Zone Five, LLC v. Textron Aviation Inc.
| Decision Date | 16 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 20-1059-DDC-KGG |
| Parties | ZONE FIVE, LLC, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. TEXTRON AVIATION, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Plaintiffs-some 748 individual owners of airplanes manufactured by defendant Textron Aviation-sued defendant after their airplanes' windows cracked. Plaintiffs have filed eight claims against defendant-claims for (1) breach of implied warranty, (2) breach of express warranty, (3) fraudulent inducement, (4) strict liability in manufacturing, (5) strict liability in design, (6) negligence in manufacturing, (7) negligence in design, and (8) deceptive trade practices. Doc. 63 at 169-81 (Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 755-807). Defendant moves to dismiss six of the eight claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6). Before the court is defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 69) and Memorandum in Support (Doc. 70). Plaintiffs have responded (Doc. 82), and defendant has replied (Doc. 84). For the reasons explained below, the court grants defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 69), in part and denies it in part.
Also before the court is defendant's Motion for a More Definite Statement (Doc. 67) and Memorandum in Support (Doc 68). Defendant's motion asks that the court order plaintiffs to provide a more definite statement of Count VIII, their Deceptive Trade Practices claim, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). Doc. 67. Plaintiffs have responded (Doc. 81) and defendant has replied (Doc. 83). Defendant also has requested an oral argument on the issue.
See Doc. 67. Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply (Doc. 85). For reasons explained below, the court grants defendant's Motion for a More Definite Statement (Doc. 67), denies its request for an oral argument,[1] and denies plaintiffs' request for leave to file a surreply (Doc. 85).[2]
I. Factual Background
The following facts come from plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 63). The court accepts the facts as true and views them in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, as the party opposing the Motion to Dismiss. Doe v. Sch. Dist No. 1, 970 F.3d 1300, 1304 (10th Cir. 2020) ().
Hundreds of plaintiffs purchased defendant's aircraft, the Cessna TTx-a single engine, fixed-gear, general aviation aircraft.[3] Doc. 63 at 45-46 (Third Am. Compl. ¶ 1). At all times relevant, defendant designed and manufactured the Cessna TTx. Id. at 160 (Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 719-20). Each plaintiff's Cessna TTx Aircraft suffered cracks, varying in degree, in and around the windows, windscreen, and pilot and passenger handles, and through the window glass. Id. at 161 ). At times, this cracking caused complete failures of this airplane-which, for simplicity, this Order refers to as the Aircraft. Id.
Defendant designed and manufactured this Aircraft with a latent defect. Id. at 46 ). This defect caused the windows and, or the windscreen, and adjacent Aircraft skin to crack. Id. These cracks created seriously safety of flight issues-including the potential for failure of the airframe, and injury and death of occupants. Id. Plaintiffs also incurred exorbitant repair costs due to these defects or lost the use of their Aircraft due to grounding it for safety reasons. Id.
Defendant promised repeatedly to correct and repair these defects but never did. Id. It induced plaintiffs to wait for non-existent repairs. Id. ). Plaintiffs provide a few specific examples of defendant's promises: On August 12, 2010, defendant's director of field operations mailed a letter to plaintiff Steve Masters acknowledging reports of cracking and assuring Mr. Masters that defendant would pay for materials and labor to repair cracking. Id. at 166 ); Doc. 63-8 (Masters Emails); Doc. 63-11 (Masters Letter). On February 11, 2009, defendant mailed a letter to plaintiff John Stenger, advising Mr. Stenger that defendant was aware of the cracking, and that defendant was revising its initial service bulletin to fix the problem, and would announce a new service bulletin and plan. Doc. 63 at 166 (Third Am. Compl. ¶ 746); Doc. 63-9 (Stenger Letter). Then, in 2014, plaintiff Bogdan Cocosel and defendant exchanged emails about the cracking issue, and defendant reassured plaintiff Cocosel that it was developing a solution to the problem. Doc. 63 at 168 (Third Am. Compl. ¶ 754); Doc. 63-14 (Cocosel Emails).
The owner of an aircraft Type Certificate, like defendant here, possesses exclusively the information about any global problems with design, systematic component failures, or dangerous trends within a model or type design. Doc. 63 at 47 (Third Am. Compl. ¶ 7). The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires Type Certification owners to document such failures to protect and educate consumers. Id. Here, defendant failed to do so. Id. ). Instead, defendant offered false assurances that the problems plaintiffs experienced with their Aircraft were simply “cosmetic” in nature and presented no structural or safety issues. Id.; see also id. at 161 ). Defendant made this statement-that the cracking issues presented no safety issues-knowing that it wasn't true. Id. at 161 ); see also id. at 164 ). It did so to buy time and prevent examination from regulatory authorities. Id. at 47 ).
Defendant owed a duty to provide the FAA with information about the safety, airworthiness, maintenance, service requirements, and any field difficulties known to it. Id. at 160 ). It had a duty to provide the same information to the owners and operators of the Cessna TTx. Id. ). Defendant knew that its Aircraft- the Cessna TTx model-had pervasive problems of cracking around and on the actual windows and windscreen of the Aircraft. Id. ). And defendant knew or should have known that this pervasive cracking created a potential flight safety issue for the Aircraft. Id. ).
Defendant, through its managing agents and employees, repeatedly informed Aircraft owners that it would fix the problem with the Aircraft's window cracking. Id. ). It did so to induce owners and operators of the Aircraft to refrain from acting themselves. Id. ). Defendant represented-to plaintiffs and during a U.S. Bankruptcy Court proceeding-that it would repair all window cracks that began within the Aircraft's initial warranty period. Id. at 161 ); see id. at 165 ). Time and time again, defendant represented falsely that it was in the process of developing a solution for this cracking problem. Id. at 160 ). But instead, it ceased manufacturing the Cessna TTx around January 2018 without warning or notice. Id. ).
Defendant's stalling tactics have produced a dangerously defective product remaining on the market and remaining in the air. Id. at 47 ). A window breaking on an Aircraft-one capable of flying at an altitude of 25,000 feet at 275 miles per hour-would create a serious flight safety issue. Id. at 165-66 (Third Am. Compl. ¶ 742). Defendant's ongoing failure to correct this cracking defect, and ongoing misrepresentations about the safety of its product, create a heightened risk for one of these Aircraft to crash and injure or kill people. Id. at 47 ); see also id. at 166 ). Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit to ensure defendant fixes this defect and compensates plaintiffs for the damages they've sustained. Id. at 47 ).
Plaintiffs purchased the CessnaTTx-one of the most expensive single engine piston aircraft in the world-at a premium price. Id. at 167 ). Defendant's failure to repair these defects has decreased the Aircraft's value and will continue to do so. Id. And if the Aircraft's structural issues occur more frequently, the FAA will have to issue an Airworthiness Directive grounding the Aircraft and reducing plaintiffs' financial value to nothing. Id. ). Plaintiffs have done their part. They each operated their Aircraft in a reasonably prudent manner, in accordance with the applicable operating handbooks and manuals. Id. at 161 ). Plaintiffs maintained each Aircraft according to FAA regulations, “Service Literature,” and “Airworthiness Directives” promulgated by the FAA and defendant. Id. ). Had defendant provided accurate information about the Aircraft, plaintiffs would've paid substantially less for the Aircraft or purchased a different type of plane altogether. Id. at 167 ).
II. Motion to Dismiss Legal Standards
Defendant seeks dismissal of plaintiffs' claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and 9(b). Doc. 69 at 1. The court provides the governing legal standard for each rule, below.
Fed. R Civ. P. 12(b)(6) allows a party to move the court to dismiss an action for failing “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal...
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