Trevino v. Ortega
Decision Date | 03 July 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 97-0280,97-0280 |
Citation | 969 S.W.2d 950 |
Parties | 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 907 Jorge H. TREVINO, M.D., individually and d/b/a McAllen Maternity Clinic, Petitioner, v. Genaro ORTEGA, individually and a/n/f of Linda Ortega, a minor, Respondent. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Thomas F. Nye, Diana L. Faust, Corpus Christi, Diana L. Faust, Dallas, Linda C. Breck, Corpus Christi, R. Brent Cooper, Dallas, for Petitoner.
Ricky J. Poole, Randall C. Jackson, Jr., San Antonio, for Respondent.
The issue in this case is whether this Court should recognize an independent cause of action for intentional or negligent spoliation of evidence by parties to litigation. 1 The court of appeals held that Texas recognizes a cause of action for evidence spoliation. 938 S.W.2d 219, 223. Because we determine that spoliation does not give rise to independent damages, and because it is better remedied within the lawsuit affected by spoliation, we decline to recognize spoliation as a tort cause of action. Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and render judgment that Ortega take nothing.
In 1988, Genaro Ortega, individually and as next friend of his daughter, Linda Ortega, sued Drs. Michael Aleman and Jorge Trevio and McAllen Maternity Clinic for medical malpractice. Ortega alleged that the defendants were negligent in providing care and treatment during Linda's birth in 1974. 2 Discovering that Linda's medical records from the birth had been destroyed, Ortega then sued Dr. Trevio in a separate suit for intentionally, recklessly, or negligently destroying Linda Ortega's medical records from the birth.
It is the appeal from this latter action that is before us. Here, Ortega claims that Trevio had a duty to preserve Linda's medical records and that destroying the records materially interferes with Ortega's ability to prepare his medical malpractice suit. Ortega explains that Aleman, the attending physician, testified that he has no specific recollection of the delivery and, therefore, the missing medical records are the only way to determine the procedures used to deliver Linda. Because the medical records are missing, Ortega's expert cannot render an opinion about Aleman's, the Clinic's, or Trevio's negligence.
Responding to Ortega's spoliation suit, Trevio specially excepted and asserted that Ortega failed to state a cause of action. The trial court sustained Trevio's special exception and gave Ortega an opportunity to amend. But Ortega declined to amend and the trial court dismissed the case. Ortega appealed. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal order and held that Texas recognizes an independent cause of action for evidence spoliation. 938 S.W.2d at 223.
This Court treads cautiously when deciding whether to recognize a new tort. See generally Kramer v. Lewisville Mem'l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 404-06 (Tex.1993); Graff v Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex.1993); Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 600 (Tex.1993). While the law must adjust to meet society's changing needs, we must balance that adjustment against boundless claims in an already crowded judicial system. We are especially averse to creating a tort that would only lead to duplicative litigation, encouraging inefficient relitigation of issues better handled within the context of the core cause of action. We thus decline to recognize evidence spoliation as an independent tort.
A number of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have been hesitant to recognize an independent tort for evidence spoliation for a variety of different reasons. See, e.g., Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 921 F.2d 765, 767 (8th Cir.1990) ( ); Edwards v. Louisville Ladder Co., 796 F.Supp. 966, 970 (W.D.La.1992) ( ); Christian v. Kenneth Chandler Constr. Co., 658 So.2d 408, 412-13 (Ala.1995) ( ); La Raia v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 118, 722 P.2d 286, 289 (1986) ( ); Gardner v. Blackston, 185 Ga.App. 754, 365 S.E.2d 545, 546 (1988) ( ); Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 166 Ill.2d 188, 209 Ill.Dec. 727, 652 N.E.2d 267, 270 (1995) ( ); Murphy v. Target Prods., 580 N.E.2d 687, 690 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) ( ); Monsanto Co. v. Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Ky.1997) ( ); Miller v. Montgomery County, 64 Md.App. 202, 494 A.2d 761, 767-68 (1985) ( ); Panich v. Iron Wood Prods. Corp., 179 Mich.App. 136, 445 N.W.2d 795, 797 (1989) ( ); Brown v. Hamid, 856 S.W.2d 51, 56-57 (Mo.1993) ( ). 3
Evidence spoliation is not a new concept. For years courts have struggled with the problem and devised possible solutions. Probably the earliest and most enduring solution was the spoliation inference or omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorem: all things are presumed against a wrongdoer. See, e.g. Rex v. Arundel, 1 Hob. 109, 80 Eng. Rep. 258 (K.B.1617) (applying the spoliation inference); The Pizarro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 227, 4 L.Ed. 226 (1817) ( ); Brown, 856 S.W.2d at 56 ( ). In other words, within the context of the original lawsuit, the factfinder deduces guilt from the destruction of presumably incriminating evidence.
This traditional response to the problem of evidence spoliation properly frames the alleged wrong as an evidentiary concept, not a separate cause of action. Spoliation causes no injury independent from the cause of action in which it arises. If, in the ordinary course of affairs, an individual destroys his or her own papers or objects, there is no independent injury to third parties. The destruction only becomes relevant when someone believes that those destroyed items are instrumental to his or her success in a lawsuit.
