court's decision in Olsen v Chikaming Twp, 325 Mich.App. 170; 924 N.W.2d 889 (2018), lv den sub nom Olsen v Jude & Reed, LLC, 503 Mich. 1018 (2019), overruled in part by Saugatuck Dunes Coastal Alliance v Saugatuck Twp, 509 Mich. 561; 983 N.W.2d 798 (2022), the circuit court found that Zelasko had failed to establish that he was an aggrieved party under MCL 125.3605 and therefore could not invoke the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit court to review the ZBA's decision. There is no indication that Zelasko sought to appeal the circuit court's decision to this Court.
Review of the site plan and special land use was placed on the agenda for the Township Board's November 9, 2020 meeting. Plaintiffs Zelasko and Tina Paul filed an ex parte motion in the circuit court, which entered a temporary restraining order enjoining the Township Board from considering those items at that meeting and directing the Board to reschedule consideration of the site plan and special land use, provide reasonable notice under the Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261 et seq., and "ensure that the public can make comments contemporaneously with the live meeting." The circuit court ordered consideration of the site plan and special land use at the Township Board's January 25, 2021 meeting, and the circuit court action thereafter was dismissed upon stipulation of the parties. The circuit court's order included provisions governing the conduct of the meeting via video conferencing technology, allowing DMR to present its request via audio, granting each person attending the meeting three minutes to comment via audio, and allowing DMR to rebut the public comments. The order also allowed persons who lacked the ability to comment via audio to submit comments via e-mail, to be read at the meeting. At the Township Board meeting on January 25, 2021, 35 persons commented on the site plan and special land use via audio, and 80 comments were submitted via e-mail or letter before the meeting. After receiving the comments, the Township Board approved the site plan and special land use.
Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit against the Township and the Township Board in the circuit court on February 16, 2021, seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and mandamus; plaintiffs filed an amended complaint April 1, 2021. Plaintiffs' amended complaint details defendants' actions in considering and ultimately granting DMR's special use request and approving DMR's site plan, and details the alleged damage to plaintiffs as a result of the Board's approval of DMR's site plan and special use request. The amended complaint also alleged that: (1) approval of the dimensional variance, site plan, and special land use violated various sections of the Township's zoning ordinance; (2) the Township improperly considered RLUIPA and the threat of a lawsuit by DMR when approving the site plan and special land use; and (3) the Township violated plaintiffs' due process rights.
The circuit court granted DMR's motion to intervene in the proceedings, and defendants moved for summary disposition of plaintiffs' amended complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(4). Defendants contended that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute because a challenge to a zoning decision of a township board must be by appeal to the circuit court under MCR 7.122, and because plaintiffs were not aggrieved parties capable of invoking the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction. After a hearing, the circuit court granted defendants summary disposition, dismissing plaintiffs' complaint under MCR 2.116(I)(1). The circuit court found that plaintiffs had failed to timely appeal the Board's decision to the circuit court, that plaintiffs were not aggrieved parties with the ability to invoke the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction, and that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate entitlement to the declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief sought. The circuit court also determined that plaintiffs' due process claims were without merit, and that plaintiffs' claim that the Township Board's decision violated its ordinances was not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiffs now appeal.
Plaintiffs contend that they were denied procedural due process because the circuit court granted defendants summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(1) without notifying plaintiffs in advance that the court was considering dismissing the amended complaint under that court rule. We disagree that plaintiffs were denied procedural due process.
We review de novo the circuit court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(1). AK Steel Holding Corp v Dep't of Treasury, 314 Mich.App. 453, 462; 887 N.W.2d 209 (2016). Whether a party has been afforded due process is a constitutional question that we also review de novo. Elba Twp v Gratiot Co Drain Comm'r, 493 Mich. 265, 277-278; 831 N.W.2d 204 (2013).
In this case, plaintiffs' amended complaint sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and mandamus alleging that the Township Board unlawfully granted DMR's special land use request and approved DMR's site plan. Defendants moved for summary disposition of plaintiffs' amended complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(4), asserting that ...
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