Lyddy v. Long Island City

• Decision Date: 18 January 1887
• Citation: 10 N.E. 155,104 N.Y. 218
• Parties: LYDDY v. LONG ISLAND CITY.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

104 N.Y. 218

10 N.E. 155

LYDDY

v.LONG ISLAND CITY.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

January 18, 1887.

Appeal from Second judicial department.

James M. Lyddy, for appellant.

Jesse Johnson, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff had judgment upon a trial before the court without a jury. On appeal the general term reversed the judgment, for alleged errors of law, and ordered a new trial. The plaintiff appeals from such reversal upon the usual stipulation for judgment absolute in the event of an affirmance by this court of the order appealed from. The action was brought to recover for legal services alleged to have been performed by the plaintiff, at the request and upon the employment of the common council of Long Island City, in the investigation of certain alleged abuses by the board of water commissioners in the administration of the affairs of the water department of the city. It is claimed by the respondent that the common council had no authority under its charter to create any liability against the city for such services, a previously existing statute giving such authority having been repealed before the rendition of the services. The defendant was originally organized as a city under chapter 719 of the Laws of 1870, and among the powers given to the common council by that act was that of employing ‘an attorney and counsel, when the business of the board required one, and to pay them a reasonable compensation.’ This charter was revised and extended by chapter 461 of the Laws of 1871, and it is claimed by the respondent that thereby the authority of the common council to employ attorneys was taken away, and that thereafter it was placed under an absolute disability to create any debt or liability on the part of the city for legal services.

While no express repeal of the provisions of the law of 1870 is contained in the act of 1871, it is provided that such provisions thereof as are ‘not inconsistent with the provisions of this act are to be construed with and made applicable hereto.’ A clear implication arises from this language that such parts of the former statute as are repugnant to or inconsistent with the provisions of the later act are intended to be repealed. It is properly urged by the appellant's counsel that repeals by implication are not favored by the law, and that a a prior statute shall not be deemed repealed by a later one when they can both be given a legitimate effect, and stand together. The rule, however, implies that, if the two acts are manifestly repugnant, and tend to nullify each other, then the older enactment must yield to the later statute. Mark v. Stone, 97 N. Y. 572. Upon examining and comparing these statutes, with a view of discovering the legislative intent upon the subject, it is apparent that the act of 1871 is much more elaborate, and attempts to establish a more comprehensive, systematic, and detailed form of municipal government, than that provided by the act of 1870. Among other things, this charter undertook to classify the business of the city, and, for that purpose, provided for the establishment of eight separate departments, consisting of the following: ‘Finance department and receiving taxes; law department; department of public works; police and health department; a board of education; board of water commissioners; a fire department; a board of assessors.’ Of the law department it was enacted that it should ‘have charge and conduct of all law business of the corporation, and of all the co-ordinate departments created by this act. The chief officer of this department shall be called the attorney and co...