Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Gildersleeve

• Decision Date: 13 February 1909
• Citation: 118 S.W. 86,219 Mo. 170
• Parties: CHICAGO, B. & Q. RY. CO. v. GILDERSLEEVE.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

118 S.W. 86

219 Mo. 170

CHICAGO, B. & Q. RY. CO. v. GILDERSLEEVE.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

February 13, 1909.

1. COURTS (§ 142)—JURISDICTION.

The circuit court of the city of St. Louis, like all other circuit courts in the state, is, to all intents and purposes, a court of general jurisdiction.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 52)—POWER TO PUNISH CONTEMPT—LEGISLATIVE POWERS.

The right of punishment for contempt is inherent in every court having common-law powers, and such courts cannot be shorn of that power by the legislative branch of the state government.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 52)—POWER TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT—JURISDICTION — LEGISLATIVE POWERS.

The circuit courts being created by Const. art. 6, § 22 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 234), and having

inherent power to punish by contempt, which cannot be taken away by the Legislature, Rev. St. 1899, § 1617 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 1199), prohibiting courts from punishing contempts by fine exceeding $50 or by imprisonment for more than 10 days, violates Const. 1875, art. 3 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 172), providing that the powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive, and judicial, and that no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others.

Lamm, Woodson, and Graves, JJ., dissenting.

In Banc. Case Certified from St. Louis Court of Appeals.

Edward J. Gildersleeve was sentenced by the circuit court of the City of St. Louis for contempt in violating a decree of injunction rendered in an action against him by the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Company, and appealed to the St. Louis Court of Appeals. Cause certified to the Supreme Court. Judgment of circuit court affirmed.

Chester H. Krum, for appellant. Robert & Robert, for respondent.

GANTT, J.

This cause has been certified to this court by the St. Louis Court of Appeals for the reason that a constitutional question, to wit, the validity of section 1617 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1899 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 1199), is necessarily involved in the judgment rendered by the circuit court of the city of St. Louis. It appears from the abstract of the record that the appellant, Edward J. Gildersleeve, had been enjoined on the 12th day of July, 1903, by the circuit court of the city of St. Louis from buying, selling, dealing in, or soliciting the purchase or sale of any mileage passenger tickets or any part thereof, or the return coupon thereof or any part thereof, or any excursion passenger ticket or any part thereof, at that time or thereafter issued or sold, or which might thereafter be issued or sold, by the plaintiff for passage over its railroad, or issued by any other railroad for use over plaintiff's road, or any part thereof where such ticket was sold, or where it appeared upon such ticket, coupon, or return ticket that the same was issued or sold, below the regular schedule rate under a contract with the original purchaser entered upon the said ticket and signed by such original purchaser that such ticket was non-transferable and void in the hands of any other person than the original purchaser, and also from soliciting, aiding, and encouraging or procuring any person other than the original purchaser of such ticket to use or attempt to use the same for passage on any train or trains of the plaintiff; and that afterwards a citation had issued out of the said circuit court on the 1st day of October, 1904, against the said defendant, Edward J. Gildersleeve, commanding him to appear before said court and show cause why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt for violating the order of injunction issued as aforesaid. It appears that said citation had been duly served upon the said Gildersleeve on the 1st day of October, 1904, and the said matter coming on for hearing on the 19th of October, 1904, and the court having heard the evidence and duly considered the same, adjudged the said Gildersleeve guilty of contempt, in that he had violated the said injunctive order, and by its judgment adjudged that he be committed to and imprisoned in the common jail in the city of St. Louis for a period of 15 days from the 29th day of October, 1904, to the 13th day of November, 1904, and that he pay the costs of the said proceedings. Within four days the said Gildersleeve filed his motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and he excepted and appealed to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, and that court has certified the same to this court.

