Lingle v. HAWAI'I GOV'T EMPLOYEES ASS'N

Decision Date31 March 2005
Docket NumberNo. 24237.,24237.
Citation111 P.3d 587,107 Haw. 178
PartiesLinda LINGLE, Governor, State of Hawai'i, Petitioner/Appellant-Appellee, v. HAWAI'I GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, AFSCME, Local 152, AFL-CIO; Mufi Hanneman, Mayor, City and County of Honolulu; Harry Kim, Mayor, County of Hawai'i; Bryan J. Baptiste, Mayor, County of Kauai; and Alan M. Arakawa, Mayor, County of Maui, Intervenors/Appellants-Appellees, v. United Public Workers, AFSCME, Local 646, AFL-CIO, Intervenor/Appellee-Appellant, v. Hawai'i Labor Relations Board, Appellee-Appellee.
CourtHawaii Supreme Court

Herbert R. Takahashi (of Takahashi, Masui & Vasconcellos), Honolulu, on the briefs, for intervenor/appellee-appellant United Public Workers, AFSCME, Local 636.

Charles K.Y. Khim, Honolulu, on the briefs, for intervenor/appellant-appellee Hawai'i Government Employees Association, AFSCME, Local 152, AFL-CIO.

Kathleen N.A. Watanabe and Daniel A. Morris, Deputy Attorneys General, on the briefs, for petitioner/appellant-appellee Linda Lingle, Governor, State of Hawai'i, joining in HGEA's first amended answering brief.

Paul T. Tsukiyama, Deputy Corporation Counsel, on the briefs, for intervenor/appellant-appellee Mufi Hanneman, Mayor, City and County of Honolulu, joining in HEGA's first amended answering brief.

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, and DUFFY, JJ.; ACOBA, J., concurring separately.

Opinion of the Court by MOON, C.J.

Intervenor-appellee-appellant United Public Workers, AFSCME Local 646, AFL-CIO [hereinafter, UPW] appeals from the first circuit court's2 April 25, 2001 final judgment (1) remanding this case to appellee Hawai'i Labor Relations Board (HLRB) for further proceedings regarding its order denying petitioner-appellant-appellee the State of Hawai'i Department of Transportation's (DOT) petition for a declaratory ruling and (2) denying UPW's motion to dismiss intervenor-appellant-appellee Hawai'i Government Employees Association, AFSCME, Local 152, AFL-CIO's [hereinafter, HGEA] July 7, 2000 notice of appeal to the circuit court. On appeal to this court, UPW challenges the circuit court's: (1) determination that it had jurisdiction to review the HLRB's refusal to issue a declaratory ruling pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 91-14 (1993); (2) allowance of a collateral attack on a court-confirmed arbitration award; and (3) conclusion that the underlying dispute in this case was not moot.

Based on the following, we affirm the April 25, 2001 final judgment.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background

The dispute in the instant case originated from the DOT's temporary work assignment involving the landscaping crew of the highway maintenance operations in Kāne'ohe and implicates the collective bargaining agreements (CBA) of UPW and HGEA.3 Specifically, on June 17, 1996, the DOT temporarily awarded a vacant Bargaining Unit 2 (BU-02) position in the "Windward Crew" to a BU-02 employee from another baseyard. As a result, UPW — the collective bargaining agent for Bargaining Unit 1 (BU-01) employees — filed a grievance against the DOT on behalf of William Kapuwai, a BU-01 truck driver for the DOT and the most senior employee in the Windward Crew. UPW alleged that its CBA [hereinafter, CBA1] required the DOT to award the temporary assignment to Kapuwai.4 After exhausting all the remedies required by CBA1, UPW submitted notice of its intent to arbitrate the grievance to the DOT.

B. Procedural Background
1. Arbitration Proceedings and Circuit Court Confirmation

On October 8, 1997, arbitration proceedings between UPW and the DOT commenced. HGEA was not a party to the arbitration. UPW contended that the DOT violated CBA1 by awarding the temporarily vacant BU-02 position in the Windward Crew to a BU-02 employee from another baseyard. The DOT responded that the right to award temporary assignments was a "management right" under HRS § 89-9(d) (1993)5 and, therefore, preempted any contradictory provision in CBA1. In other words, the DOT asserted that, even if its award of a BU-02 temporary assignment to a BU-02 employee from another baseyard violated CBA1, it was entitled to do so as of right under HRS § 89-9(d).

