State v. Mann

• Citation: 13 N.C. 263
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decision Date: 31 December 1829
• Parties: STATE v. JOHN MANN.

13 N.C. 263

STATE

v.JOHN MANN.

SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

DECEMBER TERM, 1829

FROM CHOWAN.

1. The master is not liable to an indictment for a battery committed upon his slave.

2. One who has a right to the labor of a slave, has also a right to all the means of controlling his conduct which the owner has.

3. Hence one who has hired a slave is not liable to an indictment for a battery on him, committed during the hiring.

4. But this rule does not interfere with the owner's right to damages for an injury affecting the value of a slave, which is regulated by the law of bailment.

The defendant was indicted for an assault and battery upon Lydia, the slave of one Elizabeth Jones.

On the trial it appeared that the defendant had hired the slave for a year; that during the term the slave had committed some small offense, for which the defendant undertook to chastise her; that while in the act of so doing the slave ran off, whereupon the defendant called upon her to stop, which being refused, he shot at and wounded her.

His Honor, Judge DANIEL, charged the jury that if they believed

the punishment inflicted by the defendant was cruel and unwarrantable, and. disproportionate to the offense committed by the slave, that in law the defendant was guilty, as he had only a special property in the slave. A verdict was returned for the State, and the defendant appealed.

RUFFIN, J. A Judge cannot but lament when such cases as the present are brought into judgment. It is impossible that the reasons on which they go can be appreciated, but where institutions similar to our own exist and are thoroughly understood. The struggle, too, in the Judge's own breast between the feelings of the man and the duty of the magistrate is a severe one, presenting strong temptation to put aside such questions, if it be possible. It is useless, however, to complain of things inherent in our political state. And it is criminal in a Court to avoid any responsibility which the laws impose. With whatever reluctance, therefore, it is done, the Court is compelled to express an opinion upon the extent of the dominion of the master over the slave in North Carolina.

The indictment charges a battery on Lydia, a slave of Elizabeth Jones. Upon the face of the indictment, the case is the same as 8. v. Hall, 9 N. C., 582. No fault is found with the rule then adopted; nor would be, if it were now open. But it is not open; for the question, as it relates to a battery on a slave by a stranger, is considered as settled by that case. But the evidence makes this a different case. Here the slave had been hired by the defendant, and was in his possession; and the battery was committed during the period of hiring. With the liabilities of the hirer to the general owner for an injury permanently impairing the value of the slave no rule now laid down is intended to interfere. That is left upon the general doctrine of bailment. The inquiry here is whether a cruel and unreasonable battery on a slave by the hirer is indictable. The Judge below instructed the jury that it is. He seems to have put it on the ground that the defendant had but a special property. Our laws uniformly treat the master or other person having the possession and command of the slave as entitled to the same extent of authority. The object is the same— the services of the slave; and the same powers must be confided. In a criminal proceeding, and indeed in reference to all other persons but the general owner, the hirer and possessor of a slave, in relation to both rights and duties, is, for the time being, the owner. This opinion would, perhaps, dispose of this particular case; because the indictment, which charges a battery upon the slave of Elizabeth Jones, is not

supported by proof of a battery upon defendant's own slave; since different justifications may be applicable to the two cases. But upon the general question whether the owner is answerable criminaliter for a battery upon his own slave, or other exercise of authority or force not forbidden by statute, the Court entertains but little doubt. That he is so liable has never yet been decided; nor, as far as is known, been hitherto contended. There have been no prosecutions of the sort. The established habits and uniform practice of the country in this respect is the best evidence of the portion of power deemed by the whole community requisite to the preservation of the master's dominion. If we thought differently we could not set our notions in array against the judgment of everybody else, and say that this or that authority may be safely lopped off. This had indeed been assimilated at the bar to the other domestic relations; and arguments drawn from the well-established principles which confer and restrain the authority of the parent over the child, the tutor over the pupil, the master over the apprentice, have been pressed on us. The...