Ziegler v. IBP Hog Market

• Citation: 249 F.3d 509
• Decision Date: 06 March 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-3178,00-3178
• Parties: (6th Cir. 2001) Kevin W. Ziegler, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. IBP Hog Market, Inc., Defendant-Appellee. Argued and Submitted:
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

Page 509

249 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2001)

Kevin W. Ziegler, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. IBP Hog Market, Inc., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 00-3178.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Argued and Submitted: March 6, 2001

Decided and Filed: April 30, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Toledo. No. 99-07613, James G. Carr, District Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] James A. Hammer, MITCHELL, STERNS & HAMMER, Bowling Green, Ohio, for Appellant.

Catherine Adams, Jill S. Kirila, SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: KEITH, SILER, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Kevin W. Ziegler brought suit in state court against his former employer, defendant-appellee IBP Hog Market, Inc. ("IBP"), alleging age discrimination in violation of Ohio law. IBP removed the case to federal court, then moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted IBP's motion, and Ziegler appeals. For the reasons that follow, we VACATE the decision of the district court, and REMAND.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 26, 1999, Ziegler filed his complaint in the Hancock County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas alleging three counts of age discrimination in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ("O.R.C.") §§ 4112.02(N), 4112.14, and 4112.99. Ziegler alleged that he was employed by IBP from September 1, 1993, until his employment was terminated on January 31, 1998. IBP removed the case on the basis of complete diversity of citizenship to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.

On October 28, 1999, IBP moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) and 12(b)(6), arguing that Ziegler's claims were untimely under the applicable statute of limitations and that his claims were barred because he failed to select one remedy as required by O.R.C. Chapter 4112. On November 23, 1999, Ziegler moved for leave to file an amended complaint, seeking to retain only the § 4112.14 claim. On December 03, 1999, Ziegler moved for leave to file a second amended complaint, seeking to add a new claim, common law wrongful discharge for age discrimination in violation of public policy.

On January 10, 2000, the district court entered judgment granting IBP's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Ziegler's claims were untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. The court deemed Ziegler's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint to supercede his motion for leave to file an amended complaint, and denied the motion concluding that the public policy wrongful discharge claim was similarly untimely and amendment was therefore futile. Ziegler filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court's order on February 03, 2000.

II. DISCUSSION

A. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

1. Standard of Review

The standard of review applicable to a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(c) is the same de novo standard applicable to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 399-400 (6th Cir. 1999). In reviewing the motion, we must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all of the complaint's factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. See id. at 400.

We review the district court's interpretation and application of state law de novo. See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991); Ferro Corp. v. Garrison Indust., Inc., 142 F.3d 926, 931 (6th Cir. 1998).

2. Analysis

In the court below, IBP asserted that it was entitled to judgment on the pleadings as Ziegler's claims were barred: (1) because Ziegler failed to elect a single remedy as required under Ohio law; and (2) by the applicable period of limitations. The district court agreed that IBP's claims were time barred. It did not, however, address the issue of whether Ziegler's failure to elect a single remedy entitled IBP to judgment on the pleadings. The parties dispute both of these issues on appeal.

a. Election of Remedies

IBP argues that Ziegler's complaint must be dismissed because he was barred from simultaneously bring claims under O.R.C. §§ 4112.02(N), 4112.14 and 4112.99. Ziegler contends that, because he moved for leave to file an amend complaint so as to dismiss his 4112.02 and 4112.99 claims in good faith and in a timely fashion, IBP was not entitled to judgment on the pleadings based on his failure to elect a single remedy. He suggests that the assertion of multiple Chapter 4112 claims simultaneously is not a fatal defect. We agree.

