Valentine v. Lunt

• Decision Date: 08 October 1889
• Citation: 115 N.Y. 496,22 N.E. 209
• Parties: VALENTINE v. LUNT et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

115 N.Y. 496

22 N.E. 209

VALENTINE

v.LUNT et al.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 8, 1889.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, second department.

Action by Ludlow W. Valentine against Elizabeth H. Lunt and others. An interlocutory judgment sustaining a demurrer to the answer was rendered at special term, and from a judgment of general term, affirming the interlocutory judgment, Elizabeth H. Lunt appeals. There is a certificate that the questions are of sufficient importance to render a decision by the court of appeals desirable before other proceedings are had in the action.

W. C. Beecher, for appellant.

Horace Secor, Jr., for respondent.

DANFORTH, J.

The questions presented are those which arise on the pleadings. It appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is an infant, the son and only child and heir at law of one Catharine A. Valentine; that on and prior to the 22d of November, 1883, she was seised in fee of and resided upon certain premises consisting of a house and lot known as ‘No. 19 Cranberry Street,’ in the city of Brooklyn; that in 1881 one Richardt was recommended to and employed by her as a competent physician; that she owned considerable property, and supported her father, mother, and brother; that Richardt, soon after his employment, entered upon illicit relations with her, and obtained control over her mind and property; ‘that thereupon a great change came over her; she compelled her relations to leave her home, and refused to see them, or her former friends, and remained completely excluded to every one, except Richardt;’ that on or about January 7, 1886, she ‘being of unsound mind, and incompetent to manage herself of her affairs, in consequence of the influence exerted over her by Richardt, he, fraudulently taking advantage thereof, obtained from her a deed dated that day, reciting a consideration of $15,000, and conveying to him the above-described premises, but he, in fact, paying no consideration therefor; that the deed was recorded on the 17th of June, 1886, and on the 27th of October, 1886, by deed of that date, and recorded October 29th, Richardt conveyed the premises to Susan A. Austin for the sum of $12,000, which she paid; that Mrs. Valentine until that time continued to reside on the premises, but then left, and ‘moved to the city of New York;’ that Austin, by mortgage dated October 1, 1887, recorded October 3, 1887, conveyed the premises to the defendant Lunt, ‘to secure the payment of $9,000 advanced by her to Austin; that Richardt continued to maintain complete dominion over the mind and property of Mrs. Valentine until her death, which occurred January 9, 1888. The judgment demanded is that the deed to Richardt of June 7, the conveyance to Mrs. Austin of October 27, and the mortgage to the defendant Lunt of October 1, 1887, be declared void, and that they be delivered up to be canceled. The defendant Lunt, by answer, admitted the original title of Mrs. Valentine; the several conveyances, and the mortgage to herself; but denied all the allegations which tended to show the invalidity of either, or which, if admitted, would form any basis for the relief sought. She then, for a further and separate defense, alleged that on the 3d of October she loaned Mrs. Austin $9,000, and took therefor her bond secured by a mortgage on the premises in question; that Mrs. Austin was then the owner of the premises, and in actual possession thereof, and had been in such possession since the 29th of October, 1886, under the deed from Richardt; that the money was loaned relying upon this ownership and possession, in good faith, and without any knowledge or notice whatever of the mental condition of Mrs. Valentine, or the fraud or undue influence claimed by the plaintiff to have been practiced or exerted by Richardt upon her. The plaintiff demurred to this last defense, on the ground that it did not show facts sufficient to constitute a defense. At special term the demurrer was sustained upon the ground that undue influence by Richardt in procuring the deed rendered it void, and took away all support to the defendant's mortgage, and the general term affirmed the special term decision upon the ground that the deed to Richardt was void, because of the unsound mind of Mrs. Valentine.

We are of opinion that the special term has given the right interpretation to the complaint, and that the learned counsel for the defendant is justified in his contention that in framing it the pleader did not intend to and does not charge that Mrs. Valentine was insane. Being insane is a general statement or conclusion, dependent upon other allegations, and is qualified, not only by the averments which precede but by those which follow it. They do not justify the conclusion. The plaintiff nowhere alleges that Mrs. Valentine ‘was insane,’ or ‘a lunatic,’ or ‘a person of unsound mind,’ but states an opinion formed by himself from certain circumstances. To say that a person, ‘being insane,’ does an act, cannot be considered as an allegation as to the condition of that person, or regarded as presenting an issuable fact or ground for relief. The pleading is no doubt to have a reasonable intendment, and is to be construed liberally, but still ‘with a view of substantial justice between the parties,’ and that will be promoted by requiring the pleader to present, without ambiguity, the facts on which he relies for judgment. That has been done in the case before us. It is the influence exerted on Mrs. Valentine by Richardt, and the fraudulent advantage taken of it to obtain from her a conveyance of the premises without payment of any consideration, although the conveyance recited it to be $15,000. The fact alleged is that she was coerced and imposed upon, and not that she was of ‘unsound mind.’ Her mental condition is referred to as rendering her susceptible to influence, and not as a fact to be met and answered. It is, we think, not put in issue by the pleadings, and it is impossible from the scope of the complaint to make out that such an averment could stand upon the circumstances stated by the plaintiff. We therefore do not decide how the rights of the parties would be affected by an allegation that the grantor was, at the time of the execution of the deed to Richardt, ‘a person of unsound mind.’ As the case is now presented we do not regard that question as before us.

It...