Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare System, Ltd.

Decision Date24 May 1999
Docket NumberNo. 98-50063,98-50063
Parties9 A.D. Cases 609 Tom ZENOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EL PASO HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, LIMITED, doing business as Columbia Medical Center-East; Columbia Medical Center-East, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Malcolm B. McGregor, David Luis Kern, Peticolas and Shapleigh, El Paso, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Joseph L. Hood, Jr., Scott, Hulse, Marshall, Feville, Finger & Thurmond, El Paso, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before GARWOOD, BARKSDALE and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-appellant Tom Zenor (Zenor) appeals the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of his former employer, Vista Hills Medical Center now defendant-appellee El Paso Healthcare Ltd., d/b/a/ Columbia Medical Center-East (Columbia). We affirm.

Facts and Proceedings Below

In 1991, Columbia hired Zenor to work as a pharmacist in the pharmacy at its Columbia Medical Center-East hospital. When Zenor began his employment, he received an employment manual expressing the at-will nature of his employment and disclaiming any contractual obligations between the employer and employee. Zenor also received a copy of Vista Hill's then-existing drug and alcohol policy. In 1993, Zenor received a copy of Columbia's Drug-Free/Alcohol-Free Workplace Policy (the Policy), which was in effect at all times relevant to this case.

In 1993, Zenor became addicted to cocaine. Between 1993 and 1995, Zenor injected himself with cocaine as many as four to five times a week. He also smoked marijuana on three or four occasions and more frequently used tranquilizers to offset the cocaine's effects. Despite his drug use, Zenor remained a generally adequate employee and usually received favorable employment evaluations. However, his evaluation for the year ended July 8, 1994, discussed with Zenor in October 1994, was not favorable, his performance was rated "below average," and he was placed in a probationary status for two months with the admonishment that discharge was possible if insufficient improvement were noted. Zenor successfully completed the probationary status. The record does not show any subsequent annual evaluation. Zenor testified he never used drugs at work, nor came to work under the influence of drugs. Columbia was unaware of Zenor's addiction until August 15, 1995.

Zenor had been working the night shift at the pharmacy. When Zenor left work on August 15, 1995, at approximately 8:30 a.m., he injected himself with cocaine. As Zenor prepared to return to work that night, he became dizzy and had difficulty walking. Suspecting that he was still impaired from the morning's cocaine injection, Zenor called the pharmacy director, Joe Quintana (Quintana), and stated that he could not report to work because he was under the influence of cocaine. During the conversation, Quintana asked whether Zenor would take advantage of Columbia's Employee Assistance Program, "ACCESS." Zenor replied that he would. Quintana then stated that he was on vacation, and instructed Zenor to contact Quintana's supervisor, Paschall Ike (Ike).

Zenor spoke to Ike, who was also on vacation and told Zenor to call his (Zenor's) own doctor. Zenor then called his personal physician, who arranged for Zenor to receive emergency treatment that evening. Zenor stayed overnight at R.E. Thomason General Hospital. The next morning, Zenor was transferred to the El Paso Alcohol and Drug Abuse Service Detox Center, where he remained hospitalized for nine days.

On August 23, while still at the Detox Center, Zenor became concerned about losing his job. Zenor and one of his Detox Center counselors, Pete McMillian (McMillian), contacted Yolanda Mendoza (Mendoza), Columbia's Human Resources Director. This was the first time Zenor had contacted Columbia since his conversation with Ike eight days earlier. Nobody at Columbia knew where Zenor had been since the night of August 15.

Zenor told Mendoza that he wished to enter a rehabilitation program and asked her whether his job would be secure until he returned. Although the evidence is disputed, there is evidence that Mendoza assured Zenor that his job would be secure until he completed the program. Mendoza then told McMillan that Zenor was eligible for a twelve-week leave of absence under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et. seq. Later that afternoon, McMillian retrieved from Mendoza the paperwork necessary for Zenor to take FMLA leave. Zenor completed the paperwork. The next day, August 24, Zenor checked into an independent residential rehabilitation facility, Landmark Adult Intensive Residential Services Center (Landmark). Landmark was not owned or operated by Columbia and was not part of its ACCESS program.

