Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State

• Decision Date: 11 December 1907
• Citation: 106 S.W. 918
• Parties: WATERS-PIERCE OIL CO. v. STATE.<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 918

106 S.W. 918

WATERS-PIERCE OIL CO. v. STATE.^*

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

December 11, 1907.

Rehearing Denied January 15, 1908.

Appeal from District Court, Travis County; V. L. Brooks, Judge.

Action by the state against the Waters-Pierce Oil Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

See 106 S. W. 326.

This case involves alleged violations of the anti-trust laws of this state, and as the charge of the able judge who tried the case sufficiently states the nature of the suit as it was submitted to the jury, and correctly defines the provisions of the anti-trust statutes applicable to the case, and states the issues that were decided by the jury, it is deemed proper to set out the charge in full, which is as follows:

"Gentlemen of the jury, in this case the state of Texas, as plaintiff, has sued the Waters-Pierce Oil Company, a private corporation chartered under the laws of the state of Missouri and doing business in Texas by virtue of a permit issued to it by the state of Texas on May 31, 1900, as defendant, to cancel said permit and to recover penalties for violations of the anti-trust laws of Texas, which the state alleges the defendant has committed on each and every day from May 31, 1900, to April 29, 1907. The state alleges that on or about January 1, 1870, John D. Rockefeller, John D. Archbold, H. H. Rogers, Henry M. Flagler, and a number of other persons conceived the scheme of monopolizing and controlling the business of refining, transporting, and selling petroleum and the products thereof throughout the United States, including the state of Texas, and that said persons to that end and for that purpose entered into a conspiracy among themselves and with other individuals and corporations, including the defendant corporation, which conspiracy the state alleges continued in force and effect from the date of its formation until the date of the filing of the state's second amended petition in this case; and the state further alleges that in pursuance of said alleged conspiracy the defendant has done various acts and entered into various agreements which constitute violations of the anti-trust laws of Texas. The state further alleges that the defendant's predecessor, the Waters-Pierce Oil Company, incorporated in 1878, on or about the 5th day of October, 1894, entered into a contract with the Eagle Refining Company, A. W. Clem, and certain other individuals named in its petition, by the terms of which defendant acquired the property of said Eagle Refining Company, situated in the city of Dallas, Tex., and the right to operate its business under the name of the said Eagle Refining Company. It further alleges that the defendant did, subsequent to May 31, 1900, operate said Eagle Refining Company and maintain the plant thereof at Dallas as an apparently competing concern for various purposes prohibited by the anti-trust laws. The state further alleges that in the year 1896 the defendant's said predecessor bought out the business of the Texas Oil & Gasoline Company and of one Roy Campbell, who were at that time doing business in the city of San Antonio, Tex., and elsewhere, and entered into contracts and agreements with the said Texas Oil & Gasoline Company and Roy Campbell whereby said Texas Oil & Gasoline Company was thereafter to be operated under said name by defendant as an apparently competing concern with defendant at San Antonio in the sale of the products of petroleum. It further alleges that said Texas Oil & Gasoline Company was operated by defendant as a concern apparently competing with it at San Antonio subsequent to May 31, 1900, for various purposes in violation of the anti-trust laws of the state. For full particulars of the state's allegations you are referred to its second amended original petition.

"The defendant denies all and singular the allegations of the state, and, in addition to various of her special defenses, pleads specially that, if it has entered into any of the agreements or committed any of the acts alleged by the state, none of same constitute violations of the anti-trust laws of Texas, because said agreements were made and said acts done (if at all) solely with reference to subjects of interstate commerce. For full particulars of defendant's allegations, you are referred to its third amended original answer.

