Benjamin v. Zeichner
| Decision Date | 05 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 2012–C–1763.,2012–C–1763. |
| Citation | 113 So.3d 197 |
| Parties | John BENJAMIN, Sr., et al. v. William ZEICHNER, M.D. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Pettiette, Armand, Dunkelman, Woodley, Byrd, & Crom, Lawrence Wayne Pettiette, Jr., Esq., Joseph Samuel Woodley, Esq., Shreveport, for Applicant.
Susan E. Hamm, Esq., Shreveport, for Respondent.
*
[2012-1763 (La. 1]In this medical malpractice case, the trial court refused to qualify Dr. James Shamblin as an expert witness for the plaintiffs, finding he did not satisfy the requirements for expert witnesses under the Medical Malpractice Act. The trial court subsequently granted defendant's motion for directed verdict based on plaintiffs' failure to present expert testimony to support their case. The court of appeal reversed these rulings. We granted this writ application to review the correctness of the court of appeal's decision. For the following reasons, we reverse the ruling of the court of appeal, and reinstate the rulings of the trial court.
Plaintiffs, the husband and children of Margaret Benjamin, filed a medical malpractice claim against defendant, Dr. William Zeichner. Plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Zeichner performed a surgery on Mrs. Benjamin on August 29, 2000, which caused a small bowel obstruction and resulted in her death. Plaintiffs alleged that the surgery was not necessary to effectively treat Mrs. Benjamin, and further contended the surgical procedure performed by Dr. Zeichner was below the applicable standard of care.
The claim was initially presented to a Medical Review Panel, which unanimously found that Dr. Zeichner's treatment of Mrs. Benjamin did not deviate below the applicable standard of care. Following the decision by the Medical Review Panel, plaintiffs filed this medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Zeichner.
In May of 2004, in response to a motion for summary judgment filed by Dr. Zeichner, plaintiffs filed the expert affidavit of Dr. James Shamblin. However, the motion for summary judgment was never heard by the court. At trial of the case in April of 2011, plaintiffs sought to introduce the testimony of Dr. Shamblin, and proffered him to the court as an expert witness in general surgery with specific expertise in bariatric surgery. Dr. Zeichner objected, arguing Dr. Shamblin did not meet the mandatory requirements for expert medical witnesses as set forth in La. R.S. 9:2794(D)(1).1
The objections concerning Dr. Shamblin's qualifications were raised in a motion in limine filed by plaintiffs. At the hearing on the motion, it was established [2012-1763 (La. 3]that Dr. Shamblin had given up his license to practice medicine in Louisiana in March of 2007 and did not renew his license to practice medicine in Alabama effective December 31, 2010. Plaintiffs' counsel was aware of Dr. Shamblin's intention of surrendering his Alabama license. Because Dr. Shamblin was not licensed to practice medicine in any jurisdiction in the United States at the time of trial, defendant argued La. R.S. 9:2794(D)(1)(d) requires that he be a graduate of “a medical school accredited by the American Medical Association's Liaison Committee on Medical Education (“LCME”) or the American Osteopathic Association.”
