Zimmerman for Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie

• Decision Date: 18 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. 82893,82893
• Citation: 697 N.E.2d 699,183 Ill.2d 30,231 Ill.Dec. 914
• Parties: , 231 Ill.Dec. 914 Irving R. ZIMMERMAN, as Guardian for Scott E. ZIMMERMAN, a Disabled Person, Appellee, v. The VILLAGE OF SKOKIE et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 699

697 N.E.2d 699

183 Ill.2d 30, 231 Ill.Dec. 914

Irving R. ZIMMERMAN, as Guardian for Scott E. ZIMMERMAN, a Disabled Person, Appellee, v. The VILLAGE OF SKOKIE et al., Appellants.

No. 82893.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 18, 1998.

Hinshaw & Culbertson, Chicago (Steven M. Puiszis and Bruce L. Carmen, of counsel), for Village of Skokie.

Gary P. Hollander, Potratz & Hollander, P.C., Chicago, for Irving R. Zimmerman.

Patricia T. Bergeson, Acting Corp. Counsel, Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon, Timothy W. Joranko, of counsel), amicus curiae for City of Chicago.

David Lincoln Ader, Jeffrey D. Greenspan, Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Cope & Bush, Chicago, amicus curiae for South Towns Risk Management, Municipal (Self) Ins. Co-op. Agency, High-Level Excess Liability Pool, South Suburban Mayors and Managers Ass'n.

Jeffrey Edward Kehl, Dowd & Dowd, Chicago, amicus curiae for Illinois Governmental Ass'n of Pools, Illinois Ass'n of School Bds., Illinois Park and Recreation Ass'n Beth Anne Janicki, Illinois Mun. League, Springfield, amicus curiae for Illinois Mun. League, DuPage Mayors and Managers Conference, Northwest Mun. Conference.

Lawrence Ruder, Ruder & Associates, Chicago, for other interested parties.

Justice McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:

The "special duty" doctrine was first recognized by this court in Huey v. Town of Cicero, 41 Ill.2d 361, 243 N.E.2d 214 (1968), as an exception to the common law "public duty" rule. The public duty rule is a long-standing precept which establishes that a governmental entity and its employees owe no duty of care to individual members of the general public to provide governmental services, such as police and fire protection. Huey, 41 Ill.2d at 363, 243 N.E.2d 214. This rule of nonliability is grounded in the principle that the duty of the governmental entity to "preserve the well-being of the community is owed to the public at large rather than to specific members of the community." Schaffrath v. Village of Buffalo Grove, 160 Ill.App.3d 999, 1003, 112 Ill.Dec. 417, 513 N.E.2d 1026 (1987). The special duty doctrine arose as a judicially created exception to the nonliability principles of the public duty rule, and is applicable in certain limited instances where a governmental entity has assumed a special relationship to an individual "so as to elevate that person's status to something more than just being a member of the public." Schaffrath, 160 Ill.App.3d at 1003, 112 Ill.Dec. 417, 513 N.E.2d 1026.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the "special duty" doctrine violates the Illinois Constitution of 1970 when it is applied by the courts to override the immunities and defenses afforded to governmental entities by the Illinois General Assembly in the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 1994)). Defendants contend that when the special duty doctrine operates to nullify the immunities and defenses available under the Tort Immunity Act, two provisions of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 are violated: article XIII, section 4, which provides that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is abolished "[e]xcept as the General Assembly may provide by law" (Ill. Const.1970, art. XIII, § 4); and the separation of powers clause under article II, section 1 (Ill. Const.1970, art. II, § 1), which provides that no branch of government "shall exercise powers properly belonging to another." For the reasons which follow, we hold that the operation of the special duty doctrine to negate the immunities and defenses provided to governmental entities by the Illinois legislature pursuant to the provisions of the Tort Immunity Act violates both constitutional provisions.

BACKGROUND

This appeal arises from a series of occurrences initiated on July 25, 1982, when Scott Zimmerman was arrested at 11:20 p.m. by Skokie police after he broke a glass mug as he was leaving Houlihan's Restaurant & Bar in the Old Orchard Shopping Center. At the outset, we note that for purposes of the narrow legal issue presented in this appeal, the parties do not dispute the underlying facts in this litigation. Therefore, we include only a general discussion of these background facts.

