Zunamon v. Brown

Decision Date13 November 1969
Docket NumberNo. 19510.,19510.
Citation418 F.2d 883
PartiesSimon ZUNAMON, Appellee, v. W. G. BROWN, J. P. Brown, Sr., and J. E. (Doc) Brown, Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Sam Robinson, of Robinson, Thornton & McCloy, Little Rock, Ark., for appellants; James W. Gallman, of Ball & Gallman, Fayetteville, Ark., Carl Langston, of Langston & Langston, Little Rock, Ark., and Carneal Warfield, Lake Village, Ark., were on the brief and reply brief.

W. H. Daggett, of Daggett & Daggett, Marianna, Ark., for appellee and filed brief.

Before MATTHES, GIBSON and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges.

MATTHES, Circuit Judge.

In this diversity case, appellants, defendants in the district court, have appealed from the judgment awarding appellee damages in the amount of $8,921.20, and quieting title in appellee against all claims of appellants in certain real estate.

The litigation emanates from appellant W. G. Brown trespassing upon 37 acres of land owned by appellee and situated in Chicot County, Arkansas. Appellee, a citizen of Illinois, purchased the land from the Chicago Mill and Lumber Company on June 29, 1965. Claiming ownership and possession of the land by an unbroken chain of title and continuous payment of taxes by his predecessors in title, appellee alleged in his complaint filed May 12, 1966, that W. G. Brown, in complete disregard of an explicit warning letter from appellee's attorney, had trespassed upon the land in question, cleared it completely of timber, and sold the severed lumber, all subsequent to August 30, 1965. Appellee averred that the amount of merchantable timber removed was 118,941 board feet and that the value thereof was $4,162.93. He prayed for judgment against Brown for treble that amount under the punitive provisions of Ark.Stat.Ann. § 50-105 (1947), as amended, (Supp. 1967). In addition, appellee claimed damage to the real estate in the amount of $100 per acre, thereby asserting a total damage claim of $16,188.79. He also asked the district court to quiet title in himself as against Brown.

Brown admitted in his answer receipt of the warning letter, his entry upon the 37 acres, and the subsequent removal of the timber therefrom, but he specifically denied appellee's claim to ownership in the parcel, affirmatively asserting ownership and possession in himself. He further disputed the application of the Arkansas treble damage statute, and denied that the value of the timber removed exceeded $2,000. He prayed for dismissal of the action "and for all other relief."

On July 15, 1966, Brown moved to dismiss the action for lack of the requisite jurisdictional amount.1 Following a pre-trial hearing on October 3, 1967, an order was entered reciting:

"Pre-trial before Judge Oren Harris in Little Rock Arkansas. Argument of counsel on defendant\'s motion to dismiss; motion denied. * *"

The cause was tried on June 25, 1968. Appellee introduced evidence in conformity with the allegations of his complaint. Appellants presented, inter alia, evidence reflecting that only 69,616 board feet of timber was actually sold by W. G. Brown for $1,740.40. The district court entered judgment as stated at the outset of this opinion.2

I.

The threshold question for decision is whether, as appellants contend, the district court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter because the amount in controversy does not exceed the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

We begin with the principle that the amount claimed by plaintiff ordinarily controls in determining whether jurisdiction lies in the federal court. This was succinctly announced in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-289, 58 S.Ct. 586, 590, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938):

"The rule governing dismissal for want of jurisdiction in cases brought in the federal court is that, unless the law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal. The inability of plaintiff to recover an amount adequate to give the court jurisdiction does not show his bad faith or oust the jurisdiction. Nor does the fact that the complaint discloses the existence of a valid defense to the claim. But if, from the face of the pleadings, it is apparent, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed or if, from the proofs, the court is satisfied to a like certainty that the plaintiff never was entitled to recover that amount, and that his claim was therefore colorable for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction, the suit will be dismissed." (footnotes omitted).

It is clear, however, from the foregoing quote that the plaintiff's allegations of requisite jurisdictional amount are not necessarily dispositive of the issue. Were it otherwise, the statutory limitation would be rendered nugatory, and a patently frivolous claim could create federal jurisdiction.

