Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.

Decision Date24 May 1996
Docket NumberNo. 20993,20993
Citation920 P.2d 67,128 Idaho 851
Parties, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,652 Brian R. ZIMMERMAN, Theresa Tarp Zimmerman, Paul Tarp and Melba Stopello, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC., and Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, Defendants-Respondents. Boise, March 1996 Term
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Martin, Chapman, Schild & Lassaw, Boise, John G. Phillip & Assoc., Chicago, Illinois, for appellants. John F. Klebba, argued.

Evans Keane, Boise, for respondents. Bruce C. Jones, argued.

TROUT, Justice.

This is a products liability action brought against Volkswagen of America, Inc., and Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft (Volkswagen) by the family of Dorothy Zimmerman (the Zimmermans) alleging that the restraint system used in Dorothy Zimmerman's (Dorothy) vehicle was defective and a substantial factor in causing her death.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 24, 1989, Dorothy was driving her 1987 Volkswagen Golf east on Franklin Road. While in the process of making a left turn onto Ten Mile Road, Dorothy was struck by a pickup truck which was traveling westbound on Franklin Road. After the collision Dorothy was alert and oriented but complained of left knee pain to the emergency medical technician responding to the accident. Dorothy was then transported by ambulance to St. Alphonsus Hospital where she spoke with Dr. Austin Cushman. Dorothy told Dr. Cushman that she did not recall striking anything within the automobile during the accident and thought that she was relatively uninjured although she did note some pain above her waist on the right side. Shortly after speaking with Dr. Cushman, Dorothy became unresponsive and later died from what Dr. Cushman concluded was an internal hemorrhage caused by a liver laceration. In Dr. Cushman's opinion, Dorothy's liver was torn from the inside outward when the restraint system in Dorothy's car caused her body to rapidly decelerate immediately after the collision and the entire force of that deceleration was imparted to her abdomen by the seat belt.

The Zimmermans' complaint alleged causes of action against Volkswagen for strict products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty and included a claim for hedonic damages. The district court dismissed the Zimmermans' claim for hedonic damages pursuant to Volkswagen's motion and the breach of warranty claim was dismissed by stipulation. The court subsequently granted Volkswagen's motion for summary judgment finding that the Zimmermans' claims against Volkswagen were both expressly and impliedly preempted by applicable provisions of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety

[128 Idaho 854] Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-169 (formerly codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1982)) (SAFETY ACT). THE DISTRICT COURT ALSO ORDERED THAt volkSwagen be awarded certain of its costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment must be granted by a district court if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). A review by this Court of a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is the same as that required of the district court when it rules on the motion. Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 610, 850 P.2d 749, 761 (1993). The Court liberally construes the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all inferences and conclusions in that party's favor, and if reasonable people could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences then an order granting summary judgment must be reversed. Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994).

If the defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to an element of the plaintiff's case, the plaintiff must establish the existence of an issue of fact regarding that element. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 272-73, 869 P.2d 1365, 1367-68 (1994). In order to forestall summary judgment in that case, the plaintiff must do more than present a scintilla of evidence, and merely raising the "slightest doubt" as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 871, 452 P.2d 362, 368 (1969); G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991).

III. PREEMPTION

The manufacturer of a motor vehicle is under a duty to design and manufacture its products so as to eliminate unreasonable risks of foreseeable injuries that may occur if the vehicle is involved in a collision or other impact. Farmer v. International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 742, 751, 553 P.2d 1306, 1315 (1976). Strict liability in tort is imposed on the manufacturer for its failure to produce a crashworthy vehicle. Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674, 676-77, 518 P.2d 857, 859-60 (1974) (quoting The Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d, § 402A (1965)). In "second collision" cases the injured occupant of the automobile bears the burden of presenting sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to reasonably find that the vehicle was defective and that the defect enhanced or intensified the injuries sustained in the accident. Johnson v. Pischke, 108 Idaho 397, 403, 700 P.2d 19, 25 (1985); Curtis v. DeAtley, 104 Idaho 787, 790, 663 P.2d 1089, 1092 (1983) (citing Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 519 P.2d 421 (1974)); Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 103 Idaho 249, 253-54, 646 P.2d 1020, 1024-25 (Ct.App.1982).

