United States v. Hernandez

• Decision Date: 08 February 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–40201.,11–40201.
• Citation: 670 F.3d 616
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Melinda HERNANDEZ, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

670 F.3d 616

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Melinda HERNANDEZ, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 11–40201.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Feb. 8, 2012.

Frank Thomas Pimentel, Asst. U.S. Atty., Laredo, TX, Renata Ann Gowie, Julia Bowen Stern, Asst. U.S. Attys., Houston, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Jose Eduardo Pena (Court–Appointed), Law Offices of J. Eduardo Pena, Laredo, TX, for Defendant–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before KING, WIENER, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

HAYNES, Circuit Judge:

Melinda Hernandez pleaded guilty to one count of harboring an undocumented alien for financial gain. Prior to entering her guilty plea, Hernandez filed a motion to suppress any “admissions [and] written or oral statements” that she made following a warrantless search of her residence, as well as any statements made by her boyfriend and an undocumented alien who was found in her home. The district court denied the motion. Hernandez argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the post– Miranda¹ statements that she, her boyfriend, and the illegal alien made constituted fruits of the poisonous tree. We agree; consequently, we REVERSE the denial of Hernandez's suppression motion, VACATE the conviction and sentence, which was based on a conditional guilty plea, and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts of this case are fully set forth in United States v. Hernandez, 392 Fed.Appx. 350 (5th Cir.2010) (unpublished), but we recount them briefly here. Law enforcement officers received an anonymous tip that ten to fifteen illegal aliens were being held against their will in Hernandez's trailer. The officers, including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents, went to Hernandez's trailer around midnight to investigate. The Government concedes that it did not have probable cause to arrest Hernandez or search her residence at this time. After announcing themselves and receiving no response, the officers banged on the doors and windows, shouting that they were police and that the occupants should open the door. The officers then heard movement within the trailer. They tried to open the front door, but the outer screen door was locked. After one of the officers broke the glass pane of the screen door with a baton, Hernandez screamed that she was coming to open the door. When Hernandez opened the door, she noticed that the officers had their weapons drawn. Although there was a dispute about exactly what transpired after Hernandez opened the door, the record reflects that Agent Garza told Hernandez about the anonymous tip and, in response, Hernandez told Agent Garza “that no one was being held against his will but also admitted—whether before or after officers entered the home is uncertain—that at least one illegal alien, a friend, was present.” Id. at 351.

The officers searched the trailer and found two illegal aliens, Luis Alberto Andrade–Quesada and his nephew, Jose Moises Regalado–Soto, in the trailer. Hernandez, Andrade–Quesada, Regalado–Soto, and Hernandez's boyfriend, Sergio Guadalupe Ayala, who was also in the trailer at the time, were taken to the ICE office for questioning. Hernandez and Ayala waived their Miranda rights and admitted that Andrade–Quesada and Regalado–Soto stayed in the trailer and that they knew that the two men were illegal aliens. Andrade–Quesada also made a statement indicating that he had agreed to pay Hernandez $150 per month so that he and his nephew could stay with her.

Hernandez was charged with harboring an illegal alien for financial gain. She pleaded guilty, but on appeal, we held that the officers' conduct was egregious, that the search of Hernandez's residence violated the Fourth Amendment, and that Hernandez's “motion to suppress should have been granted with respect to any evidence discovered on site at the trailer.” Id. at 352–53. We reversed the order denying Hernandez's motion to suppress, vacated Hernandez's conviction and sentence, and remanded the matter to the district court to consider whether the post– Miranda statements made by Hernandez and Ayala at the ICE office were admissible and whether the statement made by Andrade–Quesada was also admissible. Id.

On remand, the Government argued that, under New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 110 S.Ct. 1640, 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990), the post– Miranda statements were admissible because law enforcement officers had probable cause to arrest Hernandez at the time the statements were made based on Hernandez's prior admission at her doorway. The Government asserted that the constitutional violation, i.e., the illegal search, “had nothing whatsoever” to do with Hernandez's admission to the officer. Instead, the Government claimed that Hernandez's admission was the result of the officer's statement that he had received a tip that there were illegal aliens being held against their will in Hernandez's trailer.

Hernandez argued that the post– Miranda statements that she, Ayala, and the illegal alien made at the ICE office constituted fruits of the poisonous tree and should be excluded. She also argued that her doorstep admission that she had at least one illegal alien in her home, which the Government asserts gave authorities probable cause to arrest her, was obtained by exploiting the illegal entry into her home.

The district court denied Hernandez's motion to suppress, agreeing with the Government that the statements made by Hernandez, Ayala, and Andrade–Quesada at the ICE office were admissible. Relying on Harris, the district court concluded that “while the search of [Hernandez's] home may have been in violation of law, [Hernandez's] admission before the search occurred gave the officers probable cause to arrest her. Therefore, any statements made at the ICE office after being Mirandized are admissible.”²

Hernandez once again entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the district court's denial of her motion to suppress the statements made at the ICE office. She was sentenced to time served and to two years and 73 days of supervised release.³ She filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction to review Hernandez's conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the denial of a motion to suppress in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. United States v. Garcia, 604 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 291, 178 L.Ed.2d 191 (2010). The district court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Id. at 190. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if we are “left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 158, 178 L.Ed.2d 95 (2010).

III. DISCUSSION

Hernandez argues that her statement, as well as Ayala's and Andrade–Quesada's statements, must be suppressed as fruits of the officers' unlawful conduct. We address the admissibility of Hernandez's statement first, and then consider whether Ayala's and Andrade–Quesada's statements are admissible against Hernandez.

A. Is Hernandez's post-arrest statement admissible?

Generally, “the exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction at trial of all evidence that is derivative of an illegal search, or evidence known as the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’ ” United States v. Singh, 261 F.3d 530, 535 (5th Cir.2001). However, evidence should not be excluded merely because it would not have been discovered “but-for” a constitutional violation. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). “Rather, the more apt question in such a case is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Id. at 488, 83 S.Ct. 407 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Verbal statements, in addition to physical evidence, are subject to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 485–86, 83 S.Ct. 407. “[V]erbal evidence which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized arrest ... is no less the ‘fruit’ of official illegality than the more common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion.” Id. at 485, 83 S.Ct. 407. However, “since the cost of excluding live-witness testimony will often be greater, a closer, more direct link between the illegality and that kind of testimony is required.” United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 277, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978).

When deciding whether testimony is admissible, the Supreme Court considers the degree of free will exercised by the defendant or a third party and balances the cost of “exclusion [that] would perpetually disable a witness from testifying about the relevant and material facts” against the need to deter unconstitutional conduct in the future. Id. at 276–78, 98 S.Ct. 1054. Although Miranda warnings are an important factor to consider in determining whether a statement is voluntary, they are not the only factor. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). If the testimony is a confession, relevant factors for deciding whether the confession is a product of free will include: “[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances ... and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct ....” Id. at 603–04, 95 S.Ct. 2254 (citations omitted).

In this case, the district court did not consider any of these factors. Rather, the district court relied on New York v. Harris in concluding that the confession was admissible. In Harris, the Supreme Court addressed whether a...