10 S.E. 233 (Ga. 1889), Parker v. Georgia Pac. Ry. Co.

Citation:10 S.E. 233, 83 Ga. 539
Opinion Judge:BLECKLEY, C.J.
Attorney:Hoke & Burton Smith, for plaintiff in error. Jackson & Jackson, for defendant in error.
Case Date:October 28, 1889
Court:Supreme Court of Georgia

Page 233

10 S.E. 233 (Ga. 1889)

83 Ga. 539




Supreme Court of Georgia

October 28, 1889

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Only in an extreme case, if at all, will a reviewing court order a new trial because leading questions were propounded to a witness.

2. The evidence being sufficient that the rule-book offered contained the rules of the company of force when the employe was injured, the book was admissible, without first proving that the employe had knowledge of the rules it contained. His knowledge was matter for either prior or subsequent verification.

3, 4. Whether an employe giving a signal to a co-employe had a right to have it observed, or whether it was possible to transact business without acting upon the assumption that it would be observed, is for decision by the jury, not by a witness.

5. Where the instructions sought are plainly implied in those given to the jury, failure to charge in express terms as requested is not error.

6. Failure of a railroad employe to extricate himself from a perilous situation brought on by the negligence of a co-employe, when he could do so by the use of ordinary care, will bar his right to recover.

7. To refer to the jury the question of the plaintiff's duty under certain circumstances detailed in the evidence is only to refer to them the question of his diligence or negligence, and is not error.

8. When the judge, at the request of the jury, on their return into court, pending their deliberations, has recharged them touching the law applicable to the plaintiff's negligence, he need not add anything respecting the defendant's negligence; no request as to that being made by the jury. ( a) The court has a right to volunteer an additional charge, or to recharge on the general rule as to finding according to a preponderance of the evidence. ( b) After giving this rule, for the court to add that by observing it the jury would, in his opinion, have no difficulty in arriving at a verdict, was not to intimate what the evidence was, or its effect, or which party ought to prevail. ( c) To instruct the jury that ordinary care must be used when it will avail is plainly to imply that it need not be used when it will not avail.

9. The court did not unduly press the jury to arrive at a verdict, though, perhaps, the language addressed to them went to the limit of propriety.


To continue reading