Zurchin v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 09 January 2018
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 17–836
• Citation: 300 F.Supp.3d 681
• Parties: Cynthia ZURCHIN, Plaintiff, v. AMBRIDGE AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

300 F.Supp.3d 681

Cynthia ZURCHIN, Plaintiff,

v.AMBRIDGE AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 17–836

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed January 9, 2018

Vicki Kuftic Horne, Nicole Daller, Law Office of Vicki Kuftic Horne, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiff.

Julia M. Herzing, Mark J. Kuhar, Knox McLaughlin Gornall & Sennett, P.C., Erie, PA, Gary H. Dadamo, Roger W. Foley, Jr., Michael L. Brungo, Maiello, Brungo & Maiello, LLP, Nancy R. Winschel, Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, Scott G. Dunlop, Danielle M. Vugrinovich, Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Nora Barry Fischer, United States District Judge

I. Introduction

Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss and supporting brief filed by Defendants Robert Keber, Roger Kowal, and Kimberly Locher. (Docket Nos. 21, 22). Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition, to which Defendants replied. (Docket Nos. 30, 33). Also pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss and supporting brief filed by Defendant Megan Mealie. (Docket Nos. 24, 25). Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition, to which Mealie replied. (Docket Nos. 31, 32). After careful consideration of the parties' submissions; the allegations contained in Plaintiff's Complaint, (Docket No. [1] ); the standards governing motions to dismiss set forth by the Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), and as articulated in Third Circuit precedent, see, e.g. , Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp. , 809 F.3d 780, 790 (3d Cir. 2016) ; and for the following reasons, Defendants Keber, Kowal, and Locher's Motion to Dismiss, (Docket No. [21] ), is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, without prejudice to the parties renewing their arguments at the motion for summary judgment stage of this matter, and Defendant Mealie's Motion to Dismiss, (Docket No. [24] ), is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, without prejudice to Defendant Mealie renewing her arguments at the motion for summary judgment stage of this matter.

II. Background

In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following relevant facts, which the Court accepts as true for the purpose of deciding the pending motions to dismiss.

Plaintiff was hired as the Superintendent of Ambridge Area School District ("AASD") on March 20, 2013. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 29). At the time of her hiring, several school board members opposed her selection and preferred to hire a male candidate who was a high school principal from the area. (Id. at ¶ 31). As a consequence of Plaintiff's hiring over the male candidate, Defendants Roger Kowal and Brian Padgett began a targeted retaliatory campaign to foster a hostile working environment and recruited other board members to further their discriminatory objective. (Id. at ¶¶ 36–37). The pattern of retaliation and creation of a hostile work environment was consistent and pervasive from the outset of Plaintiff's employment. (Id. at ¶ 39).

During a board meeting on June 12, 2013, Defendant Padgett screamed, "You mother fucker, you better watch yourself. I will go after you. You better watch yourself, you mother fucker," and "I will get you," at Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 42–44). Defendant Padgett was subdued by other board members, who separated him from Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 46). Defendant Kowal laughed during the threat and thereafter. (Id. at ¶ 47). After Plaintiff filed a police report on June 13, 2013, Defendant Padgett was charged with harassment and terroristic threats. (Id. at ¶ 51). After word circulated that Defendant Padgett was going to shoot Plaintiff at a future board meeting, police were present at subsequent board proceedings. (Id. at ¶¶ 52–53). Defendant Padgett concluded his term on the school board in November 2013 and pled guilty to the harassment charges in July 2014 after Plaintiff refused to withdraw the criminal complaint. (Id. at ¶¶ 54–56). After Defendant Padgett entered his plea, Defendant Kowal informed Plaintiff, "I will ruin you if it's the last thing I do; if it means ruining this school district." (Id. at ¶ 57). Concerted activity was thereafter undertaken by Defendants Kowal, Badgett, and Mealie for the purpose of causing harm to Plaintiff's professional reputation and employment. (Id. at ¶ 59). For example, Plaintiff was publicly and falsely accused of running a meth lab and engaging in Satanic worship. (Id. at ¶ 62). Defendants engaged in a deliberate, malicious, and ongoing pattern of abusive and threatening behavior to cause Plaintiff physical, emotional, and economic harm. (Id. at ¶ 63).

