Zilleruelo v. Commodity Transporters, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 January 2022
• Docket Number: 20200334
• Citation: 506 P.3d 509
• Parties: John ZILLERUELO, Appellant, v. COMMODITY TRANSPORTERS, INC. and Steven DeConto, Appellees.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

506 P.3d 509

John ZILLERUELO, Appellant,

v.COMMODITY TRANSPORTERS, INC. and Steven DeConto, Appellees.

No. 20200334

Supreme Court of Utah.

Heard September 16, 2021

Filed January 20, 2022

Douglas B. Cannon, Madelyn L. Blanchard, Salt Lake City, for appellant

Matthew D. Church, Daniel E. Young, Carson M. Fuller, Salt Lake City, for appellees

Justice Pearce authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Durrant, Associate Chief Justice Lee, Justice Himonas, and Justice Petersen joined.

Justice Pearce, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 On a snowy December night, Steven DeConto, a Commodity Transporters, Inc. truck driver, collided his trailer with John Zilleruelo's car. More than four years after the collision, Zilleruelo sued DeConto and Commodity Transporters. DeConto and Commodity Transporters moved for summary judgment, arguing that Zilleruelo had filed his action outside the statute of limitations. Zilleruelo contended that he had timely filed his suit because the accident had rendered him mentally incompetent for one year, and Utah Code section 78B-2-108(2) had tolled the statute of limitations during the period of his incompetency.

¶2 The district court granted summary judgment to DeConto and Commodity Transporters. The district court concluded that Utah Code section 78B-2-108(2) required a person be both mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian to toll the statute. The district court looked to a power of attorney Zilleruelo had executed nearly twelve years before the collision and concluded that document had created a legal guardianship. That conclusion permitted the district court to decide that the statute of limitations had continued to run during the time Zilleruelo claimed he was incompetent. Zilleruelo appeals. We conclude that the district court misinterpreted section 78B-2-108(2) and reverse.

BACKGROUND¹

¶3 On the evening of December 7, 2013, John Zilleruelo was driving south on I-15 in North Salt Lake amid steady snowfall. Steven DeConto was also on the road that evening, driving a truck and pulling a trailer owned by Commodity Transporters. DeConto's trailer collided with Zilleruelo's car.

¶4 On July 19, 2018—four years, seven months, and twelve days after the collision occurred—Zilleruelo filed suit against DeConto and Commodity Transporters (collectively, Commodity Transporters), alleging negligence, vicarious liability, and negligent entrustment.

¶5 In his complaint, Zilleruelo asserted that he had sustained a "severe brain injury

" in the collision, which rendered him mentally incompetent for "at least" one year following the accident. Zilleruelo also asserted that during this time, he was without a legal guardian and "unable to manage his business affairs or ... comprehend his legal rights or liabilities."

¶6 Commodity Transporters filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Zilleruelo had failed to file his complaint within the four-year statute of limitations. In response, Zilleruelo argued that because he was mentally incompetent for the year following the collision, Utah Code section 78B-2-108 (the Tolling Statute) had tolled the statute of limitations.

¶7 Commodity Transporters’ motion for summary judgment argued that the Tolling Statute did not toll the statute of limitations for two reasons. Commodity Transporters first averred that Zilleruelo was not mentally incompetent for the year following the accident. Commodity Transporters also argued that even if Zilleruelo was mentally incompetent, the Tolling Statute was nonetheless inapplicable because Zilleruelo had signed a durable power of attorney in Virginia in 2002 in favor of his mother, Maria Sorto (the 2002 POA).

¶8 The 2002 POA authorized Sorto to, among other things, "commence, prosecute, defend, compromise, settle, and adjust all actions, accounts, debts, claims, demands, and all other matters" on Zilleruelo's behalf. It further provided that, "All acts done by my Agent during any period of my disability, incompetence, or incapacity shall have the same effect in all respects as if I were not disabled, incompetent, or incapacitated." Commodity Transporters argued that because the 2002 POA empowered Sorto to act as Zilleruelo's agent, "[h]er acts were binding on him as if he did not have a disability," and therefore, Zilleruelo hadn't experienced a period of mental incompetency that would toll the statute of limitations.

