Del Monte v. Wilson
Decision Date | 24 February 1992 |
Docket Number | No. S021805,S021805 |
Citation | 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 826,1 Cal.4th 1009,824 P.2d 632 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | , 824 P.2d 632, 60 USLW 2573 Charles DEL MONTE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Pete WILSON, as Governor, etc. et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
Howell Y. Jackson, Sacramento, for defendants and respondents.
Dan Stormer, Hadsell and Stormer, Paul Steven Miller, Western Law Center For the Handicapped, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and appellants.
We are to decide whether the distribution of veterans' benefits conditioned on California residency at a fixed point in the past violates the federal constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. We conclude that we are constrained by recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court to hold the statutes providing for such a distribution are unconstitutional.
Chapter 6 of the Military and Veterans Code, entitled "State Benefits for Veterans," provides for veterans' benefits including tuition and living expenses for students (Mil. & Vet.Code, § 980 et seq.), farm and home loan assistance (id., §§ 985 et seq., 987.50), and disaster indemnity (§ 989.4 et seq.). 1 Defining eligibility for benefits under the chapter as a whole, section 980 provides in pertinent part:
In a separate chapter providing for education benefits for veterans' dependents, section 890 defines the term "veteran" as follows: "any person who served in the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps of the United States and was killed in action or died as a result of war service in the World War since April 6, 1917; (2) any member of the Army, Navy, Coast Guard or Marine Corps of the United States, or any of their auxiliaries who was killed in action in World War II on or after December 7, 1941, and prior to January 1, 1947, or who died at any time as a result of war service during such period; (3) any member of the armed forces of the United States who was killed in action during any period of hostilities in which the United States is engaged, or who died or was totally disabled at any time as a result of active service during any such period or during the induction period; or (4) any person who, at the time of entry into the armed forces of the United States was a resident of this state and was subsequently declared by the United States government to be missing in action, captured in the line of duty by hostile forces, or forcibly detained or interned in the line of duty by a foreign government or power."
The Budget Act for many years has specified that no funds appropriated to provide assistance to veterans' dependents under section 890 et seq. shall be expended for the assistance of dependents of veterans not meeting the requirements of section 980. (See, e.g., 1990-1991 Final Budget Summary, Item No. 1960-001-001, pp. 72-73; 1989-1990 Final Budget Summary, Item No. 1960-001-001, p. 103.)
Plaintiffs are veterans of World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, and their dependents. 2 Respondent Department of Veterans Affairs refused them veterans' benefits on the ground that they had not been California residents at the time they entered military service. 3 On May 6, 1988, plaintiffs filed their petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, and moved for class certification. They alleged that the restriction of veterans' benefits to persons who were California residents at the time they joined the military service was a violation of the federal constitutional guaranty of equal protection and the right to travel. They also claimed that the limitation on expenditures in the Budget Act was a violation of the single-subject rule of the California Constitution, and that the arbitrary methods by which the Department of Veterans Affairs had considered their claims violated the federal constitutional guaranty of due process. 4
The trial court found that plaintiffs had standing, but entered a judgment denying the petition and rejecting plaintiffs' constitutional claims. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded with directions to issue the peremptory writ of mandate. 5 It held that the distinction drawn by the statutes violates the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution. It did not reach the question whether the statutes also violate the federal constitutional right to travel, or whether the item in the Budget Act violates the single-subject rule of the California Constitution. It held that the Department of Veterans Affairs failed to provide adequate procedural safeguards in denying benefits to dependents of veterans, and that the Military and Veterans Code must be interpreted to extend the veterans' procedural safeguards to applicants who are the dependents of veterans. Respondents petitioned for review, challenging only the holding that the statutes violate the federal constitutional guaranty of equal protection.
As we are called upon to determine whether the statutory scheme at issue here violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution, we reiterate the fundamental tenet of our jurisprudence that unless a statute impairs fundamental rights or involves an inherently suspect classification, "legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." (Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center (1985) 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313; see also New Orleans v. Dukes (1976) 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516, 49 L.Ed.2d 511.)
Despite this established rule of judicial deference to legislative classifications, we observe that in recent years the United States Supreme Court has struck down several state statutes that distinguished between long-term residents and recent migrants to a state. The high court invalidated statutes that employed fixed-point residency requirements to determine eligibility for benefits, maintaining that the very purpose of these statutes to prefer or reward established residents is illegitimate. In three cases the court analyzed the matter purely as a question of equal protection; in the fourth, a divided majority of the court could not agree whether such a statute also violated the constitutional right to travel, but struck down the state statute nonetheless. We feel constrained by these decisions to declare unconstitutional the statutes challenged here.
In Zobel v. Williams (1982) 457 U.S. 55, 102 S.Ct. 2309, 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (hereafter Zobel ), residents of Alaska attacked a statute that distributed income derived from exploitation of its natural resources to its residents in amounts dependent upon the duration of their residence. The legislation granted residents one dividend unit from the state's natural resources fund for every year of residence after 1959, when Alaska joined the union.
The court determined that the statute did not reasonably further a legitimate state purpose....
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