Long v. Long
| Citation | 125 S.W.2d 1034 |
| Decision Date | 15 March 1939 |
| Docket Number | No. 7209.,7209. |
| Parties | LONG v. LONG et al. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Texas |
Proceeding in the matter of the probate of the will of Mrs. Martha I. Long, deceased, wherein Frances Mae Long filed a contest to the application for probate. From a judgment in favor of the contestant, Frank O. Long and others appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. To review a judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, 98 S.W.2d 236, reversing the judgment of the district court and rendering judgment for Frank O. Long and others, Francis Mae Long brings error.
Judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, and cause remanded to the Court of Civil Appeals, with instructions.
Thompson, Knight, Baker & Harris and Rhodes S. Baker, all of Dallas, for plaintiff in error.
Fred H. Minor, of Denton, and W. F. Bane and Storey, Sanders, Sherrill & Armstrong, all of Dallas, for defendants in error.
This cause originated in the County Court of Dallas County, Texas, sitting in matters probate. Frank O. Long et al. made application to probate a certain instrument as the last will and testament of Mrs. Martha Long, deceased. Such probate was resisted by Frances Mae Long, a granddaughter of the deceased. The will was admitted to probate in the county court. Miss Long appealed to the district court, where trial de novo was had. The trial in the district court, with the aid of a jury, resulted in a verdict and judgment for the contestant, Miss Long. Frank O. Long et al. appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals at Dallas, but the case was transferred to the Court of Civil Appeals at El Paso on the equalization of the dockets of such courts. On final hearing in the El Paso Court of Civil Appeals, the judgment of the district court was reversed, and judgment rendered for Frank O. Long et al. In other words, judgment was rendered admitting the will to probate. Tex. Civ.App., 98 S.W.2d 236. The case is before the Supreme Court on writ of error granted on application of the contestant, Miss Long.
The record shows that probate of this will was resisted by Miss Long on two grounds: First, lack of testamentary capacity; and, second, undue influence alleged to have been exercised over the testatrix by Frank O. Long. The jury found that Mrs. Long possessed testamentary capacity at the time the will was signed, but that the will was the product of undue influence.
It is impossible to lay down any hard and fast rule, or rules, which will accurately govern the question as to whether a given record contains affirmative probative evidence of undue influence. All that we can do is to announce certain general rules of law, and then in this case, as in all cases, apply such rules to the facts in the record. Law is not an exact mathematical science. No two cases are alike. Each case must stand on its own bottom as to the legal sufficiency of the facts proven. In spite of this, there are certain well-known rules of law which govern in cases of undue influence. We deem it expedient to here announce those which we think control this case.
1. It is not possible to frame a definition of undue influence which embraces all forms and phases of the term. Every case is different from every other case, and must depend largely on its own facts and circumstances. Generally speaking, undue influence is such influence or dominion as exercised at the time, under the facts and circumstances of the case, which destroys the free agency of the testator, and substitutes in the place thereof the will of another. Undue influence has also been defined as that dominion acquired by one person over the mind of another which prevents the latter from exercising his discretion, and which destroys his free agency. Also, undue influence has been defined as "that which compels the testator to do that which is against his will from fear, the desire of peace, or some feeling which he is unable to resist." 42 Tex.Jur., p. 792, sec. 2, and authorities there cited.
2. It cannot be said that every influence exerted by one person over the mind of another is undue. The influence is not undue unless the free agency of the testator has been destroyed, and a will produced that such testator did not desire to make. 42 Tex.Jur., p. 793, sec. 4.
3. In will cases, after mental capacity has been shown, the burden of proving undue influence is on the party contesting the probate of the will. Hart v. Hart, Tex.Civ.App., 110 S.W. 91.
4. It is rarely possible to prove undue influence by what is generally known as direct testimony. Undue influence is usually a subtle thing, and by its very nature it usually involves an extended course of dealings and circumstances. Usually a person charging undue influence must substantiate such charges by circumstances extending over a considerable length of time. It is therefore the settled rule that undue influence can be established by what is known as circumstantial, as well as direct, evidence. Besteiro v. Besteiro, Tex.Com. App., 65 S.W.2d 759; Bergstedt v. Bender, Tex.Com.App., 222 S.W. 547.
5. Undue influence and mental incapacity are two distinct grounds for avoiding a will. Undue influence in its essential elements has no real relation to mental incapacity. Mental incapacity implies the lack of intelligent mental power; while undue influence implies within itself the existence of a mind of sufficient mental capacity to make a will, if not hindered by the dominant or overriding influence of another in such a way as to make the instrument speak the will of the person exercising undue influence, and not that of the testator. Scott v. Townsend, 106 Tex. 322, 166 S.W. 1138.
6. In spite of the rule just announced, weakness of mind and body, whether produced by infirmities of age or by disease or otherwise, may be considered as a material circumstance in determining whether or not a person was in a condition to be susceptible to undue influence. 42 Tex.Jur., p. 796.
7. A person of sufficient mental capacity to make a will has a right to devise his property as he may see fit, so long as he transgresses no law. Also, a person in making a will rests under no legal obligation to devise his property according to the laws of descent and distribution, or according to any moral law, and the mere fact that a testator has ignored such laws is no ground for setting aside his will. In spite of this, however, the fact that a testator has left a will that is unnatural in its terms, and makes a difference between those who, according to natural law, ought to stand equal as to his bounty, may be considered as a circumstance along with other circumstances in determining whether or not the will was a product of undue influence.
Measured by the above rules, we come now to consider whether this record is entirely bare of facts which would justify the rejection of this will as a product of undue influence exercised over the mind of the testatrix by Frank O. Long. Bear in mind that the jury has found such undue influence. We must therefore indulge the presumption that the jury believed and accepted all probative evidence tending to sustain its verdict.
The record before us shows that Mrs. Long signed this will on December 12, 1927, and that she died on ...
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