Zolner v. U.S. Bank Nat'Lass'N, CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:15-cv-00048

• Decision Date: 01 December 2015
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:15-cv-00048
• Parties: JESSICA ZOLNER PLAINTIFF v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION A/K/A U.S. BANK A/K/A ULTON PROCESSING SERVICES, INC. and HARTFORD-COMPREHENSIVE EMPLOYEE BENEFIT SERVICE COMPANY A/K/A THE HARTFORD DEFENDANTS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

JESSICA ZOLNER PLAINTIFF v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION A/K/A U.S. BANKA/K/A ULTON PROCESSING SERVICES, INC.and HARTFORD-COMPREHENSIVE EMPLOYEE BENEFIT SERVICE COMPANY A/K/A THE HARTFORD DEFENDANTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:15-cv-00048

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY OWENSBORO DIVISION

December 1, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Hartford-Comprehensive Employee Benefit Service Company's Partial Motion to Dismiss Counts Two and Three [DN 31]. Fully briefed, this matter is ripe for decision. For the following reasons, the Partial Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Jessica Zolner, "began her employment with Defendant U.S. Bank in Henderson, Kentucky in December 2012." (Pl.'s Second Am. Compl. [DN 28] ¶ 9.) Defendant U.S. Bank provided Plaintiff with employee benefits, including disability benefits, and Defendant Hartford-Comprehensive Employee Benefit Service Company (hereinafter "Hartford") "assisted in management of these benefits and in administration of U.S. Bank's Family and Medical Leave Act" leave for employees. (Id. ¶ 10.)

Around January 2014, Plaintiff alleges that she began experiencing health issues that caused her to be "exhausted" and to "experienc[e] extreme pain." (Id. ¶¶ 13, 15.) Plaintiff states that she suffers from multiple sclerosis, depression, carpel tunnel, and bipolar disorder, which cause "her trouble with or the inability to do tasks including caring for herself, performing manual tasks, walking, standing, lifting, bending, learning, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working." (Id. ¶ 16.) "In or before January 2014," Plaintiff requested FMLA leave and disability benefits from "defendants." (Id. ¶¶ 18, 19.) Plaintiff states that she was then approved on January 18, 2014 for FMLA leave through June 18, 2014. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 22.) When communicating with both Defendants after January 18, 2014, she asserts that she was told that she "need not communicate her absences . . . because she was approved for continuous FMLA leave through June 2014." (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff allegedly received two letters from Hartford informing her of her approved FMLA leave, one received on February 24, 2014, approving leave between February 15, 2014 and June 18, 2014, and one received on March 31, 2014, approving leave between March 2, 2014 and June 18, 2014. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 24.)

However, on April 14, 2014 Plaintiff received a letter from U.S. Bank informing her that she had been terminated due to the fact that she had not communicated her absences to U.S. Bank. (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff contends that her termination was caused by her taking FMLA leave and because of her disabilities. (Id. ¶ 26.) She asserts that she experienced harassment by fellow U.S. Bank co-workers and was met with agitation, annoyance, and inconvenience due to her taking "intermittent FMLA" leave. (Id. ¶ 27-29.) Later, she alleges Defendants refused to provide her with her requested medical records and FMLA certifications, and Defendants denied her disability benefits. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 32.)