Even those courts that have recognized an evidence spoliation tort note that damages are speculative. See, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal.App.3d 491, 198 Cal.Rptr. 829, 835 (1984); Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 150 Ill.App.3d 248, 103 Ill.Dec. 774, 501 N.E.2d 1312, 1320 (1986). The reason that the damages inquiry is difficult is because evidence spoliation tips the balance in a lawsuit; it does not create damages amenable to monetary compensation.
Our refusal to recognize spoliation as an independent tort is buttressed by an analogous line of cases refusing to recognize a separate cause of action for perjury or embracery. 4 Like evidence spoliation, civil perjury and civil embracery involve improper conduct by a party or a witness within the context of an underlying lawsuit. A number of courts considering the issue have refused to allow the wronged party to bring a separate cause of action for either perjury or embracery. See, e.g., Cooper v. Parker-Hughey, 894 P.2d 1096, 1100 n. 3 (Okla.1995) ( ); OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Howell, 260 Kan. 305, 918 P.2d 1274, 1296 (1996) (embracery); Trudell v. Heilman, 158 Cal.App.3d 251, 204 Cal.Rptr. 551, 553 (1984) ( ); Hoston v. Silbert, 514 F.Supp. 1239, 1241 (D.D.C.1981) (embracery), rev'd on other grounds, 681 F.2d 876 (D.C.Cir.1982). These decisions rely on public policy concerns such as ensuring the finality of judgments, avoiding duplicative litigation, and recognizing the difficulty in calculating damages. Kessler v. Townsley, 132 Fla. 744, 182 So. 232, 232 (1938) (res judicata); OMI, 918 P.2d at 1290, 1293 ( ). Similarly, recognizing a cause of action for evidence spoliation would create an impermissible layering of liability and would allow a plaintiff to collaterally attack an unfavorable judgment with a different factfinder at a later time, in direct opposition to the sound policy of ensuring the finality of judgments.
We share Ortega's concern that, when spoliation occurs, there must be adequate measures to ensure that it does not improperly impair a litigant's rights, but we disagree that the creation of an independent tort is warranted. It is simpler, more practical, and more logical to rectify any improper conduct within the context of the lawsuit in which it is relevant. Indeed, evolving remedies, sanctions and procedures for evidence spoliation are available under Texas jurisprudence. Trial judges have broad discretion to take measures ranging from a jury instruction on the spoliation presumption to, in the most egregious case, death penalty sanctions. See, e.g., Watson v. Brazos Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 918 S.W.2d 639, 643 (Tex.App.--Waco 1996, writ denied) ( ); Ramirez v. Otis Elevator Co., 837 S.W.2d 405, 412 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1992, writ denied) ( ); see also TEX.R. CIV. P. 215(b). As with any discovery abuse or evidentiary issue, there is no one remedy that is appropriate for every incidence of spoliation; the trial court must respond appropriately based upon the particular facts of each individual case.
Ortega also argues that the failure to maintain Linda's medical records violated a statutory duty to...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Patel v. OMH Medical Center, Inc.
... ... 565, 606 A.2d 375 (1992) ; Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 67 Ohio St.3d 28, 615 N.E.2d 1037 (1993) ... 66. Trevino ... 565, 606 A.2d 375 (1992) ; Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 67 Ohio St.3d 28, 615 N.E.2d 1037 (1993) ... 66. Trevino v. Ortega ... ...
-
In re Advanced Modular Power Systems, Inc.
... ... v. Schooley, 984 S.W.2d 654, 666 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist,] 1998, no pet.) (citing Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 954-55 (Tex.1998)) ... 2. Bad Faith ... Pursuant to Fifth Circuit precedent, for ... ...
-
Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc.
... ... 4. See generally Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 955 (Tex.1998) (Baker, J., concurring) (exploring scope of parties' common-law duty to preserve evidence relevant to ... ...
-
Torres v. El Paso Elec. Co.
... ... v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.4th 1, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 954 P.2d 511, 514-21 (1998) ; Monsanto Co. v. Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Ky.1997) ; Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 951-53 (Tex.1998) ; see also Temple Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.4th 464, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 852, 976 P.2d ... ...
-
CHAPTER 4 - 4-4 Work Product
...Co. v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193, 204 (Tex. 1993) (agreeing with and quoting dissenting justices' explanation).[109] Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 956 (Tex. 1998) (quoting Nat'l Tank Co. v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193, 204 (Tex. 1993)). [110] William V. Dorsaneo, III, The History of Te......
-
Discovery
...to the Plaintiff. Ortega v. Trevino , 938 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 1997, writ granted) rev’d by Trevino v. Ortega , 969 S.W.2d 950, 93 (Tex. 1998). In Ortega , the trial court implicitly recognized the tort of intentional and negligent spoliation of evidence. However, in 1......
-
Business Litigation
...by it).] §4:84 Spoliation “Spoliation” is the intentional destruction of tangible evidence relevant to a case. [ Trevino v. Ortega , 969 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1998).] When spoliation is established, the trier of fact may presume that the destroyed evidence was unfavorable to the party responsibl......
-
Table of Cases
...Marketing, Inc., 487 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007), §551.1.1 Trepel v. Roadway Express , 194 F. 3d 708 (6th Cir. 1999), §345A Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1998), §201.1 Trigon Ins. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 282. (E.D. Va. 2001), §243 Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co ., 68 F.3d......