(1) Christopher Barnett v. (1) Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C.
| Decision Date | 23 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 18-cv-00064-TCK-FHM |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma |
| Parties | (1) CHRISTOPHER BARNETT, Plaintiff, v. (1) HALL, ESTILL, HARDWICK, GABLE, GOLDEN & NELSON, P.C., (2) J. PATRICK CREMIN, (3) JOHNATHAN L. ROGERS, and (4) UNIVERSITY OF TULSA, a private university, Defendants. |
Before the Court are (1) Defendant University of Tulsa ("TU")'s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)") (Doc. 13), (2) Defendants Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gabel, Golden & Nelson, P.C.'s, J. Patrick Cremin's, and Johnathan L. Rogers's ("Hall Estill Defendants") Motion to Dismiss pursuant to the Oklahoma Citizens Participation Act (Doc. 34), (3) TU's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to the Oklahoma Citizens Participation Act (Doc. 35), (4) TU's Objection to Ruling by Magistrate (Doc. 37), and (5) Hall Estill Defendants' Motion to Strike (Doc. 48). For the reasons discussed below, Hall Estill Defendants' and TU's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to the OCPA and TU's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) are GRANTED, and TU's Objection to Ruling by Magistrate and Hall Estill Defendants' Motion to Strike are DENIED AS MOOT.1
The instant case stems from events that occurred in Christopher Barnett v. Tulsa Community College, a lawsuit currently pending in Tulsa County District Court. (Doc. 29, Ex. 2) ("TCC case"). Plaintiff alleges that, in advance of the hearing on Plaintiff's motion for restraining order and temporary injunction in the TCC case, Defendants contacted the Oklahoma Attorney General's Office ("AG's office") to make a false threat report. In response to this, the AG's office reported potential threats to the Tulsa County Sheriff's Office and, upon arriving for a hearing on his motion, the presiding judge, Judge Jefferson D. Sellers ("Judge Sellers"), identified Plaintiff to a Tulsa County Sheriff's Deputy and instructed Plaintiff to speak to the Deputy. The Deputy asked Plaintiff if he had made any threats against anyone and, upon his denial, informed him that she had received a report of a threat that he made. Finally, the Deputy instructed Plaintiff to remain in the courtroom until he received permission to leave.
Plaintiff filed this action in Tulsa County District Court on January 5, 2018, in which he alleged the following claims against all Defendants: (1) unlawful seizure pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (3) false imprisonment, (4) false light, (5) abuse of process and (6) civil conspiracy. Hall Estill Defendants removed this action to this Court on January 30, 2018. (Doc. 2.) TU filed their Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on February 6, 2018, and both TU and Hall Estill Defendants filed their Motions to Dismiss pursuant to the Oklahoma Citizens Participation Act on March 6, 2018. (Docs. 13, 34 and 35.)
The Oklahoma Citizens Participation Act ("OCPA") is an anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation ("anti-SLAPP") law. Its stated purpose is "to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to 'petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person to file a meritorious lawsuit for demonstrable injury.'" See Anagnost v. Tomecek, 2017 OK 7, 390 P.3d 707, 709-10. It accomplishes these goals by allowing parties to file special motions to dismiss legal actions that relate or are in response to free speech. Id. In a motion to dismiss brought under the OCPA, the movant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claim "is based on, relates to, or is in response to the movant's exercise of the right of free speech, the right of petition, or the right of association." See Krimbill v. Talarico, 2018 OK CIV APP 37, 417 P.3d 1240, 1245-46. The burden then shifts to the party bringing the claim to show "by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question." Id.
A prima facie case consists of evidence sufficient as a matter of law to establish a given fact, if not rebutted or contradicted. See id. at 1246. In determining whether a prima facie case has been shown, the Court may consider the pleadings, as well as supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts on which the liability or defense is based. Id. at 1246-47. This standard exceeds both the notice pleadings standard of Oklahoma state court and the federal court pleadings standard of "sufficient to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." See id., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2012). It does not, however, impose a higher burden of proof than that required of the plaintiff at trial and allows the plaintiff to use circumstantial evidence. See Krimbill, 417 P.3d at 1246.
Hall Estill Defendants removed this case pursuant to the Court's federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiff's § 1983 claims. (Doc. 2.) Additionally, the Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims, as the claims are so related that they form part of the same case or controversy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2018). In exercising supplemental jurisdiction, the Court must apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151-52 (1988); Gasperini v. Ctr.for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 426-28 (1996); Erie R.R. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). However, "[c]lassification of a law as 'substantive' or 'procedural' . . . is sometimes a challenging endeavor." See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). In cases where the line between procedure and substance is unclear, the Supreme Court has set forth a multi-faceted analysis designed to prevent both forum shopping and the inequitable administration of laws. See Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v. AmeriCulture, Inc., 885 F.3d 659, 668 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 5.3, at 351-365 (7th ed. 2016)).
The Court must first look to whether a there is a valid federal statute or federal rule of procedure on point, such as a provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rules") or the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. If so, then the federal law should be applied, even if there is a conflicting state law. If there is no valid federal statute, the Court must then determine if the application of the state law is likely to be outcome determinative. If the state law is not outcome determinative, then federal law must be used. However, if the state law is outcome determinative, then the Court must determine if there is an overriding federal interest justifying the application of federal law. If state law is outcome determinative and there is no countervailing federal interest, then state law applies. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 5.3, at 351-365 (7th ed. 2016).
Plaintiff argues that the OCPA does not apply in this case. In support of this position, Plaintiff argues that (1) the OCPA does not apply in federal court, (2) Defendants waived the application of the OCPA by removing this action, and (3) the OCPA does not protect Defendants, as they have engaged in defamation. The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn. First, in support of the position that the OCPA does not apply in federal court, Plaintiff cites the Tenth Circuit's decision in Los Lobos, in which the Tenth Circuit held that New Mexico's anti-SLAPP statute was inapplicable in federal court, as the "plain language" of the statute "reveals the law is nothing more than a procedural mechanism designed to expedite the disposal of frivolous lawsuits aimed at threatening free speech rights." Los Lobos, 885 F.3d at 668-69. Defendants, however, all argue that the OCPA is substantive, rather than procedural. (Docs. 44 and 45.)
Los Lobos does not control whether the OCPA applies in federal court. Los Lobos is carefully limited to the New Mexico law it addresses, noting that the holding is based on the text of the New Mexico law and distinguishing it from other anti-SLAPP statutes that might be applicable in federal court, such as statutes "that shift substantive burdens of proof, or alter substantive standards." Los Lobos, 885 F.3d at 670. The Tenth Circuit also noted that nothing in the New Mexico statute alters the underlying standard under which the court will decide the case. Id. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit noted that while anti-SLAPP statutes all have common elements, there are significant differences, requiring that each state's statutory scheme must be evaluated separately. Id. at 672 n.7.
Los Lobos also repeatedly contrasts the New Mexico statute with the California anti-SLAPP statute, noting that the California statute shifted substantive burdens and altered substantive standards. To prevail on a motion under the California law, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff's suit arises from an act in furtherance of the defendant'sconstitutional right to free speech. The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to establish a reasonable probability that it will prevail on its claim. If the plaintiff cannot establish that, the case will be dismissed. See Los Lobos, 885 F.3d at 670; Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 261 (9th Cir. 2013). Though the OCPA employs distinct substantive standards, it employs the same burden shifting structure as California. Additionally, both the California statute and the OCPA do not require a defendant to show that the plaintiff has not alleged facts "sufficient to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" to meet their burden in sustaining a motion to dismiss. See FED. R. CIV....
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