Jones v. Jones

• Decision Date: 24 June 1890
• Parties: JONES v. JONES et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

120 N.Y. 589

24 N.E. 1016

JONES

v.JONES et al.

Court of Appeals of New York,

Second Division.

June 24, 1890.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, second department.

Appeal from judgment of the general term of the supreme court in the second judicial department, affirming judgment entered on verdict, and on decision of the trial court. The action was brought for the partition of certain land situated at Hunter's Point, in Long Island city, and fronting on East river, opposite the city of New York. The plaintiff alleged title in herself to two undivided fifth parts of the premises, which came to her by descent from Charles H. Jones, her father, who died intestate in 1882. In the action as originally commenced Mrs. Rutherford and Mrs. Oakley were not made defendants, but on their own application they were made parties. They and defendant Lillian L. Jones, and none others, answered. It appears that Oliver H. Jones died seised of the premises, in 1870, leaving his will, by which he devised to his wife, Louisa, a life-estate in the land, and remainder to his five children. The defendants, other than John L. Gardner, were such children. His will was admitted to probate and recorded in 1871, and letters testamentary issued to his widow, his son, Oliver L. Jones, and his son-in-law, Gardner. The widow died in 1876, and in December, 1877, the defendants Rutherford and Oakley made a deed of conveyance of their interest in the premises in question to their uncle, Charles H. Jones, the father of the plaintiff. The negotiation which resulted in the conveyance was had by their brother, Oliver L. Jones, with them, and the consideration paid to each of them for it was $1,000. Those defendants alleged that it was obtained by him, acting for the grantee, by misrepresentation, concealments, and abuse of the confidential relation between them and their borther, and that the consideration which they were induced by him to take was grossly inadequate to the value of their interest in the property. The issues were tried by jury, and they, by their verdict, found: (1) That the price paid was inadequate for the property at the time of the conveyance; (2) that the execution and delivery of the deed were procured by Oliver L. Jones by undue influence, while he occupied a confidential relation to those defendants; (3) that in procuring its execution and delivery he acted on behalf of the grantee; (4) that it was procured by his representation that each share so conveyed was not worth more than $1,000, or that the assessments had to be paid at once, or that it was practically impossible for each of the grantors to carry her interest in the property without the sale of considerable portion of her estate to enable her to pay her share of the taxes and assessments; (5) also by the concealment from them of the fact in relation to the method of settling the assessments at a discount, or that their payment was not required for a term of years from the time of levy, or in regard to the terms of a lease which had been made by the widow to one Bostwick for the benefit of the Standard Oil Company; (6) that the value of the whole premises at the time of conveyance was $75,000; (7) that neither Mrs. Rutherford nor Mrs. Oakley fully discovered the alleged fraud prior to April 1, 1881. Thereupon the trial justice made in writing the decision of the court, embracing the facts so found by the jury, and, as conclusion of law, determined that the deed was procured by fraud and was void; that the defendants Rutherford and Oakley, by way of reimbursement, pay to the plaintiff the amount of the consideration paid to them, respectively, for the conveyance, less the proper proportion of the rents of the premises received by the plaintiff; that the deed should be canceled; and that those defendants were entitled to a reconveyance by deed to them to be made by the plaintiff. Judgment was directed accordingly, with costs.

D. Jones, for appellant.

Joseph H. Choate and E. S. Hatch, for respondents.

BRADLEY, J., ( after stating the facts as above.)

The claim of the defendants Oakley and Rutherford to the relief sought by them was somewhat founded upon the alleged relation of confidence of their brother, Oliver L. Jones, to them, and its abuse by him. He was an executor of the will of their father, at the time of whose death, in 1870, those two defendants were of the ages of 14 and 17 years. Oliver was the eldest of the children, and on the death of their mother, in 1876, he also became the administrator of her estate. There was evidence tending to prove that the defendants Oakley and Rutherford had, up to the time in question, given no attention to the business relating to the estate in which they were interested, and had but very little, if any, knowledge or information of it, but relied mainly upon their brother to take care of the business, protect their interest, and to supply them such moneys as they needed from its income; and that they were confidently dependent upon his advice and direction in those respects, and that this relation continued beyond the time of the making of the deed in question. He had some years before married the plaintiff, who was the only child of Charles H. Jones, and after the marriage he lived in the house with his father-in-law, and attended considerably to his business. The evidence on the part of the defendants was to the effect that the sale of their interests in the land at Hunter's Point was first suggested by their brother to them; that he designated the price which each of them could obtain on the sale of it to Charles H. Jones; and that he represented to them that the assessments upon the land amounted to upwards of $40,000, called their attention to the unfavorable character of the premises, and to the difficulty of paying the taxes and assessments, and led them to understand that it would be necessary, if they retained the property, for them to dispose of some other portions of their estate to pay them. While it was true that the assessments then about to be and shortly after levied upon this property did amount to the sum mentioned, the time in which payment might be made, with interest at the rate of 10 per cent. per annum, would not expire until the end of 10 years after the levy was perfected; and it appears that, with a veiw to various street improvements in the city of Long Island, assessments had been made, and improvement certificates issued, and that such certificates were in the market at prices considerably below their par value, and were receivable by the city at par in payment for assessments. The conclusion was warranted by the evidence that none of those facts were communicated to those defendants, and that they had no knowledge or information on that subject at the time of making the conveyance, but were led to suppose and did believe that the amount of their share of the assessments would soon have to be provided for and paid by them to save the property from sale. This land was low and marshy, and at the time of high tide was substantially covered with water. It fronted on East river, opposite the city of New York, and its advantages for appropriation and use were in its location, and capacity to be made available for useful purposes by dockage and filling up. The widow of Oliver H. Jones, having the life-estate in the property, had made to a representative of the Standard Oil Company a lease for the term of 10 years from May 1, 1876, at a yearly rent equal to the annual taxes and 3 1/2 per cent. of all the assessments which should be made upon the premises during the term; and it was further provided by the lease that all the docks, piers, and filling put on them during that time, should remain without payment, and that the lessor should have the option to take and retain on the land the buildings and other structures put thereon by the lessee, by paying one-half of the value they would have at the end of the term. The defendants Oakley and Rutherford testified that they had no knowledge of the terms of the lease, and had received no information from their brother in that respect at the time they made the sale; and that they were not aware of the advisory provision in their father's will that the property be not sold until his youngest child came of age, which time had not arrived when this sale was made. It appears that the brother was advised of the lease and its provisions, and it may be inferred that he understood something of the purpose...