While there was no question Dr. Shamblin was a 1958 graduate of Tulane Medical School, the trial court determined there was no competent evidence presented concerning the accreditation status of that school by the LCME in 1958. Plaintiffs attempted to introduce a faxed letter from Tulane University which purported to establish Tulane Medical School's accreditation status, but the trial court found the letter and accompanying attachments were inadmissible hearsay. Finding no evidence that Dr. Shamblin graduated from a properly accredited medical school, the trial court refused to qualify him as an expert witness. While the trial was ongoing, plaintiffs filed a writ application with the court of appeal, which was denied, finding no error in the trial court's ruling based on the showing made.2 Plaintiffs then filed a writ application with this court. However, before this court considered the writ, the trial court granted defendant's motion for directed verdict based on plaintiffs' failure to present expert testimony to support their case. This court subsequently denied the writ as moot.3
Plaintiffs filed an appeal, contending the trial court erred in prohibiting Dr. Shamblin from testifying as an expert in this case and in granting the directed verdict [2012-1763 (La. 4]in favor of the defendant. The court of appeal reversed the trial court's rulings.4 Although the court agreed there was no conclusive evidence in the record of Tulane Medical School's accreditation status in 1958, it did not find that factor alone was sufficient to preclude Dr. Shamblin from testifying as an expert in this case. The court found it significant that, although Dr. Shamblin had relinquished his medical licenses by the date of trial, he had begun reviewing the evidence in this case well before then and had formed his conclusions concerning Dr. Zeichner's alleged negligence before he relinquished his medical licenses. The court noted the record contained Dr. Shamblin's affidavit from 2004 wherein he asserted that Dr. Zeichner breached the standard of care and that the breach caused the death of Mrs. Benjamin. At the time the affidavit was issued, the court noted Dr. Shamblin was licensed in both Alabama and Louisiana, and clearly qualified under La. R.S. 9:2794(D)(1)(d) to provide expert testimony. Thus, to require Dr. Shamblin to maintain his licenses simply to testify in this case or to require plaintiffs at this late date to retain another expert who would be unfamiliar with the case creates an unduly onerous burden, considering there was no question as to Dr. Shamblin's expert qualifications under La. R.S. 9:2794(D)(1)(d) when he rendered his affidavit. The court reasoned that to retroactively determine Dr. Shamblin is not qualified under that subsection of the statute simply because he voluntarily relinquished his medical licenses is a hyper-technical reading of the statute which in no way furthers its intended purpose to provide competent expert witness testimony.
Moreover, the court found that subsection (d) does not specifically require that the prospective expert be licensed at the time of his testimony. The court compared it with subsection (a), which specifically states that the prospective expert be [2012-1763 (La. 5]“practicing medicine at the time such testimony is given or was practicing medicine at the time the claim arose.” The court concluded that the failure of subsection (d) to contain a specific time period in its wording creates ambiguity. Thus, the court found it was reasonable to assume, considering the lack of a specific time period referenced in subsection (d), that a physician is qualified to testify as an expert if he was licensed at the time the claim arose. The court stated this interpretation was particularly reasonable, when, as here, the work product and conclusions reached by the prospective expert were first rendered when he still maintained his medical license.
Dr. Zeichner filed a writ application in this court, which we granted. 5
The issue in this case involves the interpretation of La. R.S. 9:2794(D)(1). Thus, it is a question of law and reviewed by this court under a de novo standard of review.6 After our review, we 7
The function of statutory interpretation and the construction given to legislative acts rests with the judicial branch of the government. The rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of the Legislature. Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will and, thus, the interpretation of legislation is primarily the search for the legislative intent. We have often noted the paramount consideration in statutory interpretation is ascertainment of the legislative intent and the reason or reasons which prompted the Legislature to enact the law. The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of the [2012-1763 (La. 6]statute itself. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. However, when the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law. Moreover, when the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text of the law as a whole.8 Further, the legislature is presumed to act with full knowledge of well-settled principles of statutory construction.9 With these principles in mind, we examine the language of the statute.
La. R.S. 9:2794(D)(1) provides:
D. (1) In a medical malpractice action against a physician, licensed to practice medicine by the Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners under R.S. 37:1261 et seq., for injury to or death of a patient, a person may qualify as an expert witness on the issue of whether the physician departed from accepted standards of medical care only if the person is a physician who meets all of the following criteria:
(a) He is practicing medicine at the time such testimony is given or was practicing medicine at the time the claim arose.
(b) He has knowledge of accepted standards of medical care for the diagnosis, care, or treatment of the illness, injury, or condition involved in the claim.
(c) He is qualified on the basis of training or experience to offer an expert opinion regarding those accepted standards of care.
(d) He is licensed to practice medicine by...
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