The avenues of relief provided by Ohio statutory law for age-based employment discrimination are exclusive and, once an action is instituted thereunder, a plaintiff is barred from bringing an action under a different provision. See Morris v. Kaiser Engineers, Inc., 471 N.E.2d 471, 473 (Ohio 1984). Section 4112.02(N) provides that "[a] person who files a civil action under this division is barred, with respect to the practices complained of, from instituting a civil action under section 4112.14 of the Revised Code . . . ." Likewise, §4112.14(B) provides that "any person instituting an civil action under this section is barred, with respect to the practices complained of, from instituting a civil action under division (N) of section 4112.02 of the Revised Code . . . ." While § 4112.99 has no similar express election of remedies language, there is some indication that Ohio courts will impute to it such an exclusivity requirement. See Balent v. National Revenue Corp., 638 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (imputing to § 4112.99 an exclusivity requirement); Giambrone v. Spalding & Evenflo Co., 607 N.E.2d 106, 108 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (same).

IBP interprets the exclusivity language of §§ 4112.02(N) and 4112.14(B) as requiring dismissal of a complaint which asserts more than one Chapter 4112 claim. IBP argues that since Ziegler asserted a § 4112.02 claim, then the § 4112.14 and § 4112.99 claims must be dismissed, and, because he asserted a § 4112.14 claim, the § 4112.02 and § 4112.99 claims must be dismissed. This would be a harsh rule indeed.

In Giambrone v. Spalding & Evenflo Co., an Ohio appellate court rejected the defendant's contention that the plaintiff's age discrimination claims were barred because he filed multiple claims pursuant to O.R.C. Chapter 4112. 607 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). There, as here, the plaintiff asserted age discrimination claims pursuant to O.R.C. §§ 4112.02, 4112.14 and 4112.99. See id. at 107. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's case for failure to elect a single remedy. See id. On appeal, the Giambrone court stated that "dismissal of [plaintiff's] entire claim because he filed under both provisions simultaneously is neither in line with the [Ohio] Supreme Court's statement that R.C. Chapter 4112 is a remedial Act to be construed liberally, nor with the legislative purpose of the statute, i.e., to compensate victims of age discrimination." 607 N.W.2d at 108 (emphasis in original). The appellate court reversed, holding that "the lower court's dismissal of [the plaintiff's] age discrimination claim was an abuse of discretion and an overly restrictive interpretation of the statutes." Id.

We find no merit in IBP's assertion that Ziegler's claims are barred because he asserted multiple age discrimination claims simultaneously. IBP can point to no cases in support of its contention. Moreover, its argument finds no support in the language of the provisions, which bar successive actions after a single remedy has been elected. Our decision is guided by the directive of O.R.C. § 4112.08 that Chapter 4112 "be construed liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes ...." While Ziegler may not assert multiple Chapter 4112 claims, he may elect a single remedy by motion to amend. Accordingly, we reject IBP's assertion that it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings solely due to Ziegler's simultaneous assertion of more than one Chapter 4112 remedy.

b. Statute of Limitations

The question of whether the district court erred in granting IBP's motion for judgment on the pleadings turns on the limitations period applicable to Ziegler's claim brought pursuant to § 4112.14. ¹ Ziegler filed his complaint less than two years, but more than 180 days, after his cause of action accrued. Ziegler contends that a six-year limitations period applies to his claim; IBP contends, and the district court found, that the applicable period is 180 days.

The Ohio statutory scheme prohibiting age discrimination has a rather complicated history, and a brief overview would be helpful. Four sections of the O.R.C. provide remedies for age-based employment discrimination. Section 4112.02 is a general anti-discrimination statute that provides a private cause of action for age discrimination². Section 4112.05 allows an individual to enforce those rights created by §4112.02 administratively rather than judicially by filing a charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. Section 4112.14, formerly § 4101.17, is addressed solely to age discrimination and allows an aggrieved employee to institute a civil action³. Finally, § 4112.99 is a general anti-discrimination statute that permits a private cause of action for age discrimination⁴. See Elek v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 573 N.E.2d 1056, 1057 (Ohio 1991).

While § 4112.02(N) includes a statute of limitations, §4112.14 does not. In 1984, the Ohio Supreme Court, in Morris v. Kaiser Engineers, Inc., 471 N.E.2d 471, 474 (Ohio 1984), was confronted with the issue of whether the express limitations period of § 4112.02(N) applied to claims brought pursuant to § 4101.17 (§ 4112.14 prior to recodification)⁵. The Morriscourt held the § 4112.02(N) statute of limitations did not apply to claims brought pursuant to §...