Dade County, Fla. v. Alvarez

• Citation: 124 F.3d 1380
• Decision Date: 16 October 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-4470,96-4470
• Parties: 134 Lab.Cas. P 33,597, 4 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 225, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 623 DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, A Political Subdivision, Petitioners-Appellants, Florida Sheriff's Association, Amicus Curiae, v. Jose ALVAREZ, Andrew Benjamin, Ted Bradley, Peter Caroddo, Paul Chahal, et al., Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Page 1380

124 F.3d 1380

134 Lab.Cas. P 33,597, 4 Wage & Hour Cas.2d

(BNA) 225,

11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 623

DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, A Political Subdivision, Petitioners-Appellants Florida Sheriff's Association, Amicus Curiae, v. Jose ALVAREZ, Andrew Benjamin, Ted Bradley, Peter Caroddo Paul Chahal, et al., Respondents-Appellees.

No. 96-4470.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Oct. 16, 1997.

Robert A. Ginsburg, Carol A. Anderson, Thomas A. T. Ronzetti, Lee Kraftchick, Miami, FL, for Petitioners-Appellants.

Phillip P. Quaschnick, Powers, Quaschnick, Tischler & Evans, Tallahassee, FL, for Amicus Curiae.

Joseph H. Kaplan, Kaplan & Bloom, PA, Coral Gables, FL, Robert W. Turken, Richard B. Simring, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, Miami, FL, for Respondents-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge, and KRAVITCH and WOOD ^*, Senior Circuit Judges.

KRAVITCH, Senior Circuit Judge:

Several current and former members of the Metro-Dade Police Department's Special Response Team ("SRT") brought this action against Dade County (the "County") under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. ("FLSA" or the "Act"), to recover overtime pay for off-duty hours spent performing physical fitness training. After a jury verdict in their favor, the district court entered judgment for the SRT officers. Because we conclude that physical training conducted off duty by SRT officers in order to maintain physical fitness standards mandated by their employer is not compensable work within the meaning of the FLSA, we reverse the judgment of the district court. ¹

I.

The SRT is a specialized unit of the Metro-Dade Police Department that assists police department personnel and other government agencies during potentially life-threatening situations. Its officers are highly trained in the use of special weapons, equipment, and techniques designed to minimize the risk of harm to officers and civilians in situations involving barricaded subjects, snipers, hostages, riots or other similar civil disturbances, and high-risk search and arrest warrants. Because SRT call-outs often require extreme physical exertion, involve serious risk to human life, and can last as long as twenty-four hours, "[g]ood physical fitness is recognized as a vital and necessary quality for individuals assigned to SRT." ²

For this reason, the County requires SRT officers to be in excellent physical condition. Prospective SRT personnel must pass a physical fitness examination before enrolling in the SRT training school. At the training school, SRT trainees undergo rigorous cardiovascular and strength training. Once members of the SRT, officers are frequently monitored to ensure that they are physically capable of performing SRT functions. Until recently, SRT supervisors tested the cardiovascular condition and strength of incumbent officers twice a year, and officers who failed this fitness exam were subject to reassignment outside the SRT. ³

At the time this lawsuit was filed in April 1994, SRT officers rotated between two weeks on primary status, during which they trained in SRT tactics and responded to calls for SRT assistance, and two weeks on warrant status, in which they served felony arrest warrants on high-risk individuals. ⁴ When on primary status, SRT officers were allotted two hours of on-duty physical fitness training each day, which they used to conduct long-distance runs, weight training, and calisthenics. ⁵ Prior to 1990, SRT members also were permitted to train on duty twice a week for two hours during the warrant cycle. Since 1990, however, the SRT has not allotted any on-duty physical training time for officers on warrant status. ⁶

Notwithstanding the restriction on on-duty training during the warrant cycle, SRT officers were expected to maintain their physical conditioning at all times. SRT supervisors instructed officers that they had to stay in shape regardless of whether they had adequate on-duty training time. For example, one SRT officer testified: "I have been told by my supervisors that it would be necessary and beneficial for me to work out in an off-duty status to maintain my physical fitness to get the job done." ⁷ An SRT Team Leader testified that he told his officers that "they had to continue to do their physical training whether they had the time on duty, and if they didn't ... that they would have to do it on their own time." ⁸ Other officers testified that off-duty training during the warrant cycle was necessary to maintain the level of fitness required for the job. In addition, expert witnesses testified that off-duty training was necessary during the warrant cycle because, without it, officers would suffer detraining and lose the endurance and performance abilities necessary for the SRT assignment.

