10, Tacoma School Dist. No. 10 v. Hedges

• Decision Date: 14 November 1895
• Citation: 13 Wash. 69,42 P. 522
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: TACOMA SCHOOL DIST. NO. 10 v. HEDGES, TREASURER.

42 P. 522

13 Wash. 69

TACOMA SCHOOL DIST. NO. 10 v. HEDGES, TREASURER.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 14, 1895

Appeal from superior court, Pierce county; W. H. Pritchard, Judge.

Petition for mandamus by Tacoma school district No. 10, a municipal corporation, against John B. Hedges, treasurer. Plaintiff had judgment, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Coiner & Schackleford and W. L. Coley, for appellant.

Snell &amp Bedford, for respondent.

HOYT C.J.

What is the proper disposition of interest and penalty collected upon delinquent taxes? is the question presented by this record. It is claimed on the part of the appellant that they should go into the general fund of the county, for the payment of salaries of county officers. The respondent contends that the amount paid as penalty and interest is an increase of the tax on account of which it is paid, and should be credited to the same fund; that each of the funds for which taxes are levied is entitled to such a proportion of the penalty and interest as the tax so levied bears to the entire tax. In the absence of any statute upon the subject, or course of practice having like force, this contention must be sustained. The imposition of the penalty must be presumed to have been for the benefit of the tax upon which such interest and penalty are assessed, and, if for the benefit of such tax as a whole, the money belonging to each fund which goes to make up the entire tax should receive its proportion; and it could make no difference whether the penalty and interest were imposed as a compensation for delay in receiving the money as an inducement to the taxpayer to make prompt payment, or as a punishment for delay. In either case, that upon which the collection was founded would be entitled to the benefit thereof, and each of the funds would be entitled to its pro rata share. The authorities upon the subject are not numerous, but the only ones which have been cited support this contention. Board of Com'rs v. State (Ind Sup.) 22 N.E. 10; State v. Huffaker, 11 Nev 300; People v. Reis (Cal.) 18 P. 309. See, also, State v. Bowker, 4 Kan. 114; Railway Co. v. Amrine, 10 Kan. 318. It is true that in some of these cases force is given by the court to expressions in the statutes of the states in which they were rendered; but such expressions did not in terms dispose of the penalty and interest, and the question may be said to have been decided uninfluenced by any statutory provision. In some, the opinions clearly show this, and, in the others, expressions occur which were unnecessary, unless it was the intention of the court to hold that, in the absence of any direction by the statute, the penalty and interest would follow the taxes upon which they were assessed. It follows that, if our statute contains no direction as to the disposition of the penalty and interest, they must be apportioned to the several funds included in the tax upon which they are collected.

The appellant has cited several provisions of the statute which it is claimed tend to show that it was the intention of the legislature to direct money so collected into the general fund of the county. As to...