On May 11, 1998, the arbitrator issued a final written decision and award in favor of UPW, in which he ruled that the right to issue temporary assignments was not a management right and, therefore, the DOT violated CBA1. On May 15, 1998, UPW moved the circuit court to confirm the arbitration award, which the circuit court, the Honorable Kevin S.C. Chang presiding, granted on July 21, 1998.

2. Proceedings Before the HLRB

While the arbitration proceedings were still in progress, the DOT, on October 20, 1997, submitted a petition to the HLRB for a declaratory ruling [hereinafter, petition] pursuant to HRS § 91-8 (1993)6 and Hawai'i Administrative Rules (HAR) Rule 12-42-9 (1981)7 as to whether a ruling by the arbitrator that the DOT must award a BU-01 employee a temporarily vacant BU-02 position would violate the DOT's management rights under HRS § 89-9(d). The DOT alleged that the arbitrator only had jurisdiction to interpret CBA1 and, therefore, a decision by the arbitrator requiring the DOT to award temporary BU-02 assignments to BU-01 employees would require the DOT to knowingly violate the CBA2 provision mandating that BU-02 temporary assignments be awarded to BU-02 employees.

On November 7, 1997, HGEA filed a petition to intervene in the declaratory proceedings, alleging, inter alia, that UPW's attempt to require the DOT to assign BU-02 positions to BU-01 employees infringed upon HGEA's rights as the exclusive bargaining representative of BU-02 employees to "bargain over the promotion and transfer of employees to positions within BU-02" under HRS § 89-8(a) (1993).8 On November 10, 1997, UPW also filed a petition to intervene on the ground that the proceedings implicated the temporary assignment rights of BU-01 employees under CBA1. Soon thereafter, all counties in the State filed petitions to intervene on the ground that their rights to award temporary assignments could be affected by the HLRB's declaratory ruling. The HLRB granted all of the intervenors' motions on December 31, 1997.

On January 21, 1998, UPW filed a memorandum urging the HLRB to refrain from issuing a declaratory ruling, alleging, inter alia, that (1) the HLRB lacked jurisdiction because the dispute was properly submitted to "final and binding" arbitration; (2) the DOT lacked standing to seek relief because its practices and policies were consistent with the proper exercise of "management rights" under HRS § 89-9(d); (3) the proceedings for declaratory relief constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the confirmed arbitration award; and (4) the DOT was collaterally estopped from relitigating the same issues presented in the arbitration proceedings.

On June 7, 2000, the HLRB entered an order denying the petition for a declaratory ruling [hereinafter, HLRB's order] pursuant to HAR Rule 12-42-9(f), in which the HLRB found that "the issues herein are moot as the Arbitration Award has been rendered and confirmed and there is no actual controversy between the parties at this stage." In essence, the HLRB refused to issue a declaratory ruling on the merits.

3. Appeal of the HLRB Decision to the Circuit Court

On July 7, 2000, HGEA filed a notice of appeal to the circuit court, the Honorable Sabrina S. McKenna presiding, from the HLRB's order. On appeal, HGEA contended, inter alia, that the HLRB's deferral to the arbitration award was improper inasmuch as: (1) the issue of whether temporary assignments was a management right under HRS § 89-9(d) was not moot; and (2) HGEA's rights under HRS §§ 89-8(a) and 89-9(d) as the exclusive bargaining representative of BU-02 employees were violated. Thus, HGEA requested that the circuit court order the HLRB to issue a declaratory ruling on these issues. After reviewing the matter under HRS § 91-14(g)(4) (1993), the court determined that it was an "error of law" for the HLRB to conclude that the dispute was moot "inasmuch as the petition for declaratory ruling, as stated, indicates a recurring problem." As such, the circuit court remanded the case to the HLRB to enter a declaratory ruling.

Final judgment was entered on April 25, 2001. On April 30, 2001, UPW filed its timely notice of appeal to this court.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Jurisdiction
The existence of jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo under the right/wrong standard. Questions regarding subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of a cause of action. When reviewing a case where the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the appellate court retains jurisdiction, not on the merits, but for the purpose of correcting the error in jurisdiction. A judgment rendered by a circuit court without subject matter jurisdiction is void.

Amantiad v. Odum, 90 Hawai'i 152, 158-59, 977 P.2d 160, 166-67 (1999) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

B. Statutory Interpretation
Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law to be reviewed de novo under the right/wrong standard.
Our statutory construction is guided by the following well established principles:
our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. And we must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose.
When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists....
In construing an ambiguous statute, "[t]he meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning. Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent. One avenue
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