Zweber v. Credit River Twp.
| Decision Date | 16 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | A14-0893 |
| Parties | Mark R. Zweber, Respondent, v. Credit River Township, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
Reversed
Scott County District Court
Thomas M. Fafinski, Nathan W. Nelson, Lesley J. Adam, Virtus Law, PLLC, Brooklyn Park, Minnesota (for respondent)
Paul D. Reuvers, Jason J. Kuboushek, Iverson Reuvers Condon, Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellants)
Considered and decided by Hudson, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Minge, Judge.*
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellants county and township challenge the district court's judgment determining that it had subject-matter jurisdiction to address respondent developer'sconstitutional claims arising from the approval of his plat application with conditions. Because the plat approval subject to conditions is a quasi-judicial action, which is reviewable only by certiorari appeal within 60 days, and because respondent's constitutional claims are not separate and distinct from that action, we reverse.
In January 2006, respondent Mark R. Zweber submitted to appellant Scott County a preliminary plat application for a proposed 39-lot subdivision, Estates of Liberty Creek (Liberty), to be located on an approximately 100-acre parcel of undeveloped land in appellant Credit River Township. The preliminary plat's northern section contained one through road; the southern section contained a double cul-de-sac, to be accessed through a road located in Territory, an adjacent development that had been established by Laurent Development Company, LLC (Laurent).
In March 2006, Laurent's president contacted county planning staff and officials with concerns relating to Liberty's street interconnectivity. After county and township staff met with Zweber to discuss amending the plat, he changed the proposal to add a through connection in the area of the previous cul-de-sac. A month later, Laurent's president wrote again to county officials, stating that Laurent was "still . . . very upset" with the proposed Liberty plat and suggesting a more westerly location for the new through street, a connection to County Road 8 for Liberty, and a different plat layout. County planning staff responded that a connection to Highway 8 was not recommended.
In August 2006, Laurent representatives once more contacted county officials and spoke at a county planning advisory commission meeting expressing concerns aboutinadequate traffic circulation, road alignment close to Territory, and construction phasing diverting all construction traffic through residential areas. The county planning advisory commission recommended plat approval, with a new condition of phased construction proceeding from west to east. Zweber, however, asserted that starting construction on the west would require obtaining a roadway easement from the adjoining westerly property owner and involve prohibitive road-construction costs.
Two weeks later, Laurent's president also wrote to county officials, requesting that Zweber disconnect a planned connection allowing traffic between a cul-de-sac in Liberty and a cul-de-sac in Territory. In September 2006 the county board voted to approve the preliminary plat with conditions, including initial construction phasing from the west and barricading the connection with Territory until the development of Liberty was 90% complete. In October 2006, the county planning manager informed Zweber of the preliminary plat approval.
In July 2007, the county planning commission recommended final plat approval, but Zweber indicated that he had no plans to begin construction activity that year and submitted a different development plan. The next month, Zweber, the township, and the county board entered into a three-way Master Development Agreement, under which Zweber agreed to develop Liberty from west to east in two phases over a five-year period. During the second phase, temporary barricades would be erected in two locations and kept in place, respectively, until construction of the Liberty infrastructure was 90% complete and until the development of Territory was 90% complete. The agreement alsorequired Zweber to defend or indemnify against any of his own claims against the county or township.
Rather than proceeding with the approved Liberty development, Zweber applied to Scott County for a proposed re-subdivision, which would create nine lots off a cul-de-sac in Territory and incorporate the double cul-de-sac design initially proposed for Liberty. The county board denied the re-subdivision on the ground that it was not consistent with transportation standards outlined by county ordinance. Zweber appealed by certiorari to this court, which reversed and remanded for re-subdivision approval. Zweber v. Scott Cty. Bd. of Commr's, No. A09-1990, 2010 WL 2733275 (Minn. App. July 13, 2010).
Following this court's decision, the county and Zweber continued to negotiate a revised development plan for Liberty. But in September 2012, Zweber also sought mandamus relief in district court, alleging that the conditions imposed with respect to his preliminary plat in 2006 amounted to an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions and 42 U.S.C. §1983 (2006). In January 2013, over Zweber's objection, the county board approved a revised development plan. The next month, Zweber's lender served him with a foreclosure notice regarding the property.
In August 2013, Zweber filed an amended complaint and petition, realleging his taking claim and also asserting an equal-protection claim, alleging that he had received disparate treatment from that received by Laurent, a similarly situated developer, who had obtained a substantial construction credit for road work and built numerous cul-de-sacs in Territory. Zweber sought an order for condemnation proceedings, damages, and a declaratory judgment that he was not required to indemnify against his claims against the county or township under the Master Development Agreement.
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The township and the county asserted, among other issues, that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Zweber's claims because they related to quasi-judicial decisionmaking and should therefore have been asserted by certiorari appeal to this court. They also sought dismissal of Zweber's claims against the township on the ground that the county was the final decisionmaker regarding plat approval, as well as a judgment declaring that the Master Development Agreement required Zweber to indemnify.
The district court issued two partial judgments. In the first partial judgment, the district court issued an underlying order concluding that it had subject-matter jurisdiction to address Zweber's constitutional arguments and denied summary judgment on both parties' claims. The district court also dismissed Zweber's claim for mandamus relief and denied the county's and township's motion to dismiss the township as a party. The second partial judgment declared that the claim-waiver-and-indemnity provision in the Master Development Agreement did not apply, so that Zweber was not required to indemnify the county and township for his claims. The county and township appeal.1
The county and the township allege that the district court erred by concluding, in denying summary judgment, that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over Zweber's constitutional claims. This court reviews the district court's denial of summary judgment de novo "to determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist, and whether the district court correctly applied the law." Cnty. of Wash. v. City of Oak Park Heights, 818 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
Subject-matter jurisdiction involves the court's authority to hear the type of dispute and grant the type of relief sought. Seehus v. Bor-Son Constr., Inc., 783 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Minn. 2010). Without subject-matter jurisdiction, a court must dismiss a claim. See Tischer v. Hous. & Redev. Auth. of Cambridge, 693 N.W.2d 426, 427 (Minn. 2005) (). The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction presents an issue of law, which we review de novo. Id. at 428.
"If a writ of certiorari filed under Minn. Stat. ch. 606 with the court of appeals is the exclusive method by which to challenge a municipality's decision, then the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case." Cnty. of Wash., 818 N.W.2d at 538. And if a litigant aggrieved by a decision fails to obtain a timely writ of certiorari, that litigant is not entitled to review on the merits of the challenge by way of some other remedy. See id.; see Minn. Stat. § 606.01 (2014) ().
Absent a statute expressly authorizing judicial review, "[w]hen the underlying basis of [a] claim requires a review of a municipality's quasi-judicial decision to determine its validity, the exclusive method of review is by certiorari under chapter 606." Cnty. of Wash., 818 N.W.2d at 539-40, 542. The certiorari process comports with fundamental separation-of-power principles and provides an appropriate method to limit and coordinate judicial review of an executive body's quasi-judicial decisions. Dietz v. Dodge Cnty., 487 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn. 1992). In contrast, a municipality's legislative decisions, which "affect the rights of the public generally," are not subject to certiorari review and must be challenged initially in district court. Cnty. of Wash., 818 N.W.2d at 539 (quotation omitted).
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