"If the plaintiff\'s allegations of jurisdictional facts are challenged by his adversary in any appropriate manner, he must support them by competent proof. And where they are not so challenged the court may still insist that the jurisdictional facts be established or the case be dismissed, and for that purpose the court may demand that the party alleging jurisdiction justify his allegations by a preponderance of evidence." McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 785, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936). See also KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269, 277-278, 57 S.Ct. 197, 81 L.Ed. 183 (1936).

The crucial issue presented here is the extent of pretrial jurisdictional inquiry required by the rule of the St. Paul decision that the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls unless it appears to a legal certainty that this amount cannot be recovered.3 "As there is no statutory direction for procedure upon an issue of jurisdiction, the mode of its determination is left to the trial court." Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 71-72, 59 S.Ct. 725, 729, 83 L.Ed. 1111 (1939). See Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U.S. 115, 18 S.Ct. 293, 42 L.Ed. 682 (1898). In appropriate circumstances the district court may determine the jurisdictional question by receiving oral testimony and other direct evidence, Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561, 566, 35 S.Ct. 164, 59 L.Ed. 360 (1915), or by receiving and weighing affidavits. Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n. 4, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 91 L.Ed. 1209 (1947); KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, supra at 277-278, 57 S.Ct. at 200-201. But, it has also been held: "Where the jurisdictional issue as to amount in controversy can not be decided without the ruling constituting at the same time a ruling on the merits of the case, the case should be heard and determined on its merits through regular trial procedure." Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 253 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir. 1958). See also Smithers v. Smith, 204 U.S. 632, 27 S.Ct. 297, 51 L.Ed. 656 (1907); Wade v. Rogala, 270 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1959); Williams v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., 14 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.Cal.1953). Cf. Land v. Dollar, supra, 330 U.S. at 735, 67 S.Ct. 1009.

There is no one single solution to the question here presented. The scope of the pre-trial jurisdictional inquiry must of necessity turn upon the specific pleadings and facts involved in each particular case. Yet in resolving the question of the appropriateness of jurisdiction as measured by the legal certainty of plaintiff's claim, all doubts should be resolved by the district court in favor of allowing a plenary trial rather than a peremptory "trial" under the guise of an evidentiary jurisdictional hearing.

"The choice is essentially between a rule on the one hand that allows some cases involving inflated claims for relief to be brought in a federal forum in order to insure access to that forum for all those cases that properly may be brought there, and, on the other hand, a rule that closes the doors to the federal forum in the face of some claims that properly could be brought there in order to insure the denial of the forum to cases involving inflated claims. The present statutory pattern requires that we choose between these alternatives, and we feel the wiser choice is to choose the former and more liberal rule * * *. If access to federal district courts is to be further limited it should be done by statute and not by court decisions that permit a district court judge to prejudge the monetary value of an unliquidated claim." Deutsch v. Hewes Street Realty Corp., 359 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1966) (footnote omitted).

With the foregoing basic guides in mind, we have no difficulty in concluding that the district court did not fall into error in not holding a full-scale pre-trial evidentiary hearing on the jurisdictional question. The complaint did not merely allege that the amount in controversy exceeded $10,000, which is frequently the extent of the jurisdictional allegation. It pleaded in detail that, based upon a timber cruise made shortly before severance,4 W. G. Brown had cut 118,941 board feet of timber having an actual value of $4,162.93. The sum of that amount trebled plus the alleged $3,700 damage to the land, was $16,188.79.5 Certainly these allegations belie any suggestion that the claim was patently spurious or colorably asserted for the sole purpose of invoking jurisdiction in the federal court. It was not legally certain that appellee could not have recovered the full amount he had claimed.

Moreover, the district court had before it at the time it denied appellant Brown's motion to dismiss interrogatories submitted to appellee and his verified answers thereto. These answers detailed further the course pursued by appellee in arriving at the amount claimed in his complaint, and they were equivalent to an affidavit in support of his claim.

Appellants would have us determine...

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