Zinni v. ER Solutions, Inc.

Decision Date27 August 2012
Docket NumberNos. 11–12413,11–12937.,11–12931,s. 11–12413
Citation23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1476,692 F.3d 1162
PartiesAnthony W. ZINNI, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. ER SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant–Appellee. Blanche M. Dellapietro, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. ARS National Services, Inc., Defendant–Appellee. Naomi M. Desty, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Collection Information Bureau, Inc., Defendant–Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Gregory A. Beck, Pub. Citizen Lit. Group, Washington, DC, Donald A. Yarbrough, Donald A. Yarbrough, Esq., Fort Lauderdale, FL, for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Barbara Fernandez, David P. Hartnett, Maureen G. Pearcy, Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLP, Coral Gables, FL, for DefendantsAppellees ER Solutions, Inc. and Collection Information Bureau, Inc.

Dale T. Golden, Charles James McHale, Jr., Golden & Scaz, PLLC, Tampa, FL, for DefendantAppellee ARS National Services, Inc.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before CARNES, BARKETT and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

BLACK, Circuit Judge:

This consolidated appeal 1 presents the issue of whether a settlement offer for the full amount of statutory damages requested under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., moots a claim brought pursuant to the FDCPA. Appellants Anthony W. Zinni, Blanche Dellapietro, and Naomi Desty appeal the district court's dismissal of their complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In each case, an Appellee 2 sent an e-mail offering to settle an Appellant's FDCPA case for $1,001—an amount exceeding by $1 the maximum statutory damages available for an individual plaintiff under the FDCPA.3 Appellees also offered attorneys' fees and costs in each case, but did not specify the amount of fees and costs to be paid. Appellants did not accept the settlement offers. The district court subsequently granted Appellees' motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), holding that the offers left Appellants with “no remaining stake” in the litigation. The district court then dismissed Appellants' complaints with prejudice. We conclude the settlement offers did not divest the district court of subject matter jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Zinni

Zinni filed a complaint on July 2, 2010, alleging that ER Solutions, Inc. violated the FDCPA by causing his phone “to ring repeatedly or continuously with the intent to annoy, abuse or harass in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5),” and by failing to make disclosures required by §§ 1692d(6) and 1692e(11). Zinni alleged ER Solutions had left him more than 50 voice mail messages in the course of attempting to collect a debt. Zinni requested damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the FDCPA, as well as judgment in his favor and against ER Solutions.

On January 10, 2011, ER Solutions e-mailed a settlement offer to Zinni's counsel. In the e-mail, ER Solutions offered $1,001 to resolve Zinni's claims under the FDCPA, plus reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to be determined by the court.4 Zinni did not respond. On January 20, 2011, ER Solutions e-mailed Zinni's counsel a second time to reiterate the offer, but Zinni once again did not respond.5

On February 23, 2011, ER Solutions filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). ER Solutions asserted that because it had offered Zinni everything he was entitled to under the FDCPA, his FDCPA claim was moot and should be dismissed with prejudice.

The district court granted ER Solutions' motion and dismissed the case with prejudice, explaining that [o]nce the defendant offers to satisfy the plaintiff's entire demand, there is no dispute over which to litigate.” The district court acknowledged that Zinni had never accepted ER Solutions' offer, but rejected as “nonsensical” Zinni's argument that, had he accepted ER Solutions' offer, he would have been left with nothing but an unenforceable promise. The district court concluded it was Plaintiff's failure to accept the offer that creates these issues in the first place,” because [i]f Plaintiff accepts the offer, it becomes a binding agreement that can be enforced through a motion to enforce settlement.”

B. Dellapietro

Dellapietro filed a complaint on February 18, 2011, alleging that ARS National Services, Inc. (ARS) left messages on her voice mail identifying itself only as “ARS,” and stating that it was “very important” that ARS speak to her “right away.” The message did not disclose the purpose of the call other than to state it was “not a telemarketing or sales call.” The complaint alleged that ARS failed to meaningfully disclose its identity, purpose for calling, or disclose its status as a debt collector as required by 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(6) and 1692e(11). Dellapietro requested damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the FDCPA, as well as judgment in her favor and against ARS.

On February 23, 2011, ARS e-mailed Dellapietro's counsel an offer to settle the FDCPA claims for $1,001 and “reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.” The e-mail stated, [i]f we are unable to agree on attorneys' fees and costs, we will agree to submit that issue to the court for resolution.” Dellapietro did not respond to the offer. On April 20, 2011, ARS filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The district court granted the motion in an order virtually identical to the one in Zinni, finding that ARS had “offered more than Plaintiff is entitled to recover under the FDCPA, thereby mooting the FDCPA claim.”

C. Desty

Desty filed a complaint on January 27, 2011, alleging that Collection Information Bureau, Inc. (CIB) repeatedly left automated voice mail messages on her cellular phone. The caller identified himself as Ted Lee and stated that he had an “important message” for her and that he “must speak with [her] as soon as possible regarding [her] account number.” Desty alleged CIB failed to meaningfully disclose its identity, purpose for calling, or identify itself as a debt collector as required by 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(6) and 1692e(11). She also alleged CIB caused her “telephone to ring repeatedly or continuously with the intent to annoy, abuse or harass in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5),” and used an automated dialer to repeatedly call her cellular phone in a manner “the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse” in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d.6 The complaint requested statutory damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, as well as judgment in her favor and against CIB.

On March 7, 2011, CIB offered via e-mail to settle Desty's case for $1,001, “plus reasonable attorney's fees and court costs.” The e-mail stated that if the parties were “unable to reach an agreement as to the amount of Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs,” CIB would “submit the issues of fees and costs to the Court to decide.”

When Desty did not respond to the offer, CIB moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The district court granted CIB's motion in an order virtually identical to the orders in Zinni and Dellapietro.

II. DISCUSSION

The issue before us is whether Appellees' settlement offers for the full amount of statutory damages requested under the FDCPA rendered Appellants' claims moot, requiring their dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).7 “When evaluating a district court's conclusions on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, we review the district court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 657 F.3d 1159, 1169 (11th Cir.2011) (quotations and alteration omitted).

Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases and controversies. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1949, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). [T]here are three strands of justiciability doctrine—standing, ripeness, and mootness—that go to the heart of the Article III case or controversy requirement.” Christian Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. United States, 662 F.3d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir.2011) (quotations omitted). With regard to mootness, the Supreme Court has explained “a federal court has no authority to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12, 113 S.Ct. 447, 449, 121 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992) (quotations omitted). “An issue is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief.” Friends of Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir.2009) (quotations omitted).

Appellants contend that the settlement offers were not for the full relief requested because Appellees did not offer to have judgment entered against them as part of the settlement. Thus, Appellants argue, the settlement offers were insufficient to moot their claims. Appellees respond that their offers were for the full amount of statutory damages plus attorneys' fees and costs, and argue that the lack of an offer of judgment does not preclude a mootness finding.

Offers for the full relief requested have been found to moot a claim. See Greisz v. Household Bank (Ill.), N.A., 176 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir.1999) ( “By [submitting an offer of judgment to plaintiff for] $1,200 plus reasonable costs and attorney's fees, the bank ... was offering her more than her claim was worth to her in a pecuniary sense. Such an offer, by giving the plaintiff the equivalent of a default judgment ... eliminates a legal dispute upon which federal jurisdiction can be based.”); Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 598 (7th Cir.1991) (“Once the...

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