Although SRT supervisors instructed officers to do whatever was necessary to maintain adequate cardiovascular and strength levels for the SRT assignment, they never directed officers to engage in any specific off-duty routine or training. The County required only that the officers remained in adequate shape to perform SRT functions and pass the physical fitness exam. The method, location, and amount of off-duty training were left to the officers' complete discretion. As one officer testified: "We are not told that we have to do weight training or we have to do running off duty." ⁹ Another stated: "Off duty I train when I like, where I like, as long as I like, with in the back of my mind the importance of getting my job done." ¹⁰

II.

Appellees brought this action alleging, inter alia, that the County violated the FLSA by refusing to compensate them for the hours they spent exercising off duty. ¹¹ At the conclusion of trial, the district court submitted a special verdict to the jury, which made the following factual determinations:

1. Plaintiffs' off-duty physical training or exercise is required or controlled by the County;

2. Plaintiffs' off-duty physical training or exercise is performed predominantly for the benefit of the County;

3. Plaintiffs' off-duty physical training is an integral and indispensable part of their principal activities as SRT officers; and

4. Dade County either knew, or showed reckless disregard for the fact, that its conduct violated the FLSA.

The district court then entered judgment for appellees, concluding that the SRT officers' off-duty physical training is compensable work under the FLSA and that the County willfully violated the Act. After denying the County's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law made pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), the district court certified for immediate appeal the question of whether appellees' off-duty exercise constitutes compensable work under the FLSA. ¹² We granted the County's petition for leave to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

We review the district court's denial of the County's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo, applying the same legal standard as the district court. Shukla v. BP Exploration & Oil, Inc., 115 F.3d 849, 851 (11th Cir.1997). The question of whether a particular set of facts and circumstances constitutes work under the FLSA is a question of law. Birdwell v. City of Gadsden, Ala., 970 F.2d 802, 807 (11th Cir.1992). As we stated in Birdwell, "[i]t is for the court to determine if a set of facts gives rise to liability; it is for the jury to determine if those facts exist." Id. at 808. The County is thus entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the facts, as interpreted in the light most favorable to the SRT officers, afford no basis for finding that their off-duty exercise constitutes work for the purposes of the FLSA.

III.

Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 to "guarantee either regular or overtime compensation for all actual work or employment." Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597, 64 S.Ct. 698, 703, 88 L.Ed. 949 (1944). The FLSA generally requires employers to pay overtime for "employment in excess of [forty hours] at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which [the employee] is employed." 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). By not providing a definition of "work" or "employment" in the FLSA, Congress left it to the courts to determine which employment-related activities are compensable under the Act.

Generally, courts have construed work to mean all activities "controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of his employer and his business." Muscoda, 321 U.S. at 598, 64 S.Ct. at 703 (holding that underground travel to iron ore mines was compensable work). Whether an off-duty activity is conducted predominately for the benefit of the employer depends on the degree to which an employee's freedom is undermined by the work-related activity. "[I]t is clear that an employee's free time must be severely restricted for off-time to be construed as work time for purposes of the FLSA." Birdwell, 970 F.2d at 810 (holding that on-call waiting time was not compensable because "detectives' off-time was not so restricted that it was not used predominately for their benefit"); see also Avery v. City of Talladega, Ala., 24 F.3d 1337, 1347 (11th Cir.1994) (holding that meal time was not compensable because officers "are free to spend their meal breaks in any way they wish so long as they remain in uniform, leave their radios on, and do not leave the jurisdiction").

The Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 251 et seq., further provides that no employer shall be liable under the FLSA for activities which are "preliminary to or postliminary to" the principal activity or activities which the employee is employed to perform. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2). Activities performed before or after the regular work shift are thus compensable under the FLSA only if they "are an integral and indispensable part of the principal...