Zuna v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 03 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 4:15-cv-01825-MWB-GBC |
| Parties | THERESA ZUNA, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(JUDGE BRANN)
The above-captioned action is one seeking review of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant") denying Plaintiff's application for supplemental security income ("SSI") under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§401-433, 1382-1383 (the "Act"), and Social Security Regulations, 20 C.F.R. §§404 et seq., 416 et seq. (the "Regulations").1
Plaintiff complained of pain in her neck, back, shoulder, and right knee, numbness in her extremities, and shortness of breath and other respiratory symptoms. Doc. 10. Examinations and imaging showed objective abnormalities in her neck, back, shoulder,right knee, and respiratory system. Doc. 10. Vocational evidence indicates that if these impairments restricted Plaintiff to a limited range of sedentary work with additional mental limitations, she could perform the basic job responsibilities of a semi-conductor bonder, a stuffer, and a nut sorter. Doc. 10. If claimant can perform even one of these jobs, she is not disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (). A nut sorter "observes nut meats on conveyor belt, and picks out broken, shriveled, or wormy nuts and foreign matter, such as leaves and rocks" and "[p]laces defective nuts and foreign matter into containers." 521.687-086 NUT SORTER, DICOT 521.687-086. Non-treating medical opinions, uncontradicted by any other "medical opinion" in the record, supported the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff could perform a range of sedentary work. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(a) (defining "medical opinion"). In Chandler, the Third Circuit held that an ALJ properly relied on a non-treating opinion, where no other medical opinion existed in the record before the ALJ. Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 360-63 (3d Cir. 2011); see also 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527(a); (d) (If statement is from individual who is not an acceptable medical source, or is on issue reserved from the Commissioner, it does not meet definition of "medical opinion").
The Court finds that the ALJ properly relied on the medical opinions and denied benefits. The substantial evidence standard requires the Court to uphold the ALJ'sdecision if any reasonable person would have relied on the relevant evidence to deny Plaintiff benefits. Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003). The ALJ decision only lacks substantial evidence if the Court would direct a verdict in Plaintiff's favor. Id. Plaintiff's lay interpretation of medical evidence and less-than-fully credible testimony are insufficient to demonstrate that no reasonable person would have relied on the medical opinions to find that she could perform work in the national economy, or that the Court would direct a verdict in her favor if the issue were before a jury. The Court recommends that Plaintiff's appeal be denied, the decision of the Commissioner be affirmed, and the case closed.
On July 11, 2012, Plaintiff applied for SSI. (Tr. 26). On November 13, 2012, the Bureau of Disability Determination denied this application, (Tr. 107-25) and Plaintiff requested a hearing. (Tr. 126). On July 7, 2014, an ALJ held a hearing at which Plaintiff—who was represented by an attorney—and a vocational expert ("VE") appeared and testified. (Tr. 41-89). On July 18, 2014, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled and not entitled to benefits. (Tr. 17-40). Plaintiff requested review with the Appeals Council, which the Appeals Council denied on February 9, 2015, thereby affirming the decision of the ALJ as the "final decision" of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-7). See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107 (2000).
On September 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed the above-captioned action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to appeal the decision of the Commissioner. (Doc. 1). On November 27, 2015, the Commissioner filed an answer and administrative transcript of proceedings. (Docs. 9, 10). On January 5, 2016, Plaintiff filed a brief in support of the appeal ("Pl. Brief"). (Doc. 12). On February 5, 2016, Defendant filed a brief in response ("Def. Brief"). (Doc. 16). February 12, 2016, Plaintiff filed a brief in reply ("Pl. Reply"). (Doc. 17). On January 15, 2016, the case was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. The matter is now ripe for review.
To receive benefits under the Act, a claimant must establish an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act requires that a claimant for disability benefits show that:
He is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
The ALJ uses a five-step evaluation process to determine if a person is eligible for disability benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals a listed impairment from 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 ("Listing"); (4) whether the claimant's impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant's impairment prevents the claimant from doing any other work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520. Before step four in this process, the ALJ must also determine Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC"). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e).
The disability determination involves shifting burdens of proof. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. If the claimant satisfies this burden, then the Commissioner must show at step five that jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). The ultimate burden of proving disability under the Act lies with the claimant. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a). Specifically, the Act provides that:
An individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the Commissioner of Social Security may require. An individual's statement as to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability as defined in this section; there must be medical signs and findings, established by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, which show the existence of a medical impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which, when considered with all evidence required to befurnished under this paragraph (including statements of the individual or his physician as to the intensity and persistence of such pain or other symptoms which may reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs and findings), would lead to a conclusion that the individual is under a disability.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1382c(a)(3)(H)(i).
The Court reviews the ALJ's decision under the deferential substantial evidence standard. Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ decision unless no "reasonable mind might accept [the relevant evidence] as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (internal citations omitted). "Stated differently, this standard is met if there is sufficient evidence 'to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict.'" Id. (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951)). Substantial evidence is "less than a preponderance" and "more than a mere scintilla." Jesurum v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
The Regulations classify Plaintiff, born in 1966, as a younger individual. (Tr. 17); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563. Plaintiff has a limited education and no past relevant work. (Tr. 33). The administrative transcript is 672 pages long. Doc. 10.
Plaintiff alleges onset in October of 2010. (Tr. 26). She briefly reported musculoskeletal symptoms in the summer of 2011, but by October 2011, she had no musculoskeletal symptoms. (Tr. 295, 297, 300).
She established care in February of 2012 with PA-C Nse Apke, who noted she "ha[d] some forms for completion." (Tr. 319). She reported back symptoms and numbness in her upper extremities, and reported neck pain on follow-up. (Tr. 317, 319). On June 28, 2012, she was hospitalized for a latex allergy and had no musculoskeletal complaints, normal gait, and walked without assistance. (Tr. 430). On July 11, 2012, she applied for SSI. (Tr. 26). On July 12, 2012, she presented to an orthopedic PA-C, D. Miller-Griffie, using a cane, although her gait appeared normal, "declined"...
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