Zeyer v. Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 18 March 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:13–cv–01344 MPS.
• Citation: 98 F.Supp.3d 425
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Maura ZEYER, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, Town of Ridgefield, Ridgefield Public Schools, Deborah Low, in her official capacity as Superintendent of Schools, Defendants.

98 F.Supp.3d 425

Maura ZEYER, Plaintiff

v.BOARD OF EDUCATION, Town of Ridgefield, Ridgefield Public Schools, Deborah Low, in her official capacity as Superintendent of Schools, Defendants.

Case No. 3:13–cv–01344 MPS.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed March 18, 2015.

Christopher S. Avcollie, Elisabeth Ann Seieroe Maurer, Maurer and Associates, P.C., Ridgefield, CT, for Plaintiff.

Deborah Dehart Cannavino, Carol J. Faherty, Epstein Becker & Green, P.C., Stamford, CT, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

MICHAEL P. SHEA, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Maura Zeyer brings this action against the Board of Education of the Town of Ridgefield (“the BOE”); Ridgefield Public Schools (“RPS”); and Deborah Low, superintendent of RPS. Her complaint relates to the alleged withholding of wages during her employment as a bookkeeper for RPS, and it contains seven counts: (1) a claim that Low denied Zeyer procedural due process; (2) a claim for unpaid wages against the BOE and RPS under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 31–72 ; (3) a claim for overtime pay against the BOE and RPS under the Connecticut Minimum Wage Act (“CMWA”); (4) a claim for overtime pay against BOE and RPS under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”); (5) a claim for breach of contract against the BOE and RPS; (6) an equitable estoppel claim against the BOE and RPS; and (7) a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against the BOE and RPS. The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1).

As elaborated herein, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Counts Two, Five, Six, and Seven because Zeyer has failed to exhaust grievance procedures under the applicable collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). The motion to dismiss is denied as to Counts One, Three, and Four.

II. Facts as Alleged

The following facts are taken from Zeyer's second amended complaint. ECF No. 48–1. The allegations will be elaborated further throughout this ruling as the Court discusses each of the counts in the complaint.

Zeyer states that she has been employed by the BOE and RPS since 1998. Compl. ¶ 12. She worked as both a bookkeeper and a house secretary. Id. ¶ 10. In September 2002, Zeyer was appointed to a full-time job at Ridgefield High School (“RHS”) and a half-time job at East Ridge Middle School (“ERMS”) and Scotts Ridge Middle School (“SRMS”). Id. ¶ 14. Her appointment letters, which list her salary, initially included only her position at RHS. Id. ¶ 11. Her remaining hours were reported by timesheet. Id. ¶ 13. Her appointment letters were revised in 2004 to reflect that she was reporting additional hours by timesheet, but still only listed a single salary for her job at RHS. Id. ¶ 21. Zeyer agreed with BOE representatives that when she reported her ERMS/SRMS hours by timesheet, she would report only 450 hours of work for the first two years and 550 hours thereafter, even though she actually worked substantially more than that. Id. ¶¶ 15–16. From 2002–2007, she was paid at the overtime rate for work at ERMS/SRMS but not for the actual number of hours worked. Id. ¶ 22.

In 2005, a change in the CBA began affecting her pension contributions. Id. ¶ 23. The contributions and benefits are tied to an employee's base salary, not including overtime pay. Id. ¶¶ 68–69. At that point, Zeyer contacted a BOE representative to figure out how the situation would be handled.Id. ¶ 23. The defendants proposed an arrangement in which Zeyer's position would become a 1.45 FTE position, she would be compensated in the form of a straight salary that would include compensation for her work at ERMS and SRMS, her appointment letter would be amended, and her pension contributions would be calculated from her total salary. Id. ¶ 25. Zeyer agreed to the arrangement (“the 2007 Agreement”). Id. ¶ 27. In approximately June 2010, following the advice of newly retained counsel, the defendants informed Zeyer that the 1.45 FTE position was improper and that she would have to return to filling out timesheets for her work at ERMS and SRMS and under-reporting her hours worked. Id. ¶ 37. From 2010 to the date that this action was filed, Zeyer was paid at the overtime rate for her work at ERMS/SRMS, but was not paid for the entire number of hours she worked. Id. ¶ 45.

