Ziemba v. Armstrong, CIV.A.3-98-CV-2344(JCH).

• Decision Date: 08 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.3-98-CV-2344(JCH).,CIV.A.3-98-CV-2344(JCH).
• Citation: 343 F.Supp.2d 173
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Duane ZIEMBA, Plaintiff, v. John ARMSTRONG, et al., Defendants.

Page 173

343 F.Supp.2d 173

Duane ZIEMBA, Plaintiff, v. John ARMSTRONG, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV.A.3-98-CV-2344(JCH).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

November 8, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Antonio Ponvert, III, Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder, P.C., Bridgeport, CT, James J. Nugent, Nugent & Bryant, Orange, CT, for Plaintiff.

Matthew B. Beizer, Neil D. Parille, Perry A. Zinn Rowthorn, Hartford, CT, Elliot B. Spector, Michelle N. Holmes, Sack, Spector & Karsten, West Hartford, CT, for Defendants.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 271]

HALL, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Duane Ziemba, is an inmate of the Connecticut Department of Correction and has filed this civil rights action alleging that on August 12 and 13, 1998, his rights under the Eight Amendment were violated by the five moving defendants. Plaintiff claims that the defendants, John Armstrong, Giovanny Gomez, Dennis Oglesby, Reginald McAllister, and Margaret Clark, failed to provide constitutionally adequate health care, failed to protect Ziemba from the use of excessive force, and used excessive force and, thus, violated Ziemba's rights under the Eighth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Pl.'s Am. Compl. [Dkt. No. 238] at ¶¶ 44-91. Ziemba also claims that Armstrong has supervisory liability for the wrongs committed against him. Id. Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendants have now moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his mental health claims, (2) the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted due to lack of personal participation by the five defendants, (3) the plaintiff's allegations do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and (4) the defendants are shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

We consider the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. On August 11, 1998, Ziemba was transferred to Northern Correctional Institution. On August 12, 1998, Ziemba set off the sprinkler in his cell and flooded the cell because correctional officers were allegedly refusing to feed him. In response, Mangiafico, a defendant in this case who previously moved unsuccessfully for summary judgment, ordered Ziemba to be extracted from his cell. An officer videotaped the extraction of Ziemba from his cell, his transfer to another cell, and his subsequent placement in four point restraints.

Mangiafico ordered Ziemba to put his hands through the trap door of his cell to be handcuffed, and Ziemba failed to respond. After Mangiafico sprayed a chemical agent in the trap door, Ziemba complied with the order and placed his hands in the trap door to be handcuffed. Correctional officers then placed Ziemba in a shower to be decontaminated.

After the shower, correctional officers escorted Ziemba in handcuffs and leg restraints to another cell. During his transfer, Ziemba yelled and screamed that the officers were hurting him by twisting his wrists in the handcuffs. In the new cell, the officers strip searched Ziemba and then placed him face down on a cell bunk in his underwear and a t-shirt. The officers applied four point restraints to his legs and arms. While restrained, Ziemba was examined by members of the facility's medical staff, including Clark, a nurse, and McAllister, a medic. Oglesby, a lieutenant, accompanied two nurses, neither of whom is a defendant in this case, who examined Ziemba between midnight and six a.m. on August 13. Ziemba asked the medical staff to check his face where he claimed Mangiafico had hit him and to check his wrists because they were injured. Medical personnel checked Ziemba and observed no injuries.

On August 13, officers removed Ziemba from four point restraints. Ziemba again asked medical personnel to look at his face because it had been injured and complained that his back was hurting him. Officers then escorted Ziemba back to his cell. During the transfer, Mangiafico noticed an abrasion on the left side of Ziemba's face beneath his eye. Because the battery in the videotape recorder went dead, the transfer of Ziemba back to his cell was not videotaped.

The State of Connecticut Department of Correction Security Division investigated Ziemba's complaint that prison officials had used excessive force against him. The investigators concluded that no excessive force had been used in escorting Ziemba to the cell, but that Mangiafico had used more force than was necessary to control Ziemba during the application of the four point restraints in violation of Administrative Directive 2.17(5)-B-2, entitled Excessive or Unnecessary Use of Force. The Security Division also concluded that medical personnel did not address Ziemba's complaints concerning injuries to his face, wrists and back when they entered his cell after the application of the restraints.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Introduction

Arguing that Ziemba failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to some of his claims, the defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants also argue that Ziemba's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because it does not allege personal participation on the part of the defendants. In addition, defendants argue that Ziemba's allegations with respect to his medical treatment fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because his allegations do not rise to a constitutional violation. Finally, defendants claim that all five moving defendants acted within the scope of their qualified immunity as employees of the State of Connecticut.

B. Standard of Review

In a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); White v. ABCO Eng'g Corp., 221 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir.2000). A court must grant summary judgment "`if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact ....'" Miner v. City of Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 661 (2d Cir.1993) (citation omitted). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "`if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 965, 113 S.Ct. 440, 121 L.Ed.2d 359 (1992). After discovery, if the nonmoving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it] has the burden of proof," then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

When a motion for summary judgment is supported by documentary evidence and sworn affidavits, the nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." F ED.R.CIV.P. 56(e); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986). The nonmoving must present "significant probative evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact." Soto v. Meachum, Civ. No. B-90-270 (WWE), 1991 WL 218481, at *6 (D.Conn. Aug. 28, 1991). Further, a party may not rely "on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment." Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932, 107 S.Ct. 1570, 94 L.Ed.2d 762 (1987).

The court resolves "all ambiguities and draw[s] all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party in order to determine how a reasonable jury would decide." Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 523. Thus, "[o]nly when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849, 112 S.Ct. 152, 116 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991); see also Suburban Propane v. Proctor Gas, Inc., 953 F.2d 780, 788 (2d Cir.1992). A party may not create a genuine issue of material fact by presenting contradictory or unsupported statements. See Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir.1978). Nor may he rest on the "mere allegations or denials" contained in his pleadings. Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir.1995). See also Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that party may not rely on conclusory statements or an argument that the affidavits in support of the motion for summary judgment are not credible).

C. The Prison Litigation Reform Act

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) limits the ability of prisoners to bring federal actions "with respect to prison conditions." Prisoners cannot pursue section 1983 or other federal actions alleging deficiencies in prison conditions "until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The statute defines the term "prisoner" as "any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release or diversionary program." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h).

The Second Circuit recently clarified the application of the section 1997e(a) exhaustion requirement to cases brought by prisoners with respect to prison conditions. Where "a prisoner plainti...