After consulting with Columbia's lawyers, Mendoza and Quintana decided to terminate Zenor's employment. On September 20, 1995, Mendoza, Quintana, and ACCESS director Joe Provencio had a meeting with Zenor, his Landmark counselor, and Landmark's Director of Adult Treatment Services Dorrance Guy (Guy). Zenor was told that he would remain an employee of Columbia until his medical leave expired, and then he would be terminated.

Zenor protested that Columbia could not fire him because the Policy stated that employees who completed rehabilitation would be returned to work. Zenor also argued that he had been told if he "self-reported" his addiction he would not be fired. Mendoza explained that Columbia was concerned because pharmaceutical cocaine would be readily available to Zenor in the pharmacy, and therefore Columbia would not allow Zenor to return to work.

Zenor offered to transfer to a day shift where he could be monitored, or to a satellite pharmacy where pharmaceutical cocaine would not be available. Columbia rejected these suggestions. The next day Guy wrote a letter to Provencio calling Columbia's action unfair, and contrary to Guy's interpretation of the Policy. Columbia did not respond to the letter.

Zenor completed the residential portion of his treatment program and was released from Landmark on October 9, 1995. On October 18, Zenor met with Mendoza and again asked to keep his job. Mendoza told Zenor that his termination stood. Zenor then requested that Mendoza write an official letter regarding his termination, in order to assist Zenor in continuing his medical benefits.

Zenor later sued Columbia, alleging that he was fired in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). Zenor also alleged claims of fraud, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Following discovery, Columbia moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for Columbia on Zenor's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, but denied summary judgment on the other claims. The case proceeded to trial on the remaining claims. At the conclusion of Zenor's case-in-chief, Columbia moved for judgment as a matter of law. The district court granted Columbia judgment as a matter of law on Zenor's disability discrimination, fraud, and breach of contract claims. Only Zenor's promissory estoppel claim was submitted to the jury.

The jury found for Zenor on the promissory estoppel claim, and awarded him substantial damages, including damages for past lost earnings, future lost earnings, and mental anguish. Columbia renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law. The district court granted Columbia's renewed motion, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support two elements of the promissory estoppel claim: the existence of any promise altering the at-will relationship or foreseeable and reasonable reliance by Zenor. Zenor appeals and in this Court challenges only the dismissal of his ADA, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel claims. 1

Discussion
I. The ADA

The ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq., prohibits an employer from discriminating against a "qualified individual with a disability" on the basis of that disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To establish a prima facie discrimination claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that he has a disability; (2) that he was qualified for the job; (3) that he was subject to an adverse employment decision on account of his disability. Robertson v. Neuromedical Center, 161 F.3d 292, 294 (5th Cir.1998) (per curiam ). See also Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 320 (5th Cir.1997); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 36 (5th Cir.1996).

At the close of Zenor's case-in-chief, the district court found insufficient evidence to support the ADA claim and granted Columbia's motion for judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, the parties raise three separate questions with respect to the ADA claim: (1) whether Zenor was disqualified from the ADA's protection because he was a "current user" of illegal drugs at the relevant time, (2)whether Zenor was an otherwise qualified individual, and (3)whether Zenor established that he suffered from a disability.

This Court reviews a judgment as a matter of law de novo. See Burch, 119 F.3d at 313. Judgment as a matter of law is proper only where "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). This Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Burch, 119 F.3d at 313.

The district court correctly granted judgment in favor of Columbia. First, Zenor is excluded from the definition of "qualified individual" under the ADA because he was a current user of illegal drugs. Similarly, due to Zenor's cocaine use, he was not otherwise qualified for the job of a pharmacist. Alternatively, regardless of whether Zenor was a current user of illegal drugs, Zenor failed to prove that he was...

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