Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp.

• Decision Date: 03 January 1994
• Docket Number: No. 92-1816,92-1816
• Citation: 13 F.3d 76
• Parties: Eric Esher SCHMID v. MILWAUKEE ELECTRIC TOOL CORPORATION Eric Schmid, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 76

13 F.3d 76

Eric Esher SCHMID v. MILWAUKEE ELECTRIC TOOL CORPORATION

Eric Schmid, Appellant.

No. 92-1816.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued June 21, 1993.

Decided Jan. 3, 1994.

Sur Petition for Rehearing Feb. 9, 1994.

Richard Frumer (argued), Frumer & Etkin, Philadelphia, PA, for appellant.

Richard W. Hollstein, James H. Pickering, Jr. (argued), Clark, Ladner, Fortenbaugh & Young, Philadelphia, PA, for appellee.

Before: STAPLETON, MANSMANN and HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:

In this products liability action, plaintiff appeals from a grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). The primary issue raised is whether the district court erred by striking the testimony of plaintiff's expert witness in its entirety on the ground that the expert altered the allegedly defective product during the course of his examination. Because we conclude that the district court's decision constituted reversible error, we will reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

On August 31, 1990, a co-worker of plaintiff Eric Schmid was using a circular saw manufactured by defendant Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation ("Electric Tool") to cut wooden forms for concrete steps. Schmid was holding the board as his co-worker cut. Allegedly, with no warning, the saw "kicked back" and severely cut Schmid's hand, causing permanent injury. Schmid theorizes that the saw suffered from a design defect: the guard was prevented from properly snapping back over the blade by debris collected in the guard mechanism.

Following the accident, Schmid's counsel sent the saw in question to an expert, Dr. Jeffrey Bratspies, for examination. According to his videotaped deposition, Dr. Bratspies noted that the guard was closing sluggishly and that there was a grating noise. He disassembled the guard to find out why. This disassembly, according to Bratspies, revealed particles trapped in the guard mechanism, some of which fell out during the course of the examination. Some of the trapped particles had caused scoring of the metal on the mating areas of the blade guard. Dr. Bratspies took photos of the assembled saw, the disassembled saw, the scoring, and the debris and the disassembled saw was then forwarded to Electric Tool's expert. Upon reassembly by that expert, the saw apparently worked properly; the guard snapped back as it was designed to do.

During cross examination of Dr. Bratspies, the following colloquy occurred:

Q. Now, as I understand it, you--you took the blade off and you--you took the guard apart. Am I correct?

A. I removed the guard, yes.

Q. And there were some particles that fell out and that sort of thing?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you--were you aware that if any other expert was to look at the saw that they would be unable to examine the saw as you examined it because of the way you disassembled the saw?

A. Yes. That was a--a judgment on my part. I felt that it was important to determine what was causing the--the problem. And after I disassembled the saw I left it in a disassembled condition. I did not reassemble it. And it was then taken back by other people, presumably, to investigate in--in--in exactly the condition that I had disassembled it.

Q. Okay. You did--you did realize that by disassembling it you were, in effect, altering the condition of it and its performance as compared with the condition in which you had received it?

A. Yes. Except that it was a transient condition at best because even as I was handling it there were particles that were falling out of it and its performance--its behavior was changing.

App. 209-10.

At trial, Dr. Bratspies's videotaped deposition, as well as the photos that he took, were initially introduced into evidence. Dr. Bratspies testified that the guard design allowed particles to interfere with the proper closing of the guard and that a seal over the guard would have prevented this problem. He opined that the saw was therefore defective and that absent this defect, Schmid would not have been injured.

Electric Tool moved to strike Dr. Bratspies's testimony, the photographs and the saw. It argued that, by disassembling the guard and not preserving the particles which The district court found merit in these arguments and granted the motion:

fell out of the guard mechanism, Dr. Bratspies destroyed evidence, thereby prejudicing the defense. Electric Tool also complained that Dr. Bratspies neither timed how long it took the allegedly sluggish guard to close nor videotaped it closing before he disassembled it.

