Zukas v. Appleton Mfg. Co.
| Decision Date | 21 June 1917 |
| Docket Number | No. 10953.,10953. |
| Citation | 279 Ill. 171,116 N.E. 610 |
| Parties | ZUKAS v. APPLETON MFG. CO. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Appellate Court, Second District, on Appeal from Circuit Court, Kane County; C. F. Irwin, Judge.
Action by Peter Zukas against the Appleton Manufacturing Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appealed to Appellate Court (200 Ill. App. 403), where judgment was affirmed, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.
See, also, 277 Ill. 87, 115 N. E. 164.Thomas C. Angerstein, of Chicago (George W. Angerstein, of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.
Schuyler F. Lynn and David K. Tone, both of Chicago, for defendant in error.
Peter Zukas, a minor, by his next friend (hereafter referred to as plaintiff), sued the Appleton Manufacturing Company (hereafter referred to as defendant) for damagesfor a personal injury alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff, an employé of defendant, as a result of defendant's negligence. Defendant was operating a foundry for the manufacture of castings. The first count of the declaration alleges that in a certain room molten iron was occasionally emptied from the cupola upon the floor, causing an explosion dangerous to plaintiff and other employés working in the room; that plaintiff was inexperienced and unfamiliar with such dangers; that it was the duty of the defendant to give notice or warning before emptying said molten iron on the floor so plaintiff could retire and avoid injury from such explosions, but that defendant negligently failed to give such notice or warning October 20, 1913, but on that day deposited molten iron on the floor, causing a tremendous explosion, so that sparks, flames, and smoke spread to and upon plaintiff, burning him so that he ran to a portion of the room where there was a door and a window, and in the stress of circumstances, under great excitement, he inadvertently plunged through a window and fell to the ground, a distance of 16 feet, and received serious injuries. The other counts are not materially different from the first. Defendant pleaded the general issue. The cause was tried by a jury and resulted in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $2,500. On appeal to the Appellate Court for the Second District the judgment was affirmed. Defendant petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted, and the record has been brought to this court for review.
It is first contended that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the case, and the Appellate Court erred in not reversing the judgment.
Section 1 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1915-16, c. 48, § 126) provides that any employer in this state may elect to pay compensation to employés for injuries sustained, arising out of and in the course of the employment, according to the provisions of the act, and thereby relieve himself from liability except as provided in the act. The election to provide compensation under the act may be made by giving notice as provided in said section. Section 2 provides that every employer enumerated in paragraph (b) of section 3 shall be conclusively presumed to have filed notice of his intention to pay compensation according to the provisions of the act, unless and until he files his notice in writing with the Industrial Board of his election to the contrary, and furnishes his employés notice, personally or by posting notice in a conspicuous place in the plant, as required by the act. The occupations enumerated in paragraph (b) of section 3 are declared extrahazardous, and include such enterprises as defendant was engaged in.
It is contended that unless defendant had elected, by giving the notice required by the statute, that it would not provide compensation under the act, it was conclusively presumed to be operating under the act, and was relieved from any liability for damages to injured employés except as provided in the Workmen's Compensation Act. The declaration did not allege that defendant had elected not to provide compensation under the act. No objection was made to its sufficiency, but defendant pleaded the general issue. On the trial of the case counsel for the plaintiff offered to prove that the defendant had elected not to provide compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Counsel for the defendant objected to the proof being made, on the ground that it was not an issue in the case, and the objection was sustained. Among the defenses relied on by the defendant at the trial were assumed risk, contributory negligence of plaintiff, and negligence of a fellow servant. It does not appear that any objection was made by plaintiff to such defenses being interposed, and the trial court, at the request of both plaintiff and defendant, instructed the...
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Pienta v. Chicago City Ry. Co.
...or that plaintiff in error was harmed by so holding. Pease v. Rockford City Traction Co., 279 Ill. 513, 117 N. E. 83;Zukas v. Appleton Mfg. Co., 279 Ill. 171, 116 N. E. 610. Numerous other errors are urged as to instructions given and refused which we do not deem it necessary to discuss or ......
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Kinnan v. Chas. B. Hurst Co.
...act, is omitted, and it is therefore insisted that the decisions are not applicable to the act of 1911. The cases of Zukas v. Appleton Mfg. Co., 279 Ill. 171, 116 N. E. 610, and Curran v. Wells Bros. Co., 281 Ill. 615, 117 N. E. 984, are relied on as holding that a declaration charging negl......
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Davis v. St. Paul Coal Co.
...opinion, but are satisfied with its soundness and must adhere to it. This question was not squarely passed upon in Zukas v. Appleton Manf. Co., 279 Ill. 171, 116 N. E. 610, and in Barnes v. Illinois Fuel Co., 283 Ill. 173, 119 N. E. 48; but what was said in those cases clearly indicates the......
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