"As the law of the case you are instructed as follows, viz:

"(1) The burden of proof rests upon the state to establish the affirmative of the issues which will hereafter be submitted in this charge for your consideration by a preponderance of the evidence, and you will find in favor of the defendant on each issue so submitted for your consideration, except such issue or issues, if any, as you find that the state has established by a preponderance of the evidence; and you will return a general verdict for the defendant unless you find that the state has established by a preponderance of the evidence some combination or combinations of facts which will entitle it to recover under the law as it is given you in charge by the court.

"(2) The statute known as the anti-trust law of 1899 was in force on May 31, 1900, and thereafter remained continuously in force until March 31, 1903. For the purposes of this charge you are instructed that this act made it unlawful for any corporation transacting or conducting any kind of business in this state to enter into or become a party to any agreement or understanding with any other corporation or individual to fix or regulate the price in Texas of any article of manufacture or merchandise or to control or limit in Texas the trade in any article of manufacture or merchandise. You are further instructed that said statute also made it unlawful for any corporation transacting or conducting any kind of business in this state to bring about or permit any union or combination of its capital, property, trade or acts with the capital, property, trade, or acts of any other person or corporation, whereby the price in Texas of any article of manufacture or merchandise would be fixed or sought to be fixed, regulated or sought to be regulated, or whereby the price in Texas of any article of manufacture or merchandise would be reasonably calculated to be fixed or regulated, or whereby the trade in such article of manufacture or merchandise in Texas would be sought to be controlled or limited, or would be reasonably calculated to be controlled or limited. The statute known as the anti-trust law of 1903 became effective on March 31, 1903, and has since continued in force. For the purposes of this charge you are instructed that this statute defines a trust to be a combination of capital, skill, or acts, by two or more persons, firms, corporations, or associations of persons, or either two or more of them, for either, any, or all of the following purposes, viz: (1) To create or which may tend to create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce in Texas, or to create or carry out restrictions in the free pursuit in Texas of any business authorized or permitted by the laws of this state; (2) to fix, maintain, or increase the price of merchandise in Texas; (3) To prevent or lessen competition in Texas in the sale of merchandise; (4) to abstain from engaging in business or in the sale of merchandise in Texas, or any portion thereof. Said statute of 1903 further defines a monopoly to be a combination or consolidation of two or more corporations when effected in any of the following methods, viz: (1) When the direction of the affairs of two or more corporations is in any manner brought under the same management or control for the purpose of producing, or where such common management or control stends to create, a trust as above defined. (2) When any corporation acquires the shares or certificates of stock, franchise, or other rights, or the physical properties or any part thereof of any other corporation, for the purpose of preventing or lessening, or where the effect of such acquisition tends to affect or lessen, competition, whether such acquisition is accomplished directly or through the instrumentality of trustees or otherwise.

"(3) Oil, all other products of petroleum, and goods, wares, or merchandise of any character which the defendant or its agents may have purchased or acquired in any manner outside of the state of Texas and caused to be transported to its agents or others within the state, are the subjects of interstate commerce when they enter this state, and so remain until such commodities are removed from the original tanks, vessels, or other packages in which they are imported into the state and become mixed with the common mass of property of similar character in this state. The anti-trust laws of Texas have no reference to agreements or pools or arrangements of any character concerning subjects of interstate commerce, and no agreement, pool, or other arrangement, if any, which the defendant may have entered into with reference to the sale of any subject of interstate commerce, can be considered by you as violating any anti-trust law of Texas. But neither oil purchased by the defendant from the Corsicana Refinery or elsewhere in Texas, nor other merchandise purchased by defendant at points in Texas, nor such oil or other merchandise purchased by defendant at points outside the state and transported into the state, and removed from the original packages or vessels in which it was brought into the state, and mingled with other property of similar character in the state, is the subject of interstate commerce, but, on the contrary, is the subject of local commerce, and any agreement or pool or arrangement entered into by defendant with reference to such property, or the sale thereof, if any such sale there were, would be unlawful, if in violation of the anti-trust laws of this state.

"(4) A corporation such as defendant can only act through its agents and servants; but such a corporation...