[T]he defendant was denied any opportunity for a fair chance to examine the saw as to its condition at the time of the accident.... [T]he expert testified as to the condition of the saw at the time of the accident and the defendant was never in a position where it could respond to that testimony.... [I]t would be grossly unfair ... to allow one side to present that kind of testimony and not have the other side be in a similar position to do so.

App. at 153-55.

Because this evidentiary decision deprived plaintiff of sufficient evidence to support his theory of the case, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant. Schmid filed this timely appeal. ¹

II.

There is some disagreement in this case as to whether the district court's decision to strike the saw and Dr. Bratspies's testimony from evidence was one made as a matter of substantive Pennsylvania products liability law or federal evidentiary law. There is some authority suggesting that spoliation of evidence, and the sanctions that such spoliation may give rise to, are matters appropriately governed by state law. See, e.g., Mensch v. Bic Corp., 1992 WL 236965 (E.D.Pa.1992) (applying Pennsylvania law); Lee v. Boyle-Midway Household Products, Inc., 792 F.Supp. 1001, 1005 (W.D.Pa.1992) (applying Pennsylvania law). On the other hand, there is also authority suggesting that the possible preclusion of evidence in cases such as this is governed by federal law as part of the inherent power of a district court to sanction parties. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2132-33, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (recognizing inherent power of a district court to sanction parties in appropriate cases); Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 986 F.2d 263, 267 (8th Cir.1993) (recognizing the inherent power of a district court to sanction parties for destruction of evidence by, inter alia, excluding testimony); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Engineering & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 368 (9th Cir.1992) (same). The parties have referred us to no case law, however, suggesting that the applicable federal and state law are materially different. Because we conclude that the district court's decision exceeded the appropriate bounds of its discretion under either federal or state law, we need not resolve the choice of law question.

III.

Since the early 17th century, courts have admitted evidence tending to show that a party destroyed evidence relevant to the dispute being litigated. Jamie S. Gorelick, Steven Marzen and Lawrence Solum, Destruction of Evidence, Sec. 2.1 (1989). Such evidence permitted an inference, the "spoliation inference," that the destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the position of the offending party. As Judge Breyer put it in Nation-wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distributors, Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218 (1st Cir.1982), "the evidentiary rationale [for the spoliation inference] is nothing more than the common sense observation that a party who has notice that [evidence] is relevant to litigation and who proceeds to destroy [evidence] is more likely to have been threatened by [that evidence] than is a party in the same position who does not destroy the document." As Judge Breyer also noted, the spoliation inference is also seen as having "prophylactic and punitive effects." Id. The admissibility of spoliation evidence and the propriety of the spoliation inference is well established in most jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. See e.g., Nation-wide Check Corp., 692 F.2d 214 (1st Cir.1982); Mensch v. Bic Corp., 1992 WL 236965 (E.D.Pa.1992) (citing Pennsylvania cases); Gorelick, et al., supra, Sec. 2.24.

The district court here invoked a sanction far more serious than the spoliation inference. It barred all evidence emanating from Dr. Bratspies's observations and thereby deprived Schmid of any opportunity to prove his case. While we do not doubt the inherent authority of a district court to impose such a drastic sanction in an appropriate case, we conclude that this was not such a case. We believe the key considerations in determining whether such a sanction is appropriate should be: (1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or destroyed the evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing party; and (3) whether there is a lesser sanction that will avoid substantial unfairness to the opposing party and, where the offending party is seriously at fault, will serve to deter such conduct by others in the future. See e.g., Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 986 F.2d 263 (8th Cir.1993); S.D.I. Operating Partnership, L.B. v. Neuwirth, 973 F.2d 652 (8th Cir.1992); Gorelick, et al., supra, Sec. 3.16, p. 117 ("To fulfill the purposes of discovery sanctions ...--that is, to restore the accuracy of the trial, compensate innocent victims, and punish guilty spoliators--courts select the least onerous sanction corresponding to the willfulness of the destructive act and the prejudice suffered by the victim.") An analysis in this case sensitive to these considerations does not support the judgment of the district court.

Dr. Bratspies did not destroy the allegedly defective product. This fact alone distinguishes most of the cases in which plaintiffs have been deprived of the use of evidence necessary to prove their claims. ² All...