Ziyadat v. Diamondrock Hospitality Co., 20-10485

• Decision Date: 13 July 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-10485,20-10485
• Citation: 3 F.4th 1291
• Parties: Rami ZIYADAT, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. DIAMONDROCK HOSPITALITY COMPANY, d.b.a. The Westin Beach Resort Fort Lauderdale, Defendant - Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

3 F.4th 1291

Rami ZIYADAT, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.DIAMONDROCK HOSPITALITY COMPANY, d.b.a. The Westin Beach Resort Fort Lauderdale, Defendant - Appellee.

No. 20-10485

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

July 13, 2021

Yechezkel Rodal, Morgan & Morgan, PA, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Kristen Diane Montgomery, Rodal Law, PA, FT Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Forrest Lee Andrews, Katherine Alexandra Chin, Stephen Hunter Johnson, Lydecker Diaz, LLC, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises out of a lawsuit brought by a former guest at a Florida hotel alleging (as relevant here) a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits racial discrimination in contracting. In particular, the guest, who is Arab, claims that one of the hotel's employees falsely accused him of engaging in inappropriate behavior at the pool, that the employee did so because she harbored animus against Arabs, and that employee's accusation led to his eviction. The district court held that the allegations in the guest's complaint failed to state a claim under § 1981 and thus dismissed the case with prejudice. Because we conclude—at this preliminary stage, anyway—that the guest's allegations plausibly allege a circumstantial case of racial discrimination, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

I

A

Rami Ziyadat reserved an eight-night stay at the Westin Fort Lauderdale in his own name. He and his fiancée, Taylor Schneider, arrived together and enjoyed their first three days at the Westin without incident. On the fourth day, Ziyadat and Schneider went to the pool, ordered a drink, and headed toward a nearby area to tan. The parties offer different accounts of what happened next.

According to Ziyadat's story—which we must accept as true for purposes of this appeal—when he got up for some water, the towel attendant stared at him. In particular, Ziyadat says, the attendant seemed to be staring at his tattoo, which included faded Arabic letters and a chain encircling his bicep. According to Ziyadat, as he and Schneider were getting out of the pool, the attendant said to him: "You don't look like you belong here. What are you doing here?" Ziyadat told the attendant that he and Schneider were hotel guests and asked her what she meant. She responded that she was calling security.

The towel attendant had a different story. According to her, Ziyadat was engaging in inappropriate behavior in the presence of children—including trying to remove Schneider's bikini top. She also claimed that he was using profane language and that he vomited in the pool. Ziyadat denies all this; he says that he acted pleasantly and that the towel attendant's account—the bikini, the profanity, the vomit—was a "complete fabrication."

Ziyadat alleges that he and Schneider left the pool and went to the front desk, where they told a manager, Robert Munn, their version of events. Munn issued them vouchers and then went to visit with his family, who had just arrived. Ziyadat and Schneider returned to the pool, but, according to Ziyadat, they felt like they were being watched by two security guards. As Ziyadat explains it, the towel attendant had told one of the guards her story about his supposed misbehavior.

Ziyadat and Schneider abandoned their pool plan and instead went up to their room to get ready to explore the Everglades. But as they were preparing to leave, they heard a knock at their door. It was Munn and the head of security. Munn explained to Ziyadat and Schneider that they were being evicted for "inappropriate" behavior and for "violat[ing] hotel policy." Ziyadat and Schneider were then escorted out by security. And to add insult to injury, Munn denied their refund request for the remaining days.

Ziyadat is Arab and has a beard. He says that none of the other hotel guests around that afternoon looked Arab. And he claims that while he and Schneider were at the pool, the towel attendant treated the other guests "pleasantly and cordially." Accordingly, Ziyadat alleges that the towel attendant fabricated her story because he is Arab. And that story, Ziyadat continues, led Munn to evict him. The towel attendant, he posits, conveyed her story to the security guard, who in turn conveyed the same lie to Munn. According to Ziyadat, Munn merely parroted what he'd heard from either the towel attendant or the security guard and spent no time independently investigating the poolside incident because he was spending time with his family.

