Zendejas v. Redman

• Decision Date: 25 September 2018
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 15-81229-CIV-MARRA
• Citation: 334 F.Supp.3d 1249
• Parties: Alejandro ZENDEJAS, Plaintiff, v. Eugenie H. REDMAN, and Colin J. Syquia, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

334 F.Supp.3d 1249

Alejandro ZENDEJAS, Plaintiff,

v.Eugenie H. REDMAN, and Colin J. Syquia, Defendants.

CASE NO. 15-81229-CIV-MARRA

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

Signed September 25, 2018

Avery Spencer Chapman, Chapman Law Group PLC, 12008 Southshore Boulevard, Suite 107, Wellington, FL, 33414, Donna Greenspan Solomon, Solomon Appeals, Mediation & Arbitration, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, T. Randolph Catanese, David Yuji Yoshida, Pro Hac Vice, Catanese & Wells, 31255 Cedar Valley Drive, Suite 21, Westlake Village, CA, 91362, for Plaintiff Zendejas.

John Robert Hart, Sarah Cortvriend, and Dean Angelo Morande, Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A., P.O. Box 150, West Palm Beach, FL, 33402, for Defendant Redman.

Patricia Anne Leonard,Colleen Lynn Smeryage, Shutts & Bowen LLP, 525 Okeechobee Boulevard, Suite 1100, West Palm Beach, FL, 33401, for Defendant Syquia.

ORDER

KENNETH A. MARRA, United States District Judge

This action arises out of Plaintiff Alejandro Zendejas's purchase of a horse named Vorst from Defendant Eugenie H. Redman. Following a jury trial, the jury unanimously found in favor of Defendants Redman and Colin J. Syquia on all counts. On August 18, 2017, judgment was entered in Defendants' favor and against Plaintiff. (DE 257.) Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and in the Alternative Motion for a New Trial (DE 270). Defendants Eugenie H. Redman and Colin J. Syquia both filed responses (DE 268 & 302), and Plaintiff filed a reply (DE 307). Also pending before the Court are Defendants Redman's and Syquia's respective Motions for Entitlement to Attorney's Fees and Costs ("Motions for Fee Entitlement") (DE 263 & 264). Plaintiff filed responses to the Motions for Fee Entitlement (DE 67 & 268), and Defendants filed replies (DE 277 & 281). The Court has considered the arguments of counsel and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons stated below, the Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and in the Alternative Motion for a New Trial is denied, and the Motions for Fee Entitlement are granted.

I. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to judgment in his favor on certain claims and affirmative defenses under Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The standard for granting a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) is precisely the same as the standard for granting the pre-submission motion under 50(a). Chaney v. City of Orlando , 483 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th Cir. 2007). The standard of review for a district court to grant the motion is whether, "when the facts and inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party, they ‘point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict.’ " United States v. Vahlco Corp. , 720 F.2d 885, 889 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Boeing Co. v. Shipman , 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969) ).¹ A court must "affirm the jury verdict unless there is no legal basis upon which the jury could have found for [the plaintiff]." Telecom Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Rolm Co. , 388 F.3d 820, 830 (11th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Counts XI and XII of the First Amended Complaint, which allege claims for violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq. ("FDUTPA"), based upon his argument that he established at trial that the bill of sale for the horse violated various provisions of Florida's Administrative Code. Under the Code, only "[a] violation of any provision of Chapter 5H-26, F.A.C., resulting in actual damages to a person , shall be considered an unfair and deceptive trade practice pursuant to Chapter 501, Part II, F.S." Fla. Admin. Code R. 5H-26.003 (emphasis added). Here, the jury found that Plaintiff did not suffer actual damages as a result of the violations. (DE 254.) Hence, the jury's finding that the bill of sale violated Florida's Administrative Code does not mean that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the FDUTPA claims.

Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that the jury's finding that Plaintiff did not suffer damages is speculative and unreasonable because Plaintiff's expert opined that the horse was worth only $30,000 on the date of the transaction but Plaintiff paid $250,000. However, contrary to Plaintiff's suggestion otherwise, there was competing evidence presented to the jury that the horse was worth $250,000 (which was the purchase price) on the date of sale. (DE 290, Leone Test., Trial Tr., vol. 4 124: 2-4.) The jury was free to reject Plaintiff's expert's opinion in favor of Peter Leone, Defendants' expert, who opined that the horse was worth $250,000 on the date of purchase. Thus, there was sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable juror to conclude that Plaintiff suffered no damages and that therefore Plaintiff was not entitled to a jury verdict on the FDUTPA claims in Counts XI and XII of the First Amended Complaint.

Next, Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to judgment in his favor because Syquia provided medical information about the horse but Defendants allegedly did not accurately disclose all information responsive to the inquiry, in violation of FAC Rule 5H-26.003(12). Plaintiff contends that the jury's finding to the contrary did not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis.

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the horse's back and gluteal soreness and receipt of pain medicine should have been disclosed because that information would have been responsive to the questions that Dr. Gomez asked Syquia regarding any "history of recurring lameness" and/or "any other pertinent medical history." Plaintiff posits that when Syquia responded "no" to the questions whether the horse had a "history of recurring lameness" or "any other pertinent medical history," Defendants violated Rule 5H-26.003(12) by not giving more information. Plaintiff emphasizes that Redman admitted that she failed to disclose certain insurance policy medical exclusions and that Dr. Ted Vlahos testimony's indicates that administration of the drug Bute to the horse demonstrates the horse's lameness.

However, there was also testimony presented at trial, including the testimony of Redman and Syquia, from which a jury could have reasonably concluded that the horse's soreness and the associated medicine were not sufficient to constitute "recurring lameness" or "medical history." (DE 288, Redman Test., Trial Tr., vol. 2 117:4-5 ("[The horse] did not have any ongoing serious problems. He had minor aches and pains."); id. 27: 7-9 ("Any horse that's doing that type of jumping is going to have some [gluteal] muscle soreness."); id. 23:7-13 ("I use these [chiropractic, acupuncture and laser therapies for the horse] as preventive medicine, because I know that when the animal is competing at a high level physically, that they have muscle soreness, or if they pull a -- they sprain something, or the gluteal muscles hurt or whatever. So if you catch these things before they become really very painful, then you prevent more serious injuries that take longer to heal."); id. 37:13-17 ("[H]orses and human athletes, whenever they're performing at a high level, soreness occurs, or strain occurs, and it's temporary, it gets treated, it doesn't cause a problem, and then next year he doesn't have it ..."); id. 39: 17-19 ("And the sore back was not an ongoing thing. It came up here and there, but it did not -- was not anything that presented itself every single time."); id. 100:3-6 ("The vets told me it wasn't that important and would not affect the horse in the long-term. This was a temporary situation that was easily taken care of with new shoes and packing."); DE 289, Syquia Test., Trial Tr., vol. 3 249:22-24 ("After certain competitions, after many days in a row, as is customary in our industry, I gave the horse one Bute tablet after competition."); id. 84:21-25 ("[A]t times after competition, after maybe the second day, it was customary that all my horses would get one Bute tablet in their feed after large competitions just as a nice way to go to sleep, yeah, after a hard week's of competition, like if you went to the gym and did a hard workout ...."); id. 14:10-11 ("I never found Vorst to have a sore back that was a concern to me."). It was within the province of the jury to credit the testimony of Redman and Syquia regarding the horse's soreness and the use of medication over the competing evidence.

Lastly, the Court notes that because the jury did not find for Plaintiff on any of the claims, the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence (or alleged lack thereof) supporting Defendants' affirmative defenses is moot. For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the evidence does not point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of Plaintiff that reasonable jurors could not have arrived at a verdict again him, and therefore Plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

B. Motion for New Trial

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to a new trial under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the jury verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence. The law is clear that a district court may grant a motion for a new trial only if the jury verdict is contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Ard v. Sw. Forest Indus. , 849 F.2d 517, 520 (11th Cir. 1988). "This rule does not, however, grant a license to the trial judge merely to substitute his judgment for that of the jury on questions of fact. Consequently, when considering a motion for new trial, the trial judge may weigh the evidence, but it is proper to grant the motion only if the verdict is against the great, not just the greater, weight of the evidence." Id.

Plaintiff argues (in a summary fashion) that the jury's...