Murphy v. Duffy

Decision Date02 April 1924
Docket NumberNo. 620.,620.
PartiesMURPHY v. DUFFY, Town Treasurer, et al.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

Vincent and Stearns, JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from Superior Court, Kent County; Chester W. Barrows, Judge.

Suit by John F. Murphy against Frank P. Duffy, Town Treasurer, and others, for injunction. Decree for complainant, and respondents appeal. Reversed, and remanded with directions.

George H. Huddy, Jr., and Huddy, Emerson & Moulton, all of Providence, for appellant John F. McCusker.

Quinn, Kernan & Quinn, of Providence, for certain other appellants.

Alexander L. Churchill and John F. Murphy, both of Providence, for appellee.

SWEETLAND, C. J. The above-entitled cause is a suit in equity in which the complainant, a taxpayer of the town of West Warwick, seeks to restrain the respondent Frank P. Duffy, town treasurer of said town, from paying any of the money of said town to the respondent John F. McCusker, on account of a contract between said McCusker and a committee, appointed by a special town meeting of said town, to provide two new schoolrooms to be added to the school building of the town, in the village of Phenix.

The cause was heard upon bill, answer, replications, and proof before a justice of the superior court. The justice ordered the entry of a final decree restraining said town treasurer from making further payment to the respondent McCusker on account of said contract. The cause is before us upon the respondents' appeal.

At the hearing before said justice the respondents sought to introduce the report of the school committee of West Warwick made to the financial town meeting of the town held in 1921, asking for additional school facilities in the village of Phenix, Riverpolnt, and Crompton, and recommending the enlargement of the present Phenix school building. This evidence was excluded. It does, however, sufficiently appear that previous to or at the financial town meeting of 1922 the need of such added school facilities in Phenix had been brought to the attention of the taxpayers of the town.

At the financial town meeting in 1922 a committee was appointed "to investigate the reported need of added school facilities at Phenix:, Crompton, and Riverpoint." At a special financial town meeting held on July 1, 1922, this committee, which we will hereafter designate as the special committee, made its report to the taxpayers. In that report the committee recommended that land be acquired by the town and added to the schoolyard at Phenix, and that a second story be added to a portion of the existing school building at Phenix, thereby providing two additional schoolrooms. The special financial town meeting adopted the recommendations of the special committee and empowered it to build another story on the Phenix school, to furnish the two additional rooms thus provided, and to acquire additional land for the schoolyard. The special financial town meeting appropriated $15,000 to be expended for those purposes upon the orders of the special committee. In conformity with the vote of the town meeting, the special committee purchased additional land for the schoolyard, had plans prepared for the additional schoolrooms, advertised for bids for the construction of said rooms, and contracted with the respondent McCusker for doing the work at the price of $11,000. In the latter part of July, 1922, the respondent McCusker commenced work under the contract and continued until some time after September 11, 1922. He stopped work because the town treasurer refused to pay to him, McCusker, the orders drawn in his favor by the special committee in accordance with said contract. It appears by the evidence that, at the time of the refusal by the town treasurer, the work under the contract remaining to be performed amounted in value to about $1,000, and required about 7 days to complete.

With reference to the powers of school committees, it is provided by chapter 1521, Pub. Laws 1917, now section 3, c. 70, Gen. Laws 1923, as follows:

"See. 3. The school committee shall locate all schoolhouses, and shall not abandon or change the location of any without good cause; and unless otherwise provided by special law or charter, said school committee of each town shall have the care and control of all public school buildings and other public school property of the town, including repairs of said buildings and the purchase of furniture and other school equipment."

It is claimed by this complainant that, if the construction of the two schoolrooms in question should be regarded as a repair of the existing school building at Phenix, the making of such repair was under the exclusive care and control of the school committee of West Warwick, and, if said construction should be regarded as the building of a schoolhouse, the authority to locate the same was exclusively in the school committee, and further that the evidence fails to disclose any formal action taken by the school committee, appearing in its records, authorizing or permitting such construction or the location of said schoolrooms.

No question is raised as to the authority of the town and of this committee to purchase additional land to be added to the schoolyard in Phenix; also the committee has in no way sought to exercise the authority which the taxpayers intended to confer upon them to provide furniture for the two new schoolrooms. It is conceded by these respondents that in accordance with the statute the power to purchase school furniture and equipment is exclusively in the school committee.

We will consider the nature of the work provided for in the contract between the special committee and McCusker. We regard it as a contract for new construction to furnish additional school facilities for the town. It was not for repairs upon the old school building, save in some minor particulars. While control of repairs upon existing school buildings is given to the school committee, it is provided by section 3, c. 66, Pub. Laws 1909, now section 2, c. 69, General Laws 1923, as follows:

"Sec. 2. Any town may vote, in a meeting notified for that purpose, to provide schoolhouses, together with the necessary fixtures and appendages thereof."

