Zinter v. Salvaggio
| Decision Date | 12 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. SA-18-CV-00680-JKP |
| Parties | RUSSELL ZINTER, JACK MILLER, BRIAN HOWD, JAMES A. MEAD, JOSEPH BRANDON PIERCE, MARK BROWN, DAVID BAILEY, JUAN GONZALESJR, KEVIN EGAN, JONATHON GREEN, JAMES SPRINGER, THERESA C. RICHARD, JASON GREEN, GREG GARDINER, SELENA HERRARA, Plaintiffs, v. CHIEF JOSEPH SALVAGGIO, LIEUTENANT JOHN DOE ANDERSON, OFFICER JANE DOE GOLDMAN, OFFICER JOHN DOE VASQUEZ, CORPORAL C MANDRY, SERGEANT JOHN DOE, DETECTIVE JIM WELLS, OFFICER L FARIAS, BADGE 534; OFFICER JOHN DOE EVANS, BADGE 556; OFFICER JOHN DOE HERNANDEZ, JOHN DOE TAZER 1, JOHN DOE TAZER 2, THE CITY OF LEON VALLEY, TEXAS, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS; LIEUTENANT DAVID ANDERSON, OFFICER JOHNNY VASQUEZ, #552, ID1176; CPL. CHAD MANDRY, OFFICER BRANDON EVANS, BADGE 556; OFFICER UZIEL HERNANDEZ, OFFICER YARBROUGH, OFFICER BRETON, OFFICER AZAR, OFFICER URDIALES, OFFICER KING, OFFICER CASTRO, OFFICER TACQUARD, OFFICER E. RIVERA, NIKO LAHOOD, JOE GONZALES, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Before the Court is Defendant Bexar County District Attorneys Nico LaHood and Joe Gonzales's Partial Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs' Response. ECF Nos. 94,96,98. Upon consideration, the Court concludes the motion shall be GRANTED. The Court finds amendment of the Second Amended Complaint would be futile. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Section 1983 causes of action asserted against Nico LaHood and Joe Gonzales in their official capacity are DISMISSED.
The undisputed facts reveal Plaintiffs are a group of protestors who demonstrated outside the Leon Valley Police Department on June 14, 18, and 23, 2018. At various times and dates during these demonstrations, Plaintiffs were arrested by the Defendant Leon Valley Police Department Officers and charged with criminal offenses. A Leon Valley Magistrate Judge later dismissed the criminal charges against all Plaintiffs. Based upon the same conduct and events, several Plaintiffs were later charged with the same or similar criminal offenses by the Bexar County District Attorney1. Following various court proceedings, these criminal charges imposed by the Bexar County District Attorney were dismissed.
In this federal action, Plaintiffs allege the Leon Valley Police Department (LVPD) and its Chief and named police officers violated their constitutional rights by prohibiting peaceful protest, by unlawfully detaining and arresting them and by subjecting them to unreasonable searches and seizures. ECF No. 87, p. 2 at pars. 1-3. Plaintiffs allege various causes of action against the individual police officers based upon alleged conduct pertaining to each Plaintiff's arrest. After atwo-year stay of this litigation, Plaintiffs amended their Complaint to include three causes of action for violation of their constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the District Attorneys in their official capacity, only. Id. at pars. 12, 56, 108-117, 156-165, 208-228. Plaintiffs seek monetary damages and declaratory relief for the Section 1983 causes of action against the District Attorneys. Id. at p. 43.
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege the Bexar County District Attorneys "enacted and enforced an unconstitutional policy or practice . . . to wit: Prosecute the plaintiffs, hang the possibility of jail time and criminal/felony records over their heads, assign multiple prosecutors to these frivolous cases, all to coerce and extort a plea bargain out of the plaintiffs, for the sole purpose of protecting and defending the unlawful actions of the defendant police officers, specifically because Plaintiffs were exercising their rights to free speech." Id. at p. 4, par. 12.
