Zotos v. Town of Hingham
| Decision Date | 19 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-11126-JGD |
| Parties | FREDERIC P. ZOTOS, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF HINGHAM, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
The plaintiff, Frederic P. Zotos ("Zotos"), has brought this action against the Town of Hingham, Massachusetts ("Town" or "Hingham"), and eleven of the Town's officials and employees, claiming that the defendants engaged in a fraudulent traffic enforcement scheme by illegally posting unreasonably low motor vehicle speed limits, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 18, and improperly issuing motor vehicle citations to the plaintiff and others for speeding in excess of the improperly posted limits. By his fourteen-count complaint, Zotos has asserted claims against the defendants, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of his right to substantive and procedural due process, as well as for punitive damages based on the alleged due process violations (Counts I-X). In addition, Zotos has asserted state law claims against the defendants for abuse of process(Count XI), fraudulent misrepresentation (Count XII), negligent misrepresentation (Count XIII), and unjust enrichment (Count XIV).1
The matter is presently before the court on the defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 4), by which the defendants are seeking dismissal of all of the plaintiff's claims against them pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The defendants contend that dismissal is warranted under the doctrine of claim preclusion because the plaintiff's claims were fully and finally litigated before the state courts in the matter of Hingham Police Dep't v. Zotos. They further contend that even if claim preclusion does not apply, Zotos' complaint still must be dismissed because the plaintiff has otherwise failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For all the reasons detailed herein, this court finds that claim preclusion does not bar Zotos' claims in this action, but that the plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief under any theory of liability. Accordingly, the defendants' motion to dismiss is ALLOWED with respect to all of Zotos' claims. Since this court is not prepared to rule that the plaintiff could not, under any circumstances, state a claim, the dismissal will be without prejudice.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts, and give the plaintiff the benefit of allreasonable inferences. See Cooperman v. Individual, Inc., 171 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 1999). "Ordinarily, a court may not consider any documents that are outside of the complaint, or not expressly incorporated therein, unless the motion is converted into one for summary judgment." Alt. Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001). "There is, however, a narrow exception 'for documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties; for official public records; for documents central to plaintiffs' claim; or for documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint.'" Id. (quoting Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993)). Applying this standard to the instant case, the facts relevant to the defendants' motion to dismiss are as follows.2
This litigation arose after Zotos received three speeding citations from Hingham police officers during the time period between November 2002 and December 2010. The first citation was issued to Zotos on November 9, 2002, and contained a warning fordriving in excess of a 30 mile per hour ("m.p.h.") posted speed limit on Cushing Street in Hingham. (Compl. ¶ 27 & Ex. 3 thereto). However, because it involved nothing more than a warning, Zotos was not required to pay an assessment or to take any other action with respect to the first citation. (Id.).
Zotos received the second citation on June 25, 2009. (Id. ¶ 31). At that time, defendant Officer Jeremiah Sullivan cited the plaintiff for the civil motor vehicle infraction ("CMVI") of driving in excess of a 30 m.p.h. posted speed limit on Charles Street at Maryknoll Drive in Hingham. (Id. & Ex. 7 thereto). Zotos initially requested a civil hearing to contest responsibility for the CMVI by making a signed request on the back of the citation and mailing it to the Registry of Motor Vehicles ("RMV"). (Id. ¶ 31). However, because he assumed that the speed limit had been properly posted and was lawfully enforceable, Zotos ultimately decided to waive the hearing and to pay the $130 assessment and $50 Head Injury Trust Fund surcharge necessary to resolve the CMVI without a hearing. (Id. ¶ 32).
On December 2, 2010, defendant Officer Eric Chessler issued Zotos a CMVI for driving 50 m.p.h., in excess of the 30 m.p.h. posted speed limit, on Gardner Street in Hingham. (Id. ¶ 37 & Ex. 13 thereto). According to Zotos, the receipt of a third speeding citation from a Hingham police officer led him to suspect that "something wasn't right." (Id. ¶ 37). Consequently, he denied responsibility for the CMVI and requested a civil hearing by making a signed request on the back of the citation and mailing it to the RMV. (Id. & Ex. 13 thereto). He also began a private investigation into the Town's trafficenforcement practices. (Id. ¶ 37). As described below, Zotos alleges that as a result of his investigation, he determined that the Town lacked authority to post and enforce the speed limits under which he was cited for speeding, and that the Town's actions were part of a larger scheme to post and enforce unreasonably low speed limit signs throughout the Town without abiding by the statutory and regulatory procedures required to do so.
Allegedly, the Massachusetts Department of Transportation ("DOT") Highway Department, acting in accordance with the authority granted to it under Section 18 and related statutes, has established regulatory procedures for the posting of speed limits within Massachusetts. (Compl. ¶ 21). Those procedures are set forth in a document entitled "Procedures for Speed Zoning on State and Municipal Roads (2005)," which reads in relevant part as follows:
Chapter 90, Section 18 authorizes the posting of numerical speed limits on all roadways in Massachusetts. The foundation for the actual posting of a speed limit is a thorough traffic engineering study. After a study has been completed, a Special Speed Regulation is drafted and approved by the governing authority of the roadway, the [RMV] and MassHighway. All posted regulatory speed limit signs must adhere to this approval process. If a speed limit is posted without this procedure, it is in violation of Chapter 90, Section 18, and is therefore considered illegal and unenforceable.
(Compl. ¶ 21) (emphasis added).
Each of the citations that Zotos received was issued pursuant to a speed limit posted under Section 18 of the Massachusetts speed laws. (See Compl. ¶¶ 27, 31, 37). Therefore, Zotos claims that in order to be enforceable, the posted speed limits had to have been established in accordance with regulatory procedures adopted by the DOT, and certified by both the DOT and the registrar of motor vehicles. . However, during his investigation into Hingham's traffic enforcement practices, Zotos allegedly obtained correspondence from state and local employees indicating that no speed study had ever been completed for Gardner Street in Hingham, where...
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