Under this section, the building of a new schoolhouse in a town and the expenditure of money appropriated for that purpose is in the jurisdiction of the town meeting and not of the school committee. Any new schoolhouse, however, erected by the town meeting, acting through its designated agent, would not be available for school purposes unless the school committee should designate a site or the site designated by the town meeting should receive the approval of the school committee. In view of the evident intention of the Legislature that the school committee, by reason of its superior information as to the needs of the schools, should fix the location of all school facilities, we think the making of the two new rooms in question, although they were added to an existing schoolhouse, should be regarded as coming within the designation of a "school-house" in the statutory provision giving to school committees the authority to "locate all schoolhouses." These rooms should also be regarded as a schoolhouse, which under the statute the town meeting, acting through the special committee, had power to build.

This complainant as a taxpayer should not be granted an injunction unless he establishes that the town treasurer is about to expend the town's money in payment upon a contract which is ultra vires of the town meeting, acting through the special committee, or upon a contract which is illegal. The providing of new school facilities was within the scope of the town meeting's powers. It could not, however, force such facilities upon the school committee until that committee had approved of their location. The school committee might have designated the location before the town meeting acted, or that committee might approve the location after it had been designated by the town meeting in the vote to build, as was held in Howland v. School District, 15 R. I. 184, 2 Atl. 549, 8 Atl. 337, or the school committee might effectually approve the location of such new facilities after they had been constructed by the special committee. This was recognized by the superior court in its final decree.

In support of his position the complainant cites the cases of Dube v. Peck, 22 R. I. 443, 48 Atl. 477, and Dube v. Dixon, 27 R. I. 114, 60 Atl. 834. Each of those cases relate to the building of a schoolhouse in Bristol. In neither was the plaintiff entitled to recover whether the contract to build upon a location not approved by the school committee was considered as ultra vires or not. The opinions set out the well-recognized principles that a person dealing with the agent of a municipal corporation is bound to ascertain the limits of such agent's authority, and that, under the statute, school committees alone have authority to locate schoolhouses. The precise question, however, as to the propriety of granting an injunction on the bill of a taxpayer in such circumstances as are presented here was not before the court. The complainant also relies upon Austin v. Coggeshall, 12 R. I. 329, 34 Am. Rep. 648. The situation presented by the facts in that case is quite different from that before us. In that case, upon the complaint of taxpayers of Newport, the treasurer of that city was restrained from making payments upon a contract made by a committee of the city council in a matter admitted to be entirely outside the scope of the authority of the city council. On this phase, this case appears to resemble somewhat that before the court in Mathewson v. Tripp, 14 R. I. 587. It there appeared that the statute creating the board of public works in Providence provided that the board might employ necessary agents and agree with them as to compensation—

"provided, however, that when such compensation shall exceed the sum of $1,000 per annum such...

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12 cases
  • Panzarella v. Boyle
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
    • December 22, 1975
    ...(1923). For example, the municipality has no voice in a school committee's choice for the location of its schoolhouses, Murphy v. Duffy, 46 R.I. 210, 124 A. 103 (1924); or its decision on school employees' salaries, Bailey v. Duffy, supra; Hardy v. Lee, 36 R.I. 302, 90 A. 383 (1914); to mak......
  • Romano v. RETIREMENT BD. OF EMPLOYEES'
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    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • February 19, 2001
    ...II, 689 A.2d at 392 (citing Vieira v. Jamestown Bridge Commission, 91 R.I. 350, 358, 163 A.2d 18, 23 (1960); Murphy v. Duffy, 46 R.I. 210, 215-16, 124 A. 103, 105 (1924)). Indeed, to rule otherwise would undermine the integrity and structure of our state government because it would allow ev......
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    ...well supported by authority." See, also, Sherman v. Carr, 8 R.I. 431; Austin v. Coggeshall, 12 R.I. 329, 34 Am.Rep. 648; Murphy v. Duffy, 46 R. I. 210, 124 A. 103. The precise question as to whether a taxpayer, acting in his individual capacity, may maintain a suit to enjoin a state agency ......
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    ...R.I. 437, 35 A. 526; McTwiggan v. Hunter, 19 R.I. 265, 33 A. 5, 29 L.R.A. 526; Ecroyd v. Coggeshall, 21 R.I. 1, 41 A. 260; Murphy v. Duffy, 46 R.I. 210, 124 A. 103. In each of those cases, however, it was clear that a substantial property right in the taxpayers was necessarily involved and ......
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