Coram v. State, Docket No. 113867.

• Decision Date: 12 September 2013
• Docket Number: Docket No. 113867.
• Citation: 2013 IL 113867,996 N.E.2d 1057,375 Ill.Dec. 1
• Parties: Jerry W. CORAM, Appellee, v. The STATE of Illinois. The Illinois Department of State Police, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2013 IL 113867

996 N.E.2d 1057

375 Ill.Dec. 1

Jerry W. CORAM, Appellee,

v.The STATE of Illinois.

The Illinois Department of State Police, Appellant.

Docket No. 113867.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 12, 2013.

Prior Version Recognized as Unconstitutional

18 U.S.C.A. § 925(c)

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Brett E. Legner, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

RaNae A. Dunham Inghram, of Inghram & Inghram, of Quincy, for appellee.

Stuart F. Delery, James A. Lewis, Mark B. Stern and Anisha S. Dasgupta, of the United States Department of Justice, of Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae The United States.

OPINION

Justice KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Burke, J., specially concurred and filed opinion in which Freeman, J., joined. Theis, J., dissented and filed opinion in which Garman, J., joined.

[375 Ill.Dec. 2]¶ 1 This appeal comes to us pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 302(a) (Ill. S.Ct. R. 302(a) (eff. Oct. 4, 2011)), the circuit court of Adams County having held section 922(g)(9) of the federal Gun ControlAct of 1968, as amended (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006)), unconstitutional as applied to Jerry W. Coram.

¶ 2 Before this court, the Illinois Department of State Police (the Department), appellant herein, contends that the firearm ban of section 922(g)(9) is “constitutional under the Second Amendment,” both facially and as applied to Coram. The United States, as amicus curiae, argues that “the circuit court erred in holding that the denial of petitioner's application for a firearm owner's identification card infringes on any constitutionally protected interests.” As we see it, there is no viable argument as to whether the federal firearms ban was properly imposed upon Coram and others like him. At oral argument Coram's attorney more or less conceded as much. Moreover, as will appear hereafter, we see no need to address the contention that section 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional as applied to Coram; nor, we conclude, was there a reason for the circuit court to do so.

¶ 3 We believe the applicable state and federal statutory schemes can be interpreted in a manner consistent with congressional intent and in such a way as to afford Coram his firearm rights under the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 22) and the second amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. II). We thus conclude the circuit court erred in holding section 922(g)(9) unconstitutional as applied to Coram.

¶ 4 CORAM'S 1992 CONVICTION

¶ 5 On June 26, 1992, Jerry Coram was charged, in the circuit court of Adams County, with the offense of domestic battery, pursuant to section 12–3.2(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, ¶ 12–3.2(a)(1)), the information stating that Coram had “slapped [the victim] in the face with his hand.” A police report indicated that Coram was intoxicated during an argument preceding the incident, and the victim, Coram's live-in girlfriend, had advised Coram, just prior to the assault, that she had engaged in sexual intercourse with other men. On July 10, 1992, Coram pled guilty to the offense of domestic battery, as charged. He was sentenced to 12 months' conditional discharge and was ordered to pay a $100 fine, plus costs. No jail time was imposed as part of the sentence. There is no indication that the charge to which Coram pled had been reduced to induce the guilty plea. Nothing in the police report of the incident suggests that a firearm was present when the offense was committed.

¶ 6 At the time of Coram's conviction, the disqualifying provisions of Illinois' Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (FOID Card Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, ¶ 83–8(a) through (h)) would not have affected Coram's rights to keep and bear arms under either the Illinois Constitution or the second amendment to the United States Constitution. In 1992, no federal statute disqualified Coram from possessing firearms as a result of his misdemeanor domestic battery conviction.

¶ 7 CORAM'S 2009 FOID CARD APPLICATION

¶ 8 In 2009, Coram applied for a FOID card. In his application, he truthfully answered that he had previously been convicted of domestic battery. He subsequently received a letter from the Illinois State Police denying his application based upon a 1996 amendment to the federal Gun Control Act of 1968, ¹ which imposed a firearm disability upon any person convictedof a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” Although not identified as a statutory basis for denial in the letter, the action was obviously premised upon the authority granted the Illinois State Police under section 8(n) of the FOID Card Act to deny the applicant a card, in the first instance, where the person is “prohibited from acquiring or possessing firearms or firearm ammunition by any Illinois State statute or by federal law.” 430 ILCS 65/8(n) (West 2010).