In Count 5, Plaintiff Brown titles his cause of action as "Abuse of Process and Malicious Prosecution - 42 USC 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments." Plaintiff Brown goes on to allege the District Attorneys "engaged in extortionate perversion of lawfully initiated process to illegitimate ends in that they procured a prosecution against [him] knowing he is innocent of the charged crime." Brown alleges the District Attorneys "enacted unconstitutional policies and procedures to maliciously and frivolously prosecute [him]." Brown then enumerates the elements of the state-law cause of action of malicious prosecution, asserting each is satisfied by the District Attorneys' actions in bringing retaliatory criminal charges against Brown. Id. at pars. 108-117
In Count 10, Plaintiffs Bailey and Springer title their cause of action as "Malicious Prosecution - 42 USC 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments." Plaintiff Springer assertsthis cause of action against the District Attorneys "is because the charge was initially rejected by the magistrate, but then these defendants re-charged [him] . . . based on the herein complained of unconstitutional policy." Plaintiff Bailey asserts his cause of action Bailey and Springer go on to enumerate the elements of the state-law cause of action of malicious prosecution, asserting each is satisfied by the District Attorneys' actions in bringing retaliatory criminal charges against them. Id. at pars. 156-165.
In Count 15, Plaintiffs Howd, Green and Springer title their cause of action as "Malicious Prosecution - 42 USC 1983 and the Fourth Amendment." These Plaintiffs go on to enumerate the elements of the state-law cause of action of malicious prosecution, asserting each is satisfied by the District Attorneys' actions in bringing retaliatory criminal charges against them. These Plaintiffs state "Leon Valley directly caused the constitutional violations suffered" and assert specific constitutional violations committed by the City of Leon Valley and "caused by policies, practices and/or customs developed, implemented, enforced, encouraged, and sanctioned by Defendant City. . . ." Plaintiffs then name the specific unconstitutional policies and customs of the City of Leon Valley. These Plaintiffs do not allege or name any unconstitutional policy or custom of the Bexar County District Attorneys' Office or of these District Attorneys that guided their actions. Instead, Plaintiffs state: "the official capacity claims brought against LaHood and Joe Gonzales are based on the herein complained of unconstitutional policies." Id. at pars. 208-228.
The District Attorneys now file this Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6).
The Bexar County District Attorneys move for dismissal of the Section 1983 causes of action asserted against them on three grounds: (1) these causes of action are barred by prosecutorial and eleventh-amendment immunity; (2) Plaintiffs cannot support these causes of action under Section 1983 because they fail to, and cannot, allege a specific policy, procedure or custom that caused any constitutional violation; and (3) Plaintiffs' allegations of malicious prosecution or abuse of process, alone cannot constitute a constitutional violation.
In response, Plaintiffs do not seek leave to amend the Complaint to cure any potential defects or omissions. Instead, Plaintiff argue prosecutorial and Eleventh Amendment immunity do not apply under these facts because Texas District Attorneys are agents of the county, not the state, and therefore, do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity. Plaintiffs argue they alleged sufficient facts to support a cause of action against Bexar County under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege the District Attorneys exercised administrative and managerial functions in establishing policies under which they asserted the unconstitutional criminal charges against them, and Bexar County may be held liable for these functions. Plaintiffs argue they sufficiently alleged and enumerated the specific facts upon which the Section 1983 cause of action is based, as well as the unconstitutional policies and customs the District Attorneys employed in bringing the criminal charges. Finally, Plaintiffs argue theSecond Amended Complaint "sufficiently alleges Defendants' unconstitutional policy violated their Fourth Amendment Rights" to assert a cause of action based upon unconstitutional malicious prosecution and abuse of process.
It is undisputed Plaintiffs bring this suit seeking monetary damages and declaratory relief against the District Attorneys in their official capacities, only. The District Attorneys argue Plaintiffs fail to state any viable claim against them because, as state actors, the Eleventh Amendment bars any official-capacity suit against them. The District Attorneys assert this argument within the context of a Federal Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss.
The United States Supreme Court has not yet determined whether Eleventh Amendment immunity is grounds for dismissal under Federal Rule 12(b)(1) or Federal Rule 12(b)(6). Wis. Dep't of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389-92 (1998); Sabine Pipe Line, LLC v. A Permanent Easement of 4.25 +/- Acres of Land in Orange County, Tex., 327 F.R.D. 131, 137-38 (E.D. Tex. 2017). However, the Fifth Circuit holds the Eleventh Amendment creates restrictions on a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction. Sabine Pipe Line, LLC, 327 F.R.D. at 137-38; see also United States v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 286 n.9 (5th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1202 (2000); Cephus v. Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm'n, 146 F.Supp.3d 818, 825 (S.D. Tex. 2015). Because the Eleventh Amendment acts as a jurisdictional bar to a suit for...
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