Franklin v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 01 July 1867
• Citation: 1 Colo. 35
• Parties: FRANKLIN v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

1 Colo. 35

FRANKLIN v. UNITED STATES.

Supreme Court of Colorado

July, 1867

Error to District Court, Gilpin County.

Mr JOHN W. REMINE, for plaintiff in error.

Mr GEORGE W. CHAMBERLAIN, United States District Attorney, for the government.

HALLETT C. J.

At the December term, 1864, of the district court of the first judicial district, sitting at Central City, Gilpin county the plaintiff in error was indicted for murder, tried and convicted of that crime, and sentenced to be executed.

He prosecutes this writ of error to reverse the judgment of the district court, and, together with other causes, he assigns the following as error:

'The court erred in entertaining jurisdiction of the offense charged in the indictment, the said first judicial district of Colorado Territory not being in the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.' The indictment appears to be founded upon section 3 of 'An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States,' approved April 30, 1790, which is in the following words:

'If any person or persons shall, within any fort, arsenal, dockyard, magazine, or any other place or district of country, under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States commit the crime of willful murder, such person or persons, on being thereof convicted, shall suffer death.'

The principal question presented in this record is, whether the place where the crime was committed was, at the time of the offense, within the descriptive terms of this act, so as to give the district court jurisdiction of the offense. The indictment sets forth that the crime was committed 'at the said county of Gilpin,' without further description of the place, and without any averment as to the jurisdiction of the United States. If the act operates in the Territories in the same way as in the several States, and to no greater extent, in other words, if the act operates in this Territory only within forts, arsenals and other places where the United States have exclusive jurisdiction, in virtue of exclusive ownership, it seems to be necessary, under the act, to aver in the indictment and prove upon the trial, that the place where the crime is committed is within the descriptive terms of the statute. United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 62. As this indictment contains no averment whatever as to the jurisdiction of the United States it is fatally defective, unless the act recited has a more enlarged operation in this territory than in the several States. If, as has been urged, the entire territory is a place or district of country under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States within the meaning of this act, it ought to be sufficient to allege that the crime was committed in that part of the territory which is within the jurisdiction of the particular court in which the indictment may be rpesented. If such is the meaning of the law, this, together with the seventh section of the same act, is the law of homicide in this territory, in force wherever the process of the court runs, and wherever the court has jurisdiction under any law, and, therefore, it is sufficient to allege that the crime was committed within the geographical limits which define the territory, over which the court has jurisdiction; in other words, within the county or counties within and for which the court is sitting. Therefore we must inquire whether this territory is a place or district of country under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States within the meaning of the law mentioned. We may find an answer to this inquiry in the sixteenth section of the act establishing this territory, which declares 'that the constitution and all laws of the United States, which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect within the said territory of Colorado as elsewhere within the United States.' Within the several States, section 3 of the act of 1790 provides for punishing murder, where committed in a fort, arsenal, dockyard or the like place, owned by the general government, and the above-mentioned section of the organic act declares it shall have the same force and effect in this territory. It may be suggested that the words 'force and effect,' used in the organic act, refer to the penal power of the law, and were not designed to limit its operation to places owned by the general government as in the several States. But a law is presumed to be effectual to accomplish its purposes, and therefore it was not necessary to declare what force and effect the act of 1790 should have in this territory, except for the purpose of limiting the places within which it should obtain. If, by the terms of the act, it is in force in the territory, its power is declared in the language of the act itself, and the limitation in the organic act, that it shall have the same force and effect as elsewhere within the United States, can refer only to the places in the territory within which it shall operate. If then, in obedience to the sixteenth section of the organic act, we give section 3 of the act of 1790 the same force and effect in this territory which it has elsewhere in the United States, we shall apply it to murder committed in forts, arsenals and the like places belonging to the United States and in the Indian country.

We may reach the same conclusion without referring to the sixteenth section of the Organic Act. In all its legislation, congress pursues the authority given in the constitution, and we may refer the section under consideration to the sixteenth clause of section 8, article 1 of that instrument. In that clause of the constitution, congress is invested with exclusive legislative authority over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, be cession of particular States, and the acceptance of congress, become the seat of government of the United States, and like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards and other needful buildings.

The description of places in the act is nearly the same as in this clause. The words, 'fort, arsenal, dock-yard and magazine,' are found in the act and in the constitution and the words, 'other place of district of country,' occurring in the act, but not in the constitution, were probably inserted out of abundant caution, or probably they refer to the district of Columbia, which, at the time of this enactment, had no existence but was in contemplation. Of these words, the Supreme Court in United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 390, say: 'Congress might have omitted in its enumeration some similar place within its exclusive jurisdiction, which was not comprehended by any of the terms employed, to which some other name might be given; and, therefore, the words 'other place or district of country' were added.' Beyond doubt, this law was enacted in execution of the power conferred in this clause of the constitution. Now there is nothing concerning the territories of the United States in this clause; it...