In September 2014, School Resource Officer Nate Smith mistreated and restrained without authorization J.H., an African American student with a documented disability. (Id. at ¶ 67). Based upon video surveillance and school policy, Plaintiff reported that incident to the Pennsylvania Department of Education, Bureau of Special Education, as an improper restraint and requested that the local police department remove Smith from his role as a School Resource Officer. (Id. at ¶¶ 68–74). After Defendant Kowal informed the police chief that he should not heed Plaintiff's concerns, Smith remained on school grounds. (Id. at ¶¶ 75–77). When Plaintiff suggested offering a summer school graduation ceremony for students with special needs, Defendant Locher stated, "Fuck those kids." (Id. at ¶¶ 77–78). Several board members directly interfered with Plaintiff's attempts to satisfy the rights of special needs students in an effort to force her resignation through an oppressive and retaliatory work environment. (Id. at ¶¶ 80–82).

In March 2015, Plaintiff advised the board that she had received a report that school district funds were being stolen by the Baden tax collector. (Id. at ¶ 83). Defendant Kowal, a personal friend of the auditors serving the district and tax collector, became defensive, verbally abusive, and challenged Plaintiff's need to report the information. (Id. at ¶¶ 84–86). The tax collector was convicted in federal court of mail fraud and filing false income tax returns. (Id. at ¶ 87). Plaintiff's report was met with animosity and hostility to create an oppressive work environment to compel her to resign or be terminated. (Id. at ¶ 88).

Also, in March 2015, a teacher filed a complaint, alleging that Defendant Mealie was subjecting her to sexual harassment by making unwelcome visits to her home. (Id. at ¶¶ 89–90). The teacher turned over sixty pages of text messages demonstrating that the harassment had occurred. (Id. at ¶ 91). Plaintiff suspended Defendant Mealie pending an investigation and participated as a witness in the district's independent investigation. (Id. at ¶¶ 92–93). In addition to revealing sexual harassment by Defendant Mealie, the text messages between February and March 2015 illustrated collusion between board members and Defendant Mealie to create a hostile work environment for Plaintiff, an intent to physically harm Plaintiff, a desire to effectuate Plaintiff's discharge, and malice. (Id. at ¶¶ 94–97).

In July 2015, Plaintiff was denied a 2% pay increase, after all other active administrators were given a 2% pay increase and one-time bonuses ranging from $1,000 to $2,000. (Id. at ¶¶ 98–99). Defendant Locher indicated that the board would not give raises to any individual who had not yet had an evaluation. (Id. at ¶ 101). Pursuant to school district policy and the terms of Plaintiff's employment contract, the board was required to perform her annual evaluation prior to the end of the school year. (Id. at ¶¶ 102–103). By refusing to perform the evaluation, the board denied Plaintiff an increase which she was otherwise due. (Id. at ¶ 104). Additionally, the board interfered with Plaintiff's ability to attend educational conferences and required her to exhaust vacation days to attend same, despite conference attendance being permitted under the terms of her contract. (Id. at ¶ 105).

On October 12, 2015, Defendant Keber told custodial staff members that if they came to a special board meeting and looked up, they would see Plaintiff with her head in a noose hanging from the bridge. (Id. at ¶ 109). Thereafter, the board members engaged in intensifying public actions to foment public antipathy toward Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 110). After outlining Defendants' actions and text messages between June 2013 and October 2015, Plaintiff alleges that she was hospitalized for stroke-like symptoms. (Id. at ¶¶ 112–117). As a result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression, requiring her to take medical leave. (Id. at ¶¶ 119–120). The medical leave, which commenced less than twenty-four hours after Defendant Keber's noose comment, was extended, and Plaintiff was ultimately not released to return to work. (Id. at ¶¶ 121–122).

Plaintiff asserts nine claims against Defendants. (Id. at ¶¶ 123–236). Relevant to the pending motions to dismiss, Plaintiff asserts the following claims: (1) a claim for sex discrimination and retaliation at Count III against Defendants AASD, Keber, Kowal, Locher, and Padgett, (id. at ¶¶ 147–153); (2) a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 at Count IV against all Defendants, (id. at ¶¶ 154–164); (3) a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 at Count VI against Defendants Keber, Kowal, Locher, Mealie, and Padgettt, (id. at ¶¶ 179–191); and (4) a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations at Count VIII against Defendants Keber, Kowal, Locher, Mealie, and Padgett, (id. at ¶¶ 204–220).

III. Legal Standard

When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must " ‘accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to...