Zulick v. Patrons Mut. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 June 2008
• Docket Number: No. 18030.,18030.
• Citation: 287 Conn. 367,949 A.2d 1084
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: John M. ZULICK et al. v. PATRONS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

949 A.2d 1084

287 Conn. 367

John M. ZULICK et al. v. PATRONS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 18030.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 10, 2008.

Decided June 24, 2008.

Howard B. Schiller, Willimantic, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Joel J. Rottner, West Hartford, with whom was Steven B. Ryan, Hartford, for the appellee (defendant).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and SCHALLER, Js.

ROGERS, C.J.

The plaintiffs, John M. Zulick and Barbara Y. Zulick,¹ brought this action against the defendant, Patrons Mutual Insurance Company, alleging that the defendant had breached the terms of an insurance policy providing for coverage for loss of the plaintiffs' personal property and had violated the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA), General Statutes § 38a-815 et seq., and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on all of the plaintiffs' claims, and the plaintiffs then filed this appeal.² The plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly determined that the loss of their property fell within a coverage limitation for "personal property usually on [the] residential premises of an [i]nsured other than the [i]nsured premises...." We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court found the following undisputed facts. The plaintiffs owned and resided in a residence at 348 Lipps Road in Ashford. They also owned property at 296 Westford Hill Road in Ashford, which is adjacent to the property at 348 Lipps Road. They leased out a residence on the property at 296 Westford Hill Road and kept certain personal property in a barn and carriage shed located on the property. On August 27, 2002, a fire destroyed the barn and carriage shed, causing a loss of the plaintiffs' personal property in the amount of $39,084.43.

The defendant had issued an insurance policy to the plaintiffs providing coverage for the loss or damage to the property at 348 Lipps Road, including related private structures and personal property. The policy provided: "We cover personal property owned by or in the care of an [i]nsured. Coverage for personal property usually on residential premises of an [i]nsured other than the [i]nsured premises is limited to 10 percent of the [c]overage C limit." The coverage C limit of the policy was $84,700. The plaintiffs filed a claim under the policy for the loss of their personal property in the barn and carriage shed. The defendant responded that the personal property had been located on "residential premises other than the insured premises" and offered to pay the plaintiffs 10 percent of the coverage C limit, or $8470.³

Thereafter, the plaintiffs brought this action alleging that the defendant had breached the insurance policy and had violated CUTPA and CUIPA. The plaintiffs claimed that, because the destroyed barn and carriage shed had been "located adjacent to the principal residence" at 348 Lipps Road and were "neither used for nor suitable for residential use," the coverage limitation for personal property kept on residential premises did not apply. The defendant raised as a special defense that, because the personal property had been located on the separately insured property at 296 Westford Hill Road, the personal property was on "residential premises other than the insured premises" and the coverage limitation applied. Therefore, the defendant claimed, coverage was limited to 10 percent of the coverage C limit. The plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the defendant's special defense claiming that, because the policy language was ambiguous, it must be construed in their favor. The defendant objected to the plaintiffs' motion and filed a cross motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' complaint.

After a hearing, the trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and partially granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claim that the defendant had breached the insurance policy. The court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to the CUTPA and CUIPA claims on the ground that the motion was premature. The defendant later filed another motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' CUIPA and CUTPA claims, alleging that the plaintiffs had failed to present any evidence to support their claim that the defendant incorrectly had interpreted the coverage limitation as a general business practice. The trial court granted that motion.

This appeal followed. The plaintiffs contend that the trial court improperly: (1) determined that the property at 296 Westford Hill Road was a "residential premises of an [i]nsured other than the [i]nsured premises," thereby limiting coverage of their loss to 10 percent of the coverage C limit; and (2) rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiffs' CUTPA and CUIPA claims. We disagree with both claims.

We first address the plaintiffs' claim that the trial court improperly determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the property at 296 Westford Hill Road was a "residential premises of an [i]nsured other than the [i]nsured premises" under the policy's coverage limitation. The plaintiffs claim that the phrase is ambiguous and reasonably can be interpreted to mean exclusively a premises at which the insured resides. The defendant counters that the trial court properly determined that the phrase unambiguously means any property that is used as a residential premises.⁴ We conclude that the phrase unambiguously refers to a residential premises owned by an insured.

As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable standard of review. "Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.... The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... On appeal, we must determine whether the legal conclusions reached by the trial court are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision of the trial court.... Our review of the trial court's decision to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., 284 Conn. 193, 198-99, 931 A.2d 916 (2007).

"[C]onstruction of a contract of insurance presents a question of law for the court which this court reviews de novo.... An insurance policy is to be interpreted by the same general rules that govern the construction of any written contract.... In accordance with those principles, [t]he determinative question is the intent of the parties, that is, what coverage the ... [insured] expected to receive and what the [insurer] was to provide, as disclosed by the provisions of the policy.... If the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, then the language, from which the intention of the parties is to be deduced, must be accorded its natural and ordinary meaning.... Under those circumstances, the policy is to be given effect according to its terms.... When interpreting [an insurance policy], we must look at the contract as a whole, consider all relevant portions together and, if possible, give operative effect to every provision in order to reach a reasonable overall result....

"In determining whether the terms of an insurance policy are clear and unambiguous, [a] court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity.... Similarly, any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from one party's subjective perception of the terms.... As with contracts generally, a provision in an insurance policy is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible to more than one reading.... Under those circumstances, any ambiguity in the terms of an insurance policy must be construed in favor of the insured because the insurance company drafted the policy.... This rule of construction may not be applied, however, unless the policy terms are indeed ambiguous." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Medical Ins. Co. v. Kulikowski, 286 Conn. 1, 5-6, 942 A.2d 334 (2008).

We begin our analysis with the language of the policy. The policy provides "This policy insures against direct physical loss to property covered under [c]overage C — [p]ersonal [p]roperty, caused by ... [f]ire...." As we have indicated, coverage C provides: "We cover personal property owned by or in the care of an [i]nsured. Coverage for personal property usually on residential premises of an [i]nsured other than the [i]nsured premises is limited to 10 percent of the [c]overage C limit." The policy defines "residence" as "a one-[family] to four-family house, a townhouse, a row house or a one-[family] or two-family mobile home."

Contrary to the plaintiffs' claim, nothing in this language suggests that the coverage limitation applies exclusively to premises that are used by the insured as a residence. Rather, we conclude that an insured of ordinary intelligence and experience reasonably would expect the phrase "residential premises of an [i]nsured" to apply to all residential premises that are owned by the insured, regardless of whether the insured uses or occupies the premises.⁵ (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, we conclude that the language of the coverage limitation is not ambiguous under these circumstances,⁶ and that the trial court properly concluded that...