Zoulalian v. New England Sanatorium & Benevolent Ass'n

• Decision Date: 22 May 1918
• Citation: 119 N.E. 686,230 Mass. 102
• Parties: ZOULALIAN v. NEW ENGLAND SANATORIUM & BENEVOLENT ASS'N.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

230 Mass. 102

119 N.E. 686

ZOULALIAN

v.NEW ENGLAND SANATORIUM & BENEVOLENT ASS'N.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

May 22, 1918.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Loranus E. Hitchcock, Judge.

Action by Aran Zoulalian against the New England Sanatorium & Benevolent Association. Verdict for defendant, and plaintiff excepts. Exceptions overruled.

George P. Beckford, of Boston, for plaintiff.

Oscar Storer, of Boston, for defendant.

CROSBY, J.

This is an action for personal injuries, received by the plaintiff while in the employ of the defendant and at work on a buzz planer.

The defendant is a corporation organized ‘for the purpose of founding a hospital or charitable asylum * * * for the care and relief of indigent or other sick or infirm persons * * * and in no manner directly or indirectly for private profit or dividend paying, to any one.’ It is plain that the objects of the corporation being benevolent and charitable, it must be held to be a valid public charity. Conklin v. John Howard Industrial Home, 224 Mass. 222, 112 N. E. 606;Thornton v. Franklin Square House, 200 Mass. 465, 86 N. E. 909,22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 486;Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147, 78 N. E. 855,7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 481, 118 Am. St. Rep. 484,8 Ann. Cas. 1109, and cases cited. In New England Sanatorium v. Stoneham, 205 Mass. 335, 91 N. E. 385, it was held that the defendant in the case at bar was a charitable corporation and as such was exempt from taxation under R. L. c. 12, § 5, cl. 3.

It is the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant is within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (St. 1911, c. 751, and acts in amendment thereof); but we are unable to agree with this contention. While it is provided by section 2 of part 1, that ‘the provisions of section one shall not apply to actions to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by domestic servants and farm laborers,’ it does not follow that all other employés who may be injured in the course of their employment are within the terms of the act. Undoubtedly the rules of law declared by this court relating to persons injured while in the employ of charitable institutions may be changed by the Legislature, still that such change was made by the Workmen's Compensation Act is not to be inferred in the absence of a plain intention on the part of the Legislature to that effect.

[3] It has often been held that certain persons or classes of persons are excepted by implication out of a statute expressed in general words, the rule being that where the words of a law in their common and ordinary significance are sufficient to include such persons or classes of persons “the virtual exception must be drawn from the intention of the Legislature, manifested by other parts of the law; from the general purpose and design of the law; and from the subject matter of it.” Bradford v. French, 110 Mass. 365, 367;McCall v. Parker, 13 Metc. 372, 381,46 Am. Dec. 735.

It never has been held in this Commonwealth that a charitable institution was liable for negligence; on the other hand, it has been expressly held that such institutions are not liable for the negligence of their servants or agents. McDonald v. Mass. General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529; Farrigan v. Pevear, supra, and cases cited.

In Com. v. Rumford Chemical Works, 16 Gray, 231, at page 232, this court said:

‘But it is never to be presumed that the Legislature intended to make any innovations upon the common law further than is absolutely required upon a just interpretation of the provisions of its positive enactments. And this, it is said by Chancellor Kent, has been the language of the courts in every age. 1 Kent, Com. (6th Ed.) 464. In the decisions of our own, it has often been recognized as an established rule that a statute is not to be construed as a repeal of the common law unless the intent to...