Plaintiff then "filed a disability discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission" (hereinafter "EEOC"), and she "received a 'right-to-sue' letter dated November 20, 2014." (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Partial Mtn. Dismiss [DN 31-1] at 4.) Subsequently, Plaintiff filed her original Complaint on April 2, 2015, which contained three claims: one fordenial of disability benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (hereinafter "ERISA"), one for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act (hereinafter "ADA"), and one for Family Medical Leave Act (hereinafter "FMLA") interference and retaliation. (Pl.'s Compl. [DN 1] ¶¶ 35-60.) On July 30, Defendant Hartford filed a Motion to Dismiss Counts Two and Three of Plaintiff's Complaint. (Def.'s Mtn. Dismiss [DN 19].) On August 8, 2015, Plaintiff then amended her Complaint, adding an alleged violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (hereinafter "KCRA") to her discrimination claim. (Pl.'s Am. Compl. [DN 24] ¶ 45.) On August 12, 2015, Plaintiff amended her complaint once more, dropping her claim under the ADA and pursuing her disability claim only under the KCRA. (Pl.'s Second Am. Compl. [DN 28] ¶¶ 44-48.) Plaintiff then filed her Response to Hartford's Motion to Dismiss on August 24, 2015, in which she requested leave to amend her Complaint once more if the Court did not rule in her favor. (Pl.'s Resp. [DN 30] at 4.) On August 26, 2015, Defendant Hartford then filed this Partial Motion to Dismiss Counts Two and Three of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. (Def.'s Partial Mtn. Dismiss [DN 31].) Plaintiff failed to respond to this Motion. Because the Partial Motion to Dismiss at issue here addresses the most recent version of the Complaint and noting no opposition from Plaintiff, the Court will only rule on the instant motion, as the earlier is now rendered moot.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court "must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiffs," League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted), "accept all well-pled factual allegations as true," id., and determine whether the "complaint . . . states a plausible claim for relief," Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Under this standard, theplaintiff must provide the grounds for its entitlement to relief, which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A plaintiff satisfies this standard only when it "pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint falls short if it pleads facts "merely consistent with a defendant's liability" or if the facts do not "permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Id. at 679. Instead, "a complaint must contain a 'short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 663 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). "But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant Hartford moves this Court to Dismiss Count Two and Three of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint regarding disability discrimination under the KCRA and FMLA interference and retaliation. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Partial Mtn. Dismiss. [DN 31-1] at 6-15.) Hartford argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted for either count because none of the purported acts of disability discrimination involve Hartford and because Hartford was not Plaintiff's employer under the KCRA or the FMLA. (Id.) The Court agrees, and will address these counts in turn.

A. Count Two: Disability Discrimination under the KCRA

Under the KCRA, "[i]t is an unlawful practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against an individual . . . because the person is a qualified individual with a disability." KRS § 344.040(1)(a). "Because the language of theKCRA mirrors that of its federal counterpart, courts interpret the KCRA consistently with federal anti-discrimination law." Brown v. Humana Ins. Co., 942 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730 (W.D. Ky. 2013) (citing Brohm v. JH Props., Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 520 (6th Cir. 1998); Howard Baer, Inc. v. Schave, 127 S.W.3d 589, 592 (Ky. 2003)). Consequently, the Court will analyze this disability discrimination claim under the framework provided by the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Id.

In order to hold a defendant liable under the ADA or the KCRA, a plaintiff must show that the defendant was his or her "employer" within the meaning of those statutes, Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 992-93 (6th Cir. 1997); see Bracken v. DASCO Home Med. Equip., Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 686, 697-98 (S.D. Ohio 2013), as KRS § 344.040 specifically "prohibits discrimination by employers," Spivey v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 246 F. Supp. 2d 714, 718 (W.D. Ky. 2003). Typically, a direct employment relationship provides the basis for liability under the ADA; however, "courts have fashioned various doctrines by which a defendant that does not directly employ a plaintiff may still be considered an 'employer' under those statutes." Swallows, 128 F.3d at 993. These theories examine whether the two entities are so interrelated that they may be considered a "single employer" or an "integrated enterprise," "whether one defendant has control over another company's employees sufficient to show that the two companies [act] as a 'joint employer,'" or "whether the person or entity that took the allegedly illegal employment action was acting as the agent of another company, which may then be held liable as the [plaintiff's] employer." Id. (citing Deal v. State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co. of Texas, 5 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 1993); Rivas v. Federacion de Asociaciones Pecuarias de Puerto Rico, 929 F.2d 814 (1st Cir. 1991); Carrier Corp. v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 778 (6th Cir. 1985); Yorkv. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1982); Fike v. Gold Kist, Inc., 514 F.Supp. 722 (N.D. Ala.), aff'd, 664 F.2d 295 (11th Cir. 1981)); see Bracken, 954 F. Supp. at 698.

Here, Plaintiff claims that she "was discriminated against and wrongfully terminated because of her disabilities," and because of this, Hartford violated the KCRA. (Pl.'s Second Am. Compl. [DN 28] ¶ 46.) Plaintiff does not allege that she was, at any time relevant, employed by Hartford. Instead, she averred in her...