B

Ziyadat sued Diamondrock Hospitality Company d/b/a The Westin Beach Resort Fort Lauderdale. He alleged that the Westin discriminated against him in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, breached its contract with him, and defamed him. In particular, Ziyadat contends that the towel attendant saw that he was Arab, fabricated a story about him, communicated that story to management via the security guard, and thereby caused the manager, Munn, to evict him.

The Westin filed a motion to dismiss Ziyadat's complaint for failure to state a claim, which the district court granted. The district court reasoned that even if Ziyadat had sufficiently alleged that the towel attendant mistreated him because of his race, he had not alleged that her racial animus caused his contractual injury—namely, his eviction. The court reasoned that the allegations suggested that Munn spoke to Ziyadat, Schneider, and the security guards, but not the towel attendant, and, therefore, that the towel attendant's alleged animus played no causal role in Ziyadat's contractual injury. Having dismissed Ziyadat's federal claim, the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over his state-law breach of contract and defamation claims and dismissed the case.

On appeal, Ziyadat contends that he has alleged a plausible claim that the Westin discriminated against him in violation of § 1981 because the towel attendant's discriminatory animus against him caused her to fabricate a story that, in turn, caused Munn to evict him.¹ In the alternative, he argues that, even if he failed to state a claim under § 1981, the district court erred in denying his request for leave to submit an amended complaint.

II

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court should dismiss for failure to state a claim only when the plaintiff's factual allegations, if true, don't "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). In determining whether allegations satisfy this standard, we must "view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the plaintiff's well-pleaded facts as true." Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez , 480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th Cir. 2007). But we must ignore "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

As relevant here, in order to state a claim under § 1981, Ziyadat must allege (1) intentional racial discrimination (2) that caused a contractual injury. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms. , 372 F.3d 1250, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004) ; see also Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1014, 206 L.Ed.2d 356 (2020). A contractual injury includes any injury relating to "the making, performance, modification, [or] termination of [the] contract[ ]," or to "the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b).

A

As to the first element, a plaintiff may establish racial discrimination directly or circumstantially. Rioux v. City of Atlanta , 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008).

Here, Ziyadat hasn't adequately alleged direct discrimination. To state a claim for direct racial discrimination, a plaintiff must allege the overt invocation of race by the alleged discriminator—for instance, the use of a racial slur or racially charged language. See Kinnon v. Arcoub, Gopman & Assocs., Inc. , 490 F.3d 886, 891 (11th Cir. 2007) (intentional discrimination established directly where defendant's employee used a racial slur); cf. Lopez v. Target Corp. , 676 F.3d 1230, 1231–33 (11th Cir. 2012) (defendant conceded intentional discrimination where its employee mocked and spoke slowly and loudly toward Hispanic customer). Ziyadat's complaint contains no such allegations.

He doesn't contend that the towel attendant ever disparaged his race, used racially charged language, or otherwise said anything about race to anyone. To be sure, Ziyadat alleged that the towel attendant stared at him and his tattoo and said, "You don't look like you belong here. What are you doing here?" But the fact that she purportedly acknowledged how he "look[ed]" no more establishes that she discriminated against him because of his race than it establishes that she discriminated against him because of his facial hair, tattoos, height, demeanor, clothing, or physique. Because not all discrimination based on appearance is based on race, Ziyadat hasn't alleged facts that would establish direct discrimination.

We conclude, though, that Ziyadat has alleged a plausible circumstantial case of racial discrimination. A § 1981 plaintiff seeking to prove racial discrimination by circumstantial evidence may proceed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, which was originally conceived for Title VII claims. See Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia , 918 F.3d 1213, 1220 n.5 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc). To make out a prima facie case, the plaintiff must point to comparators of a different race who were "similarly situated in all material respects" and were not subject to the same mistreatment. Id . at 1229. In the employment context, this typically means that the comparators must have engaged in the same basic conduct or misconduct, been subject to the same policy, worked under the same supervisor, and had...