Upon Zimmerman's arrest, he was taken to the Skokie police station/jail, where he refused to be fingerprinted and became extremely upset. As a result of his refusal to cooperate with the fingerprinting procedure, the police placed Zimmerman alone in a cell in the men's cellblock at approximately 1 a.m. After he was placed in the cell, Zimmerman punched and kicked at the walls, screamed, and rattled his cell bars. At about the same time Zimmerman was placed into the cell, his family members arrived at the Skokie jail. Zimmerman's parents informed the officers that their son had been medically diagnosed as a claustrophobe, that he was under the care of a psychiatrist, and that he should be removed from the cell because he could not tolerate such confinement. At her request, Zimmerman's mother was allowed into the cellblock to calm Zimmerman. However, her efforts were unsuccessful, and she returned to the public area of the jail.

Although the statements made by Zimmerman's parents to the Skokie police concerning During that evening, Zimmerman was removed from his cell for a second attempt at fingerprinting, and, upon his removal, he calmed down. However, Zimmerman once again refused to comply with the fingerprinting procedure and was replaced in the cell, where his violent behavior resumed. Thereafter, one of the officers checked on Zimmerman every 15 minutes and marked Zimmerman's physical condition as "okay" on the jail log. When an officer looked in on Zimmerman at approximately 2:45 a.m., Zimmerman was found lying in the cell with his hands around his neck, complaining that he could not breathe and gasping for air. At that time, Zimmerman was also screaming that he was going to kill himself because police had beaten him up for no reason. Fifteen minutes later, at approximately 3 a.m., when Zimmerman was again looked in on by an officer, Zimmerman was found hanging from the bars of his cell with his jeans around his neck, his body facing away from the bars and his legs looped through the bars.

[231 Ill.Dec. 918] Zimmerman's claustrophobia were true, the police refused to believe these declarations and informed Zimmerman's family members that he would not be removed from the cell until he calmed down and could be fingerprinted. The relationship between Zimmerman's parents and the police thereafter became confrontational, and the family members were ordered to leave the police station. Zimmerman's family members complied after being assured by the officers that the officers would keep a watch over Zimmerman.

Zimmerman was resuscitated at the Skokie jail by the officers, who administered CPR. Zimmerman was thereafter transported to a hospital where it was determined that blood loss to his brain as a result of the hanging caused him to suffer permanent brain damage that impaired his ability to work and care for himself. Medical workers also found that Zimmerman had a cut under his right eye, contusions and bruises on his chest and arms, and a deep gash on his shin, which resembled the shape of a shoe or boot tip.

Subsequently, Zimmerman was declared a disabled person by the probate court of Cook County and his father, Irving, was appointed his guardian. Irving (plaintiff) thereafter filed suit on behalf of his son to recover damages for personal injuries Zimmerman suffered during the period he was in the custody of the Skokie police. Plaintiff's cause of action, originally filed on February 23, 1983, named as defendants the Village of Skokie and the police officers involved in these incidents.

Plaintiff's case was dismissed with prejudice as a sanction by the trial court on March 27, 1986, after plaintiff failed to comply with trial court orders directing Zimmerman to appear for a deposition and requiring plaintiff to respond to defendants' written discovery. Upon the trial court's denial of plaintiff's petition under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 2-1401) to vacate its dismissal order, plaintiff appealed. The appellate court vacated the circuit court's denial of plaintiff's section 2-1401 petition and remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings. Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 174 Ill.App.3d 1001, 124 Ill.Dec. 618, 529 N.E.2d 599 (1988). Defendants' petition for rehearing was denied by the appellate court, and this court denied defendants' petition for leave to appeal. Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 124 Ill.2d 563, 129 Ill.Dec. 158, 535 N.E.2d 923 (1989).

Following remand to the trial court, plaintiff's case proceeded against defendants. On January 18, 1994, shortly before trial in this matter, the circuit court ruled on defendants' motion to strike and dismiss all counts of plaintiff's complaint. Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's claims on the pleadings on the basis that they were barred by various provisions of the Tort Immunity Act. Pursuant to section 4-105 of the Tort Immunity Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 85, par. 4-105) and section III(D) of the Municipal Jail and Lockup Standards as they read in 1982, the trial court granted defendants' motion only as to count V of the complaint, which asserted a cause of action in negligence. Section 4-105 of the Act read as follows:

"Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner In count V, plaintiff alleged that defendants breached their duty to take reasonable action to summon medical care for Zimmerman. The trial judge determined that section 4-105 did not establish a cause of action in negligence when read in conjunction with section 2-202 of the Tort Immunity Act, which provides:

...