Zitter v. Petruccelli
Decision Date | 08 May 2017 |
Docket Number | Civil No. 15-6488 (NLH/KMW) |
Parties | MARC ZITTER, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER PETRUCCELLI, et al. Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Jeffrey Erik Jakob
William F. Cook
William M. Tambussi
Brown & Connery LLP
360 Haddon Avenue
Westmont, NJ 08108
Kevin J. Fleming
State of New Jersey
Office of the Attorney General
25 Market Street
P.O. Box 116
Trenton, NJ 08625
This case concerns an oyster harvesting operation in Cape May, New Jersey. Plaintiff sues several state officials claiming that they destroyed thousands of dollars' worth of his oysters in retaliation for protected speech. Presently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's previous decision granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as it pertains to the Takings Clause claim asserted in the First Amended Complaint. For the reasons stated herein, the Motion for Reconsideration will be denied.
Zitter, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *21. Therefore, the Court held, Plaintiff could not allege that there had been an unlawful taking.
The opinion and order were issued on September 30, 2016. The instant Motion for Reconsideration was filed on October 28, 2016. On that same day, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint which asserts a Takings Clause claim. Most notably, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that the state entity that actually took and destroyed Plaintiff's oysters-- the Division Fish and Wildlife-- lacks statutory and regulatory authority to enforce the violations with which Zitter was charged. (See Second Amended Complaint ¶ 291)Plaintiff asserts that this is a different theory of liability than before.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. Although the Second Amended Complaint asserts a Takings Clause claim, Defendants do not argue that the Second Amended Complaint fails to state a claim as to the Taking Clause (other than arguing 11th Amendment and qualified immunity); nor do Defendants argue that this Court already ruled on the Takings Claim as asserted in the Second Amended Complaint.
Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) provides, "[u]nless otherwise provided by statute or rule (such as Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, 52 and 59), a motion for reconsideration shall be served and filed within 14 days after the entry of the order or judgment on the original motion by the Judge or Magistrate Judge."
The motion will be denied for two independent reasons.
Defendants argue the instant motion should be denied as untimely. The Court agrees. Plaintiff does not dispute that his motion for reconsideration was filed 28 days (i.e., more than 14 days) after the entry of the order on the original motion. However, Plaintiff argues that his Motion for Reconsideration is brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), which is specifically exempted from the Local Rule's 14-day time limit. Rule 59(e) motions must befiled "no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment," Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), therefore, Plaintiff argues, his motion is timely.
Defendant responds that Rule 59(e) does not apply because the rule only applies to final judgments, not interlocutory orders. The Court agrees. First, the Court begins with the title and text of the rule itself: (emphasis added). The rule speaks of only judgments, not orders. This is significant given that the very next Rule -- Rule 60 -- is entitled "Relief from a Judgment or Order." (emphasis added).1
Mitchell v. Twp. of Willingboro Municipality Gov't, 913 F. Supp. 2d 62, 78 (D.N.J. 2013); see also, Jones v. Sanko Steamship Co., Ltd., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26205 at *10-11 (D.N.J. March 2, 2016)(Simandle, C.D.J.)() (internal citations omitted); Fields, Jr. v. Dickerson, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47278 at *2 (D.N.J. March 30, 2017)(Hillman, D.J.)() ; McPhaul v. Astrue, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17784 at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2011)(Linares, D.J.)() ; Byrne v. Calastro, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64054 at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2006)(Cavanaugh, D.J.)("[Local Civil Rule7.1(i)], rather than Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governs motions for reconsideration filed in the District of New Jersey.").2
The Court holds that Local Civil Rule 7.1(i), and not Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), governs Plaintiff's instant application. Accordingly, the motion is untimely.
Defendants also argue that "Plaintiff's alleged basis for reconsideration was not raised previously and therefore is not appropriate for reconsideration." (Opposition Brief, p. 5) Indeed, it appears undisputed that Plaintiff asserts a new theory of his Takings Clause claim as the basis of the instant motion, which is the same theory simultaneously asserted in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint.
The Court agrees that reconsideration is inappropriate. As a matter of logic, the Court cannot reconsider an issue not previously raised by the parties, and consequently not considered by the Court in the first instance. See Shanahan v. Diocese of Camden, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37994 at *5-6 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2014)(Hillman,D.J.)("'[n]ot only are ... motions [for reconsideration] not a substitute for the appellate process, such motions are not an opportunity to argue what could have been, but was not, argued in the original set of moving and responsive papers.'")(quoting Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 130 F. Supp. 2d 610, 613 (D.N.J. 2001)); Oritani Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 744 F. Supp. 1311, 1314-15 (D.N.J. 1990)(denying a motion for reconsideration of the Court's summary judgment...
To continue reading
Request your trial