¶ 9 Where, as here, “the denial” of a FOID card, and hence the right to legally possess a gun under Illinois law, was “based upon [a prior conviction of] * * * domestic battery”—among other offenses the statute also addresses forcible felonies—section 10(a) of the FOID Card Act states that “the aggrieved party may petition the circuit court in writing in the county of his or her residence for a hearing upon such denial.” 430 ILCS 65/10(a) (West 2010). At that hearing, the court is charged with determining whether “substantial justice has not been done,” and if it has not, the court is authorized by statute to direct the Department to issue the FOID card. 430 ILCS 65/10(b) (West 2010). The court's determination with respect to substantial justice is governed by the criteria of subsection (c) of section 10. Pertinent to the case before us, the statute provides that the court may “grant * * * relief” from “such prohibition” “if it is established by the applicant to the court's * * * satisfaction that * * * the circumstances regarding a criminal conviction, where applicable, the applicant's criminal history and his reputation are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety; and * * * granting relief would not be contrary to the public interest.” 430 ILCS 65/10(c)(2), (c)(3) (West 2010). An applicant must also establish that he or she has not been convicted of a forcible felony within 20 years of the application, “or at least 20 years have passed since the end of any period of imprisonment imposed in relation to that conviction.” 430 ILCS 65/10(c)(1) (West 2010). By its plain language, subsection (c) of section 10, at the time of Coram's application and subsequent proceedings in the circuit court, allowed the court, in a proper case, to grant relief from prohibitory factors listed in section 8 and applied by the Department in the denial of a FOID card—including the factor listed in subsection (n).

¶ 10 PROCEEDINGS IN THE CIRCUIT COURT

¶ 11 On January 25, 2010, Coram filed a petition in the circuit court of Adams County seeking judicial review of the denial of his FOID card application. On May 10, 2010, Coram's petition came before Judge Mark Schuering for hearing. Pursuant to statutory requirements (430 ILCS 65/10(b) (West 2010)), the Adams County State's Attorney was given due notice and was afforded the opportunity to present evidence and object to the relief requested in the petition. The State's Attorney did neither.

¶ 12 A psychological report was filed in support of Coram's petition. In the report, the examining psychologist indicated that Coram exhibited no psychological malady and there appeared to be no reason for mental health treatment. The report states: “A careful review of [Coram's] life showed that, with the exception of the events that happened almost 20 years ago, he has lived an exemplary life. * * * He exudes a sense of significant social responsibility, is deeply religious, and has positive relationships with others.” The report concludes:

“There is no reason why, from a psychological viewpoint, [Coram] poses a danger to others, or should not be reconsideredfor an FOID [card]. He is a pleasant man; shows no aberration in the last 19 years that would be considered to be legally, morally, or ethically significant or problematic. His behavior is positive, pro-social, and his demeanor is pleasant and positive. His life space is solid, he has adequate supports, appears to be a competent worker who has enjoyed a 15 year tenure in the same place, and enjoys being a productive member of society.”

The examining psychologist “strongly recommended” that Coram be “reconsidered for an FOID [card],” noting, “[f]rom a mental health standpoint, there is no indication that [Coram] would be dangerous if given an FOID [card], and allowed to access any form of weaponry.”

¶ 13 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered an order directing the Illinois State Police to issue a FOID card to petitioner. In the body of his order, Judge Schuering acknowledged Coram's 1992 conviction, but concluded that “[s]ubstantial justice has not been done in the denial of Petitioner's application for a FOID Card by the Department.” In support of that assessment, the court found that “the circumstances regarding [Coram's] conviction, Petitioner's criminal history and his reputation are such that he will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety[,] [t]hat granting the relief requested in the said petition would not be contrary to the public interest.”

¶ 14 One month after entry of the order, the Department, through the Illinois Attorney General, filed motions to intervene and vacate the court's order. The motion to intervene was allowed. In support of its motion to vacate, the Department argued that federal law prohibited Coram from possessing a firearm and ammunition because of his 1992 misdemeanor domestic battery conviction, and the Department lacked the authority to issue a FOID...