¶9 Zilleruelo countered that the 2002 POA did not create a legal guardianship under Utah law, which, Zilleruelo argued, requires a legal guardian to be court-appointed.² Zilleruelo also argued that the statute of limitations had tolled even if the 2002 POA had created a legal guardianship because the Tolling Statute does not condition tolling on the lack of a legal guardian. Zilleruelo asserted that instead, under the plain language of the statute, tolling occurs during the time an individual is mentally incompetent, even if the individual is represented by a legal guardian.

¶10 The district court granted summary judgment to Commodity Transporters. The district court acknowledged "a genuine dispute [of material fact] regarding [Zilleruelo]’s competency during the year following the accident." But the district court concluded that did not prevent the entry of summary judgment because the 2002 POA designated Sorto as Zilleruelo's legal guardian. The court observed that although the Tolling Statute forbids a mentally incompetent individual from bringing a cause of action without a legal guardian, it "does not specify that [the legal guardian] must be ... ‘court-appointed.’ " The court then defined a legal guardian, using Utah Uniform Probate Code, as "a person who has qualified as a guardian of a[n] ... incapacitated person pursuant to testamentary or court appointment."(Citing UTAH CODE § 75-1-201(20).)

¶11 Turning to the language of the 2002 POA, the district court determined that "[Zilleruelo] intended that his agent bring any actions in his name should the need arise." The district court reasoned that by executing the 2002 POA, Zilleruelo intended "to avoid a court-appointed guardian and in effect make it unnecessary for the court to [appoint one]." Based on this inferred intent, the court determined that Sorto was Zilleruelo's legal guardian for purposes of the Tolling Statute. Accordingly, the district court concluded that because the Tolling Statute conditioned tolling on the lack of a legal guardian, and "because [Zilleruelo] had a legal guardian at the time of the incident giving rise to these claims and during the period of his alleged incapacity, the statute of limitations did not toll."

¶12 Zilleruelo appeals. He argues that the district court misinterpreted the Tolling Statute when it conditioned tolling on the lack of a legal guardian.³

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶13 Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(a). "In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court views ‘the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below’ and gives ‘no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law,’ " which "are reviewed for correctness." Goodnow v. Sullivan , 2002 UT 21, ¶ 7, 44 P.3d 704 (quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State , 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989) ).

¶14 Zilleruelo asks us to address three issues, though we need only address one to resolve this matter. That is, whether "the existence of a legal guardian for a mentally incompetent person prevent[s] the statute of limitations from being tolled" under the Tolling Statute. This presents a question of statutory interpretation that we review for correctness. See State v. Outzen , 2017 UT 30, ¶ 5, 408 P.3d 334.

ANALYSIS

I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT INTERPRETED THE TOLLING STATUTE TO CONDITION TOLLING ON THE ABSENCE OF A LEGAL GUARDIAN

¶15 Ordinarily, a statute of limitations begins to run once a cause of action is complete. Myers v. McDonald , 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). "Once a statute has begun to run, a plaintiff must file his or her claim before the limitations period expires or the claim will be barred." Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson , 2005 UT 14, ¶ 20, 108 P.3d 741. The Utah Legislature has recognized the potential for unfairness to minors and mentally incompetent individuals whose circumstances may render compliance with a statute of limitations difficult. And it has enacted the Tolling Statute, which tolls the limitations period while a plaintiff is underage or mentally incompetent.

¶16 The Tolling Statute states, in pertinent part:

(1) An individual may not bring a cause of action while the individual is: (a) under 18 years old; or (b) mentally incompetent without a legal guardian.

(2) During the time that an individual is underage or mentally incompetent, the statute of limitations for a cause of action other than for the recovery of real property may not run.

UTAH CODE § 78B-2-108(1) – (2).

¶17 The district court interpreted the Tolling Statute to toll the statute of limitations only when a plaintiff is both mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian. Zilleruelo argues that the district court's interpretation is incorrect because the plain language of the Tolling Statute "does not condition tolling on the existence or nonexistence of a legal guardian." As Zilleruelo reads the statute, "the only requirement to toll a statute of limitations is that the plaintiff is ‘incompetent.’ "

¶18 "It is well settled that when faced with a question of statutory interpretation, ‘our primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature.’ " Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship , 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863 (quoting Salt Lake Cnty. v. Holliday Water Co. , 2010 UT 45, ¶ 27, 234 P.3d 1105 ). "[T]he best evidence of the [L]egislature's intent is the plain language of the statute itself." Bagley v. Bagley , 2016 UT 48, ¶ 10, 387 P.3d 1000 (quoting Penunuri...