Zuviceh v. Nationwide Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 11 May 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 2000 CA 0773.,2000 CA 0773. |
| Parties | Barbara Songy ZUVICEH v. NATIONWIDE INSURANCE COMPANY. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Albert J. Nicaud, Metairie, LA, for plaintiff/appellant, Barbara Songy Zuviceh.
Raymond P. Augustin, Metairie, LA, for defendant/appellee, Nationwide Insurance Company.
BEFORE CARTER, C.J., WEIMER and KLINE,1 JJ.
This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment holding that under LSA-C.C. art. 3515, et seq., Mississippi law is applicable to the interpretation of an uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) policy. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On August 15, 1998, Barbara Songy Zuviceh (Zuviceh), a Mississippi resident, was injured in a head-on collision that occurred in Slidell, Louisiana. The accident occurred when a vehicle owned and operated by Steven Wicks, a Louisiana resident, allegedly crossed the center line and struck Zuviceh's vehicle.
On the date of the accident, Steven Wicks had in full force and effect a policy of automobile liability insurance issued by Allstate Insurance Company with limits of liability of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars per person. Also on the date of the accident, Zuviceh had in full force and effect a policy of UM coverage issued to her and her husband, Fred Zuviceh, by appellee, Nationwide Insurance Company (Nationwide). Nationwide issued the policy to the Zuvicehs in the state of Mississippi and, at the time of its issuance, the Zuvicehs' vehicle was registered in Mississippi.
Under Louisiana law, automobile insurance delivered or issued for delivery in this State for a vehicle registered in Louisiana must have UM coverage equal to the liability amount unless the named insured had rejected UM coverage or selected lower limits. LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(i). Such rejection must be in writing on a form provided by the insurer. LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(ii). Purportedly, Nationwide has no such form executed by Zuviceh.
Zuviceh petitioned the trial court for a judgment declaring whether Louisiana or Mississippi law applied to the UM coverage provided to her by Nationwide. After applying a choice-of-law analysis, the trial court determined that Mississippi law applied to interpret the terms of the Nationwide policy because Mississippi has a more substantial interest in the uniform application of its laws than Louisiana has in providing an insurance remedy to an out-of-state resident who sustains an injury while temporarily within the state's borders. It is from this adverse finding that Zuviceh appeals.
In 1985, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided the case of Snider v. Murray, 461 So.2d 1051 (La.1985), to resolve a conflict among the Louisiana Courts of Appeal regarding the application of Louisiana law on UM coverage. The court held that even if Louisiana law applied to the litigation, LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(1), by its express terms, affected only automobile policies delivered or issued for delivery in this state and since the policy at issue was neither delivered nor issued for delivery in Louisiana, plaintiffs could not avail themselves of LSA-R.S. 22:1406. The court further stated, "Perhaps the Legislature could have enacted a law which under modern conflict of laws theories would affect insurance policies written in other states when the accident occurs in Louisiana, but the Legislature did not include such a provision in La.R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)." (Footnote omitted.) Snider, 461 So.2d at 1053-1054. Subsequently, by Acts 1987, No. 444, the Legislature enacted LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(iii), which states:
This Subparagraph and its requirement for uninsured motorist coverage shall apply to any liability insurance covering any accident which occurs in this state and involves a resident of this state.
After the enactment of LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(iii), Louisiana courts were faced with the issue of whether Louisiana's UM law now automatically applies to policies when the accident occurs in Louisiana and involves a Louisiana resident, or whether the court must conduct a conflict-of-laws analysis to determine what law applies. The courts of appeal have reached conflicting resolutions to that issue. Our review of the jurisprudence reveals the following decisions rendered recently by the courts of appeal.
The third circuit's most recent case on the subject, Anderson v. Oliver, 97-1102 (La.App. 3d Cir.1/7/98), 705 So.2d 301, writ denied, 98-0755 (La.5/8/98), 718 So.2d 434, analyzed its three previous cases of Willett v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 594 So.2d 966 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 598 So.2d 355 (La.1992); Holcomb v. Universal Insurance Co., 93-1424 (La. App. 3d Cir.6/1/94), 640 So.2d 718, writ denied, 94-1740 (La.10/7/94), 644 So.2d 643; and Trautman v. Poor, 96-627 (La. App. 3d Cir.12/11/96), 685 So.2d 516. The court then determined that the correct method of analysis was that of Willett and Holcomb; because these cases present conflict-of-laws issues, the first thing to be determined is which state's law is applicable. Anderson, 705 So.2d at 305. In reaching that decision, the third circuit in Anderson specifically rejected the analysis employed in Trautman.2
The fifth circuit, in Drew v. Martello, 98-1141, 98-1142, p. 6 (La.App. 5th Cir.2/23/99), 729 So.2d 90, 93, concluded that Louisiana's UM law specifically provides that it is applicable to "any accident which occurs in this state and involves a resident of this state." Therefore Louisiana law was properly applied to the facts of the case. The court conducted no choice-of-law analysis.
