Wood v. State

• Citation: 103 Ga.App. 305,119 S.E.2d 261
• Decision Date: 23 February 1961
• Docket Number: 2,No. 38574,Nos. 1,38574,s. 1
• Parties: J. I. WOOD v. STATE of Georgia
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)

Page 261

119 S.E.2d 261

103 Ga.App. 305

J. I. WOOD v. STATE of Georgia.

No. 38574.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division Nos. 1, 2.

Feb. 23, 1961.

Rehearing Denied March 10, 1961.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The trial court did not err in finding the defendant in contempt under count 1 of the indictment.

(a) The constitutional courts of this state are not limited by the definition of contempts in Code § 24-105, and may go beyond the provisions of the statute in order to preserve and enforce their constitutional powers by treating as contempts acts which clearly invade them.

(b) The grand jury is a constituent part of the court, and anyone whose conduct interferes with, or has a tendency to obstruct the grand jury, or endeavors to interfere with the performance of its duties may be found in contempt.

(c) The principles stated in headnote 3 also are appropriate to division 1 of the opinion.

2. The trial court erred in convicting the defendant on count 2 of the indictment for contempt.

3. (a) The trial court did not err in its conviction of the defendant on the third count of the citation for contempt.

(b) The success or failure of an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice is not a test of whether or not there is a contempt, since it can not be known what effect, if any, the attempt may have had.

(c) The truth or falsity of statements made in an attempt to obstruct or impair the administration of justice is irrelevant and, if contemptuous, such statements may be punished as a contempt.

(d) Punishment for contempt of court is not prevented by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech (Code § 2-115, Const. art. 1, § 1, par. 15) since contempt of court is an abuse of the liberty of speech.

(e) The due process, freedom of speech, and equal protection clauses of the Constitution of the United States do not bar punishment for contempt of court.

(f) The act of the judge in charging the grand jury with its duties is a judicial act, and an improper interference therewith may be found to be contempt of court.

(g) The lack of criminal intent or the presence of good faith will not bar a conviction for contempt of court.

(h) Punishment for contempt of court is not a denial of due process of law.

(i)-(k) The remaining of seventy-five demurrers are considered and disposed of in the opinion.

(1) Intemperate and repeated attacks upon the motives, judgment, and alleged biases of the judge which allegedly led him to charge the grand jury to make certain investigations, and which attacks could have had the effect of interfering with, or diverting the attention of the grand jury from its assigned duties, may properly be found to be contempt of court.

(m) The principles stated in headnote 1 also are appropriate to division 3 of the opinion.

The defendant, at the time sheriff of Bibb County, Georgia, was cited for and convicted of contempt of court by the Superior Court of Bibb County, Georgia. The facts out of which the contempt citation arose were as follows: On June 6, 1960, the opening day of the June term, 1960, of the Bibb Superior Court, Judge Long charged the grand jury, which had been regularly impaneled and sworn for the term of court, giving them special instructions which were joined in by the other two judges of that court, advising the grand jury that a situation had arisen in the county which the court felt should be thoroughly and completely investigated by the grand jury. In this charge the jury was advised that there appeared to be an inane and inexplicable pattern of Negro bloc voting. The charge went on to point out that accusations had been made that candidates for public office had paid large sums of money to certain leaders in an effort to gain their favor and to obtain the Negro vote, and that there were also accusations that certain Negro leaders, after having met with a candidate and endorsed his candidacy, have changed and supported an opposing candidate who put up a large sum of money, and that this creates an unhealthy, dangerous, and unlawful situation which tends to corrupt public office holders and some candidates for public office. The charge went on to point out the violations of law which would be involved should the grand jury find these charges to be founded in truth. The charge cited Code § 34-9907, which provides, in part, that if any person shall buy or sell, or offer to buy or sell, a vote, or shall be in any way concerned in buying or selling, or contribute money or any other thing of value for the purpose of buying a vote at any election in this State, or in any county thereof such person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Code § 34-1907.1 also was cited. This section reads, 'No person, firm, or corporation shall print, have, or possess a ballot or ballots or any likeness of the same, except the officials having charge of the general elections, primary elections, or special elections under the laws of this State, and the electors when engaged in the acts of voting.' The charge went on to instruct the jury that, if money is furnished to any person or group of persons for the purpose of hiring people qualified to vote to canvass others voters in an effort to influence their votes in behalf of any candidate, this would be a violation of law and against the public policy of the State. Certain questions were posed to the jury which it was to investigate in inquiring into these charges of violations of election laws.

The next day, while the grand jury was in session and actually engaged in investigating the matters set forth in the charge by the court, the defendant prepared and issued a written statement which was by him and under his direction on that day released to local news media, causing the contents of this statement to be published and disseminated to the general public. At the time this 'news release' was made, the grand jury had before them voting tabulations and other documents, including endorsements by certain political groups, relating to primaries and elections in which the defendant actively participated as a candidate for public office and as an active supporter of a candidate. It was stipulated between the solicitor-general and the defendant that the judges of the Superior Court read the statement, and also that members of the Bibb County grand jury, during the course of its investigation about the matters they were charged to investigate, read the news release of the defendant, his 'An Open Letter to the Bibb County Grand Jury,' and a further statement which the defendant made on July 8th after he was cited for contempt of court. The 'Open Letter to the Bibb County Grand Jury' was signed by the defendant with the title, 'Sheriff of Bibb County.' The news release of June 7th and the statement of July 8th were signed by him without the addition of the caption, 'Sheriff of Bibb County.'

The news release of June 7th stated:

'The people of Bibb County should take notice when their highest judicial officers threaten political persecution carried out under the guise of law enforcement.

'Whatever the Judges' intention, the action of the Superior Court Judges ordering a Bibb County Grand Jury to investigate 'negro block voting' will be considered one of the most deplorable examples of race agitation to come out of Middle Georgia in recent years.

'At a time when all thinking people want to preserve the good will and cooperation between the races in Bibb County, this action appears either as a crude attempt at judicial intimidation of negro voters and leaders, or, at best, as agitation for a 'negro vote' issue in local politics.

'No one would question the duty of a Grand Jury to investigate any and all election law violations. However, simple justice would demand that the Judge not single out the negro people for particular investigation. If we seriously wish to enforce the old law against hiring workers for canvassing or influencing voters, then let us start by indicting our U. S. Senators, Congressmen, and Governors and almost all elected State officials.

'If we overlook the mountain of white candidates and campaign workers who have violated this old law, to investigate the mole hill of few negro campaign workers, then truly we are manipulating the law in a manner to persecute the few.

'This is the type of political-legal action which brings down ridicule and demands for civil right legislation against the South.

'Negro people will find little difference in principle between attempted intimidation of their people by judicial summons and inquiry and attempted intimidation by physical demonstration such as used by the K.K.K.

'It is hoped that the present Grand Jury will not let its high office be a party to any political attempt to intimidate the negro people in this community.

'It seems incredible that all three of our Superior Court Judges, who themselves hold high political office, are so politically nieve [naive?] as to actually believe that the negro voters in Bibb County sell their votes in any fashion, either to candidates for office or to some negro leaders.

'If anyone in the community be free of racial prejudice, it should be our Judges. It is shocking to find a Judge charging a Grand Jury in the style and language of a race baiting candidate for political office.

'It further seems the height of hypocrisy to dust off an old blue law that has been ignored for fifty years and suddenly order its rigid enforcement against a minority group of voters.

'However politically popular the judges' action may be at this time, they are employing a practice far more dangerous to free elections than anything they want investigated.'

The 'Open Letter to the Grand Jury' read as follows:

'Pursuant to the request that the general public furnish to you information concerning 'bloc voting' in this county, I wish to furnish you with the following information.

'For many years, even for decades, our newspapers, law enforcement agencies,...