Two other cases, to wit, Chicago & Alton Railway Co. v. Gildersleeve, 118 S. W. 96, and Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Co. v. Gildersleeve, 118 S. W. 97, were submitted along with this case and involve the same question. In the Chicago & Alton Case the fine imposed for the contempt was $300, and in the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Case the sentence was 30 days in jail.

1. But one question is raised on these appeals by the defendant, to wit, that the circuit court in each of said cases exceeded its lawful powers as defined by section 1617, Rev. St. Mo. 1899, which is in these words: "Punishment for contempt may be by fine or imprisonment in the jail of the county where the court may be sitting or both, in the discretion of the court; but the fine in no case shall exceed the sum of fifty dollars, nor the imprisonment ten days; and where any person shall be committed to prison for the non-payment of any such fine, he shall be discharged at the expiration of thirty days." If this is a valid constitutional enactment, it is obvious that the judgment must be reversed. If, on the other hand, the Legislature exceeded its constitutional powers in abridging and impairing the power of the circuit court to punish contempts of its judgments and decrees, then the judgments must be affirmed.

The learned counsel for the appellant, Gildersleeve, goes to the root of the matter by insisting that the circuit court of this state has not and never had any inherent common-law jurisdiction, but is subject to legislative control, and its powers are such, and such only, as the Legislature shall see fit to prescribe.

Article 3 of the Constitution of Missouri of 1875 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 172) provides "The powers of the government shall be divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial, each of which shall be confided to a separate magistracy, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of those departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except in instances in this Constitution expressly directed or permitted."

Article 6, § 22 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 234), creating circuit courts, is as follows: "Circuit Courts, Jurisdiction and Terms. The circuit court shall have jurisdiction over all criminal cases not otherwise provided for by law; exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases not otherwise provided for; and such concurrent jurisdiction with and appellate jurisdiction from inferior tribunals and justices of the peace as is or may be provided by law. It shall hold its terms at such times and places in each county as may be by law directed; but at least two terms shall be held every year in each county."

Article 6, § 27 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 236), creating the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, is as follows: "Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Jurisdiction of Court of Appeals. The circuit court of St. Louis county shall be composed of five judges and such additional number as the General Assembly may from time to time provide. Each of such judges shall sit separately for the trial of causes and the transaction of business in special term. The judges of said circuit court may sit in general term for the purpose of making rules of court and for the transaction of such other business as may be provided by law at such time as they may determine, but shall have no power to review any order, decision or proceeding of the court in special term."

The circuit court of the city of St. Louis, like all other circuit courts in the state, is to all intents and purposes a court of general jurisdiction, and has been so often adjudged to be such that it would be a waste of time to cite decisions to that effect. As late as Ex parte Clark, 208 Mo. 121, 106 S. W. 990, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 389, this court in banc said: "In the second place, division 2, is in very fact, as its name indicates, but a division of the circuit court of that city, and hence, to all intents and purposes, a court of general jurisdiction. The mere fact that in matters of detail, in the administration of justice, certain criminal cases are assigned to it, and that such assignment is heavy enough to occupy, peradventure, its whole time, does not lop off or dim its power as a constitutional court—a circuit court proceeding according to the course of the common law."

In view of the articles and sections above quoted from the Constitution itself, it is too plain for argument that the circuit court is created, not by the Legislature, but by the Constitution. We all agree, I take it, that the right of punishment for contempt is inherent in every constitutional court having common-law powers, and that such courts cannot be shorn of that power by the legislative branch of our state government. As was said by McKean, C. J., in Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. (U. S.) 319, 1 L. Ed. 155: "Not only my Brethren and myself, but likewise all the judges of England, think that without this power no court could possibly exist—nay, that no contempt could, indeed, be committed against us, we would be so truly contemptible. The law upon this subject is of immemorial antiquity, and there is not any period when it can be said to have ceased or discontinued."

The Supreme Court of Indiana, in Little v. State, 90 Ind. 338, 46 Am. Rep. 224, most aptly stated...