The restraint system used in Dorothy's Golf, identified by its acronym VWRA, is a "passive" system requiring no action on the part of the occupant to actuate it. The VWRA system consists, for the most part, of a shoulder belt which is anchored to the seat on the inboard side and to the door on the outboard side and includes a padded knee bar under the dash and a specially designed seat to minimize submarining. There is no lap belt and, when the door closes, the shoulder belt is automatically positioned across the occupant's chest.

The VWRA system was designed to comply with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 (FMVSS 208), 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1986), a regulation promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), an agency within the Department of Transportation, under the auspices of the Safety Act. This regulation specified motor vehicle performance requirements for the protection of vehicle occupants in crashes and allowed car manufacturers the choice of selecting one of three options for satisfying In determining whether Volkswagen can be held liable for not including a lap belt in Dorothy's Golf, a threshold issue is whether that particular claim is preempted by the Safety Act. The Safety Act provides that the NHTSA shall promulgate safety standards that manufacturers are required to incorporate into their products. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a). Section 1392 also mandates uniformity in the development of safety standards through the Safety Act's express exemption provision:

[128 Idaho 855] the federal performance standards, i.e. either complete passive protection, passive restraints, or lap and shoulder belt protection systems with belt warnings. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208. The VWRA was designed to comply with the second option and was intended to function so that in a collision the driver's knees would contact the padded knee bar under the dash to limit motion of the lower portion of the driver's body, and the shoulder belt would prevent the driver's head from hitting the windshield. In their complaint, the Zimmermans do not allege that the VWRA failed to operate as it was designed to during the accident and they concede that the VWRA fully complied with the performance standards set forth in FMVSS 208. The only defect in the VWRA the Zimmermans could definitively point to was Volkswagen's failure to also include a lap belt.

Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.

15 U.S.C. § 1392(d).

FMVSS 208, as it read when Dorothy's Golf was manufactured, required that all passenger cars possess one of three types of crash protection: (1) complete passive protection for all crashes; (2) passive restraints for head-on collisions; or (3) manual three-point seat belts with belt warnings. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, S4.1.2.1-3. FMVSS 208 also provided that a manufacturer could install an automatic belt "that requires no action by vehicle occupants ... to meet the crash protection of any option under S4 and in place of any seat belt assembly otherwise required by that option." 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, S4.5.3.

It is well settled that any state law which conflicts with federal law is "without effect" as provided under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 1 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 515-16, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 2128, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981) and citing M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819)). In some cases, state law is expressly preempted by the language of a federal statute. Id.

As the Zimmermans have conceded, the VWRA fully complied with the performance requirements of FMVSS 208. The issue then is whether Volkswagen can be held liable for selecting one of the options clearly available to it under the regulations promulgated by the NHTSA which do not require a lap belt. The...

To continue reading

Request your trial
39 cases
  • Cellucci v. General Motors Corp.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • 2 Enero 1998
    ...WL 18670 (D.Ariz. Nov.18, 1986); Martinez v. Ford Motor Co., 224 Mich.App. 247, 568 N.W.2d 396 (1997); Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 920 P.2d 67 (Idaho 1996); Dykema v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 189 Wis.2d 206, 525 N.W.2d 754 (Wis.Ct.App.1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 811......
  • Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Texas
    • 24 Septiembre 1998
    ...161 Other courts that have addressed this question have reached differing conclusions. The Supreme Court of Idaho held in Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. that the regulation directly addressed performance requirements to protect vehicle occupants during crashes and that a no-lap-be......
  • Drattel v. Toyota Motor Corp.
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals
    • 16 Junio 1998
    ...206-207, 665 A.2d 345, 347 [1995], cert. denied 516 U.S. 1072, 116 S.Ct. 773, 133 L.Ed.2d 726; but see, Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of Am., 128 Idaho 851, 856-857, 920 P.2d 67, 72 [1996], cert denied 520 U.S. 1115, 117 S.Ct. 1245, 137 L.Ed.2d Noteworthily, the trilogy of Supreme Court cases and......
  • Campbell v. Kildew, 29717.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • 17 Junio 2005
    ...standards; and (3) whether the trial court reached its determination through an exercise of reason. Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 857, 920 P.2d 67, 73 (1996). Where a trial court sits without a jury the Supreme Court liberally construes the trial court's findings of f......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT