Business Modeling Techniques, Inc. v. General Motors Corp. (Pontiac Motor Div.)
| Decision Date | 20 April 1984 |
| Citation | 123 Misc.2d 605,474 N.Y.S.2d 258 |
| Parties | BUSINESS MODELING TECHNIQUES, INC., Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION (PONTIAC MOTOR DIVISION), Piehler Pontiac Corporation, and Lou Holtz Buick, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
This action was brought by plaintiff to recover damages for an alleged breach of warranty involving a 1982 Pontiac automobile. Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, which motion was denied because of the existence of questions of fact as to the cause of plaintiff's damages. Defendant General Motors Corporation cross-moved for an order dismissing or granting summary judgment as to plaintiff's claim for attorneys' fees under the Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (1976).
In support of its cross-motion, defendant General Motors Corporation contends that plaintiff is not a consumer as defined in the Act since it was a lessee rather than a buyer of the automobile in question. It further claims that the automobile is not a "consumer good" as defined in the Act. Plaintiff argues that a lessee is considered a "consumer" and that an automobile, even though used in part for business purposes, is considered a "consumer product" under the Act.
The Magnuson-Moss Act provides that a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a warrantor to comply with a written or implied warranty may bring suit for damages and equitable relief, and, if successful, may recover attorneys' fees and costs as part of the judgment. A consumer is defined as a buyer of any consumer product, any person to whom such product is transferred during the duration of an implied or written warranty applicable to the product and any other who is entitled by the terms of such warranty or under applicable state law to enforce against the warrantor the obligations of the warranty. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3) (1976).
Clearly the automobile was transferred to plaintiff during the period in which the warranty was in effect. However, defendant contends that plaintiff, being a corporation, was not a "person" to whom the automobile was transferred. This argument, carried to its logical conclusion, would likewise exclude defendant General Motors Corporation from the operation of the Act, since warrantors are also defined as persons. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(4)(5); 16 C.F.R. 701.1(f)(g) (1983). Such a narrow interpretation that the Act applies only to natural persons cannot have been intended in view of the broad purpose of the Act to protect the value in the use of warranted goods and to provide a prompt and effective remedy in the event of a breach. See C. Reitz, Consumer Protection Under The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 129 (1978).
Although the Act defines warranties in the context of sales of products, it goes on to expressly extend its provisions to those to whom the product is transferred. The right to sue under the Act is also given to the person in possession of the product during the period in which the warranty is in effect, whether or not that person is the buyer of the product. This Court concludes that plaintiff is a consumer entitled to invoke the protections of the Magnuson-Moss Act.
In order to state a viable cause of action, plaintiff must also establish that the automobile in question is a consumer product. The Act defines consumer product as any tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal, family or household purposes. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1). The regulations promulgated under the Act further amplify this definition:
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