Zeyer attempted to negotiate with the defendants after they made clear that they would no longer honor the 2007 Agreement. Id. ¶ 46. In 2011, the defendants informed Zeyer that they were preparing a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) that would attempt to resolve the issue of Zeyer's compensation, though the completed MOU was not provided to Zeyer until approximately June 2012. Id. ¶¶ 47, 49. The MOU stated that Zeyer would be placed in a twelve-month bookkeeper position with a salary of $78,958 for services provided at RHS, ERMS, and SRMS. Id. ¶ 55. The defendants sought the union's approval of the MOU, but the union voted to reject it. Id. ¶ 58.

Zeyer alleges in Count One that Low denied her compensation and pension benefits without due process of law, in Count Two that the BOE and RPS are liable under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 31–72 for unpaid wages, and in Counts Five and Seven that the BOE and RPS breached the 2007 Agreement and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when they changed the terms of her compensation. She alleges in Counts Three and Four that the BOE and RPS failed to pay her for the proper amount of overtime she worked, in violation of the CMWA, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 31–76c, and the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207. And she alleges in Count Six that the BOE and RPS should be equitably estopped from reneging on the 2007 Agreement.

The defendants move to dismiss Counts One, Five, and Seven on the ground that Zeyer has failed to exhaust the grievance procedures available to her through her union's CBA; Zeyer argues that utilizing those procedures would have been futile. The defendants also argue that Counts One, Two, Three, and Four are barred, at least in part, by the relevant statutes of limitations; Zeyer argues that those limitations periods should be tolled. Finally, the defendants argue that Count One fails on the merits because Zeyer has not stated a cognizable claim that she was deprived of a protected property interest, that Count Five fails because Zeyer has not alleged facts supporting the existence of the contractual terms that she says were breached, and that Count Six fails because Connecticut does not recognize equitable estoppel as a cause of action.

III. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss

To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). The complaint must contain more than “ ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “A complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit, materials incorporated in it by reference, and documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are ‘integral’ to the complaint.” Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 67 (2d Cir.2004) (citations omitted).

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) authorizes dismissal when the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. “In resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the district court must take all uncontroverted facts in the complaint (or petition) as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction. But [w]here jurisdictional facts are placed in dispute, the court has the power and obligation to decide issues of fact by reference to evidence outside the pleadings, such as affidavits. In that case, the party asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.” Tandon v. Captain's Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc., 752 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir.2014) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

IV. Discussion

A. Count One (Procedural Due Process)

Count One alleges that the defendants failed to provide Zeyer with due process when depriving her of her property interest in continued employment in the 0.45 FTE position, which arises from a provision in Section 6.01 of the CBA that “[n]o employee shall be suspended without pay or discharged without just cause.” Exh. A to Def.'s Mem. Sup. Mot. Dismiss (“CBA”) (ECF No. 31–1) at 6.¹ The defendants argue that Zeyer fails to state a claim because she was never deprived of any property interest, that the due process claim should be dismissed because Zeyer has failed to exhaust the grievance procedures provided by the CBA, and that Zeyer's due process claim is barred by the statute of limitations. As set forth below, the Court rejects the defendants' arguments because there are sufficient allegations to support a finding that Zeyer was deprived of a property interest, Zeyer's failure to pursue a formal administrative grievance does not preclude the claim, and Zeyer has made allegations sufficient to raise a factual issue as to whether the defendants are estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense.

“A public employee has a property interest in continued employment if the employee is guaranteed continued employment absent ‘just cause’ for discharge.” Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir.2002). The defendants claim that changing Zeyer's status from 1.45 FTE to 1.0 FTE was not a deprivation of a property interest because Zeyer's interest was in avoiding “discharge,” and the reduction to 1.0 FTE was not a...