In Adams v. Thomason, 32,728 (La.App. 2d Cir.3/1/00), 753 So.2d 416, writ denied, XXXX-XXXX (La.6/16/00), 764 So.2d 965, the second circuit analyzed the appellate courts' conflicting jurisprudence considering the issue of whether LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(iii) automatically requires the application of Louisiana law. The court then concurred with the third circuit's decision in Anderson and determined that it is more appropriate to conduct a full analysis of the conflict-of-laws principles involved than to merely rely upon LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(iii). Adams, 753 So.2d at 426.
The fourth circuit most recently addressed the issue in Austin v. Western World Ins. Co., 99-2541 (La.App. 4th Cir.5/17/00), 765 So.2d 390,writ denied, XXXX-XXXX (La.9/22/00), 768 So.2d 1288. Therein, the court relied on its previous decision of Dekeyser v. Automotive Cas. Ins. Co., 97-1251 (La.App. 4th Cir.2/4/98), 706 So.2d 676, in which it held that LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(iii) provided a specific rule governing the question of UM coverage, thus it was the Legislature's intent that the specific rule, i.e. LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(iii), control the conflict of laws issue rather than the provisions of Civil Code Book IV entitled "Conflict of Laws." Austin, 765 So.2d at 393. The court then determined that the Louisiana law provision in the UM statute did not violate either the Due Process or Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution and held that Louisiana's UM law applied to the facts of the accident. Austin, 765 So.2d at 393-395.
In summary, the second and third circuits favor a choice of law analysis over the automatic application of LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(iii). The fourth and fifth circuits would automatically apply Louisiana's UM law based on the Legislature's pronouncement in LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(iii) without conducting a choice-of-law analysis.
LSA-C.C. art. 14 provides, "Unless otherwise expressly provided by the law of this state, cases having contacts with other states are governed by the law selected in accordance with the provisions of Book IV of this Code." In "Louisiana Conflicts Law: Two `Surprises'", 54 La.L.Rev. 497, 503 (1994), Professor Symeon C. Symeonides3 explains the impact of LSA-C.C. art. 14, as follows:
[T]hrough its introductory phrase "[u]nless otherwise expressly provided by the law of this state," Article 14 establishes the residual character of Book IV vis-a-vis other more specific provisions of Louisiana legislation. Book IV is not intended to supersede more specific conflicts rules contained in other Louisiana Statutes, such as those found in the Insurance Code.... When applicable, those rules, being more specific, will prevail over the provisions of Book IV of the Civil Code. (Emphasis added.)
The threshold issue is whether LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(iii) of the UM Statute is a provision "otherwise expressly provided by the law of this state" as stated in LSA-C.C. art. 14, which requires application of Louisiana law without a conflict-of-law analysis.
Appellee directs our attention to LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D) and LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(iii), to wit:
(Emphasis added).
The introductory paragraph of LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D) states unqualifiedly that the provisions enumerated thereafter apply to policies issued in Louisiana. The Legislature did not change that qualification by amending the statute to include the language of LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(iii). As it is written, the amendment, which is one of the "following provisions" referred to in LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D), governs the issuance of UM coverage in Louisiana.
The starting point for interpretation of any statute must be the language of the statute itself; when the law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and its letter shall not be disregarded in search of the intent of the legislature. LSA-C.C. art. 9; Barrilleaux v. NPC, Inc., 98-0728, p. 4 (La.App. 1st...
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Zuviceh v. Matioinwide Ins. Co., 2000 CA 0773.
... 786 So.2d 340 Barbara Songy v. NATIONWIDE INSURANCE COMPANY. No. 2000 CA 0773. Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit. May 11, 2001. Rehearing Denied June 20, 2001. Page 341 Albert J. Nicaud, Metairie, LA, for plaintiff/appellant, Barbara Songy Zuviceh